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Regulation and deregulation have become important policy questions dominating 
the analysis of Papua New Guinea's transport sector over the last 10 years. In search of 
solutions to achieve efficiency and low cost transportation, the government has toiled 
hard at understanding the transport industry and the existing institutional arrangements 
prevailing within the system. In doing so, substantial amounts of loan funds have been 
devoted to sectoral studies conducted by consultants to uncover the problems inherent in 
the system. Although these weaknesses are being exposed to scrutiny of the government, 
there is still uncertainty as to where to actually start any reforms. This is not peculiar to 
transport but is relevant to any industry where protectionist attitudes are still 
commonplace. The potential for change is there but initiatives to change are far from 
evident.
The objective of this study is to use consultants' studies and data as base data to 
permit further analysis of areas requiring liberalisation and areas where change is not 
relevant. In the maritime sector of PNG, it is apparent that the market is small and 
geographic factors have resulted in highly segmentalised sector on which licensing and 
pricing policies are in part based. These formal controls have, however, diminished the 
degree of competition along the major trade routes. Similarly, pricing policies which 
contains both a fixed and variable component, are disadvantageous to small shippers. The 
existing situation has been aggravated by discriminatory market integration and collusion 
between major operators. Such constraints have imposed barriers to effective competition 
from independent operators.
It is therefore impossible for these shipping operators, stevedoring operators, 
Harbours Board and the shippers to disentangle themselves from the regulatory 
environment. That is why the existing regulations have been used by some industry 
participants to influence policy changes in ways that have been beneficial to their 
organisations. For others, investment decisions have been forestalled by such 
regulations. As a result, costs have outgrown revenue in sub-sectors and industry 
growth has been lacking.
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1.1 THE PROBLEM AND THE SETTING
The transport problems of many small and remote coastal and island communities 
in Papua New Guinea are in large part a result of the small volume of cargo and numbers 
of passengers such areas are able to offer. These are illustrated in Table 1.1 (Freight 
traffic) and Table 1.2 (Passenger traffic), respectively.
About 70 per cent of the freight tonnage originate from a few places namely Lae, 
Kiunga, Port Moresby, Madang, Rabaul, Kieta in the main ports sub - sector. In the 
coastal and river areas much of the cargo originates from the North Solomons areas. This 
is probably the reason why the shipping capacity is highly concentrated in these areas.
The table shows that the most heavily trafficked routes are Lae, Finschafen, 
Madang, Wewak, Kimbe and Rabaul. Passenger services on these services are provided 
by the Lutheran Shipping Company in competition with the Pacific New Guinea Line 
(PNGL) and the Coastal Shipping Company. Smaller boats are, responsible for 
passenger movements between the inter-island coastal ports and inland areas.
It would therefore appear that traffic to these areas is guided by a variety of 
response mechanisms as well as by changes in traffic intensity and by the spatial features 
of transport services. This situation has affected investment by the private sector and 
impedes the transferability of transport between geographic markets due to 'trade 
incompatibility' in that the transfer of transport capacity can sometimes create an over­
provision of supply. These geographic market boundaries not only limit opportunities 
but create a 'market barrier' protecting existing services. Thus operational economies of 
scale play an important role in the trade routes between the main ports.
Tabla 1.1 Coastal Port to Port Cargo Tonnages (1989)
Origin Port E SepIK Seplk Sandaun New New New New N. Sub






Port Morseby 26,309 355,907
Alotau 4 3,480
Mlslma 858
Oro Bay 687 10,741
Lae 84 46 25 67 926 31 8,381 342,160
Flnschhaten 74 1,940




Klmbe 255 255 12,258
Blalla 129 129 15,418
Rabaul 779 5,912 3,913 4,831 6,827 727 23,300 75,112
Kandrlan 462
Kavleng 94 94 4,490
Lorengau 61 61 5,531
Lihir 347 347 868
Kleta 1,657 1,657 36,150
Buka 5,246











Morobe Coast 1 736
Huon Coast 15 1,087
• Madang Coast 16 483
• East Seplk-Coast 119
jSepIk-River 496
•Sandaun-Coastal 4,211
• Manus 65 47 112 1,149
• New Ireland-S 483 298 781 3,366
j New Ireland-N 15 400 415 2,712
: S.Coast New Britain 859
•N.Coast New Britain 60 60 19,665
North Solomons 908,119
iS ub-To ta i 80 833 34 5 60 1,400 948,729 ......
¡rb'tAts 68,221 Î ,904,064
'SourcîT DOT̂ îriâÎvSÎ5̂ r̂ h]ppïnfiMTrainîîêsSr̂ frainspôrrYoaFBo<ô>K̂ ?995r




















Lae 49 33 1,091 5 64 888 423 560 24,011
Finschhafen 3 230 11,841
Madang 239 143 1,310 16,634
Wewak 911 52 11,258
Vanimo 136 1,239
Aitape 175 281
Kimbe 280 2,183 332 5,861
Blalla 11 19 1,326 1,570
Rabaul 2,512 1,221 15 2,614 13 377 299 9,393
Kandrlan 12 12




























New Ireland-S 45 45
New I reland-N 57 57
S.Coast New Britain 384 647
N.Coast New Britain 6 6
North Solomons 11 43
Sub-Total 503 86 6 ,408
TOTALS 1 ,377 364 3,882 1 ,525 4,261 3,834 1,842 377 1 ,0 89 99 ,174
CO
Source: DO T analysis of shipping manifests. Transport Year Book 1990.
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Inadequate transport services tend to hinder economic growth and development in 
certain areas. Disparities inherent to shipping patterns have diminished social, political 
and economic contact between such areas and major national and regional growth centres 
and this has affected national coherence and unity.
There is also current concern over the extent to which anticipated benefits of port 
investments have been passed onto customers and this is further complicated by the 
Papua New Guinea Harbours Board's 'landlord' relationship with its users. This has 
been put into sharp focus by present pricing policy which is not consistent with norms of 
microeconomic efficiency for resource allocation. The adopted philosophy of 'charge 
what the market will bear' is essentially a form of taxation under which the users of 
certain port facilities subsidise others. According to a 1990 Transport Efficiency Study 
(TES), current wharfage tariffs are equivalent to an annual 2.79 million kina subsidy 
(TES, p.97) and the berthage tariffs are equivalent to an annual 0.46 million kina subsidy 
(ibid, p.97) by overseas to coastal shipping. In addition, most of the Board's ports serve 
different hinterlands and are therefore not comparable. This sometimes erodes the good 
intentions of the Board.
Finally, government regulations have been unable to respond to the changing 
industrial economic conditions. Licensing and price control regulations both have, for 
example, shortcomings which inhibited competition. The 'over-protective' institutions 
inherited from the colonial past have created areas of monopoly in the maritime industry.
Shipper protection is another major objective of regulation, but there is little 
evidence of the actual means by which this is supposed to be achieved. In the end, it has 
usually been existing suppliers who have been protected. This problem has been brought 
into sharp focus when there have been initiatives considered by the government to achieve 
'efficiency and competition', but which have not received the support of the industry. As 
was noted by a World Bank study (volume 1. 1988. p.25), operators are well organised 
and can be expected to resist government efforts to introduce reforms. In some sectors, 
excess capacity already exists largely because of restrictive entry barriers, and any further
5
'injection' of entrants would generate excess capacity in the short run with problems 
expected to occur in safety areas.
It is traditional thinking, however, that small shippers generally feel that 
regulation tends to place them on a more equitable competitive footing vis a vis their 
larger rivals, due mainly to elimination of rebates and loyalty discounts. However, the 
present regulatory provisions do not offer this to such shippers.
As market and cost factors slowly took hold in existing transport operations and 
in future planning, thus interacting with historical realities and existing institutional 
settings , a sort of modus vivendi has evolved in which operators have come to accept 
regulation as inevitable if not desirable. It has been recognised that regulation provides an 
ability to impose favourable and stable rates on large shippers of goods and also on bulk 
shipments. Price control regulation has given suppliers the right to impose a 'rate 
structure' that an individual operator's own economic power may not be able to achieve. 
The problem areas of the maritime sector can be identified as relating to:
i) the main ports and inter-island shipping patterns;
ii) concentrated short sea routes;
iii) port and shipping pricing policies; and
iv) institutional arrangements.
The central objective in this thesis is to examine shipping cost structures, industry 
structures, supply and demand conditions and institutional arrangements. Present 
conditions will be discussed so that policies can be devised to address the difficulties 
identified above. The economic and technological conditions that prescribe, modify and 
influence business decisions in the maritime industry, such as, for example, the licensing 
of ships, will be identified.
Most writings in industrial economics contend that, under rigorous competition, 
pricing in free unregulated markets should, over a period of time, achieve the lowest cost
6
of performing a particular function and that this will prevail. This contention is well 
illustrated by Phillips who asserts that:
'For this and other reasons, the Anglo-Saxon political and legal tradition 
has been to prefer a privately organised economy as long as such an 
economy does not lead to unjust practices. Not surprisingly, therefore, the 
predilection of public policy in countries under the influence of these 
traditions is never to suggest regulation except in instances in which the free 
market is clearly unworkable. Indeed, it has been necessary for the free 
market to be unworkable in both an economic and political sense. In 
keeping with this tradition, one way to improve regulatory practices is to 
eliminate presently existing regulation where it is no longer required or not 
to institute where minor modification in present institutional structures could 
give rise to sufficient competition to serve effectively as an economic 
regulator'. (1965, p. 115)
This suggests why it is important to have a detailed knowledge of the economic 
structure in a regulated industry like Papua New Guinea's maritime industry in order to 
determine the need or lack of it whether regulation in the industry is needed, given that 
regulation is a basic characteristics of the market in which the maritime industry sells its 
services and facilities.
1.2 THE OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY
As indicated previously, the central objective of this thesis is to assess the extent 
of competition within the market structure, to examine regulatory impacts, and to predict 
the industry's probable structure if these competitive forces were released from regulatory 
restraints. Thus the thesis will examine what would happen if transport prices and 
service offerings were dictated by the usual profit considerations that determine decisions 
in a free enterprise economy. Thus, Porter's (1980) framework using inputs derived 
from models by Shepherds (1990) and James et al (1991. p3), will be used in order to 
assess qualitatively the 'competitive situation' of the maritime sector.
The pursuit of this objective will be guided by testing the following hypotheses:
7
i) Present legislation provides more ’incentives' to dominant suppliers than small 
competitors. Favourable insulation apparent in some main port sectors has 
enabled certain operators in creating 'unbreakable' market niches. The result has 
been an extension of certain arrangements and corporate shareholding patterns 
between incumbents with reciprocal problems, and this has lead to the creation of 
monopoly and duopoly situations in certain markets.
There is also the problem of the appropriateness of maritime regulations which 
have not been able, in any effective manner, to reduce the yawning gap between 
large suppliers and small shippers. It is apparent, therefore, that present 
legislation protects currently established suppliers and producers.
ii) The absence of adequate competition reflects a high degree of vertical integration 
and coercive market practices. The restricted size of the market provides ideal 
conditions for horizontal and vertical mergers. These have been so significant that 
they have enhanced combined market shares as well as making effective collusion 
likely. This is reflected in internal and external arrangements between shipping 
companies and their agents, for stevedoring, for freight forwarding, and linkages 
to overland transport companies. This situation has discouraged effective 
competition in the industry. The presence of independent operators suggests that 
the only possible policy option in this market is oligopolistic competition.
This fundamental assumption is validated by the striking presence of oligopolistic 
and collusive behaviour exhibited by shipping and stevedoring companies, which 
control more than 30 per cent of the total market, and which support the 
maintenance of present legislation. This is a dilemma presently facing the 
government of Papua New Guinea.
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iii) In sections of the main ports, inter-island freight and passenger markets, there is 
'free' entry and ’contestability', and hence a high incidence of 'hit and run' may 
possibly occur. It is highly probable this competition may be strong in the inter­
island workboat services and short sea routes (i.e some main ports trade).
iv) The importance of workboat services in the inter-island network is central because 
of the replacement of large vessels by smaller workboats substituting non-stop 
services with multiple stop services.
1.3 OUTLINE OF THE THESIS
This thesis has the following structure. Chapter 2 discusses definitions of 
'regulation', 'competition', and 'privatisation', and the rationale for their adoption is 
reviewed. Chapter 2 also discusses the structure-conduct-performance paradigm and its 
related problems. This leads to a detailed discussion of Porter's 'Extended Rivalry’ 
model. There is also an examination of the characteristics of Shepherd (1990)'s and 
James et al (1991)'s, market models, which overcome some of the inadequacies of 
existing frameworks. Finally, a review of regional and local transport case studies is 
made and there is a discussion of the implications of that review.
Chapter 3 provides an overview of the maritime sector. Chapter 4 examines the 
market structure and the nature of the supply of shipping services. Chapter 5 assesses the 
demand for shipping services and an estimation of buyer demand is made using the 
concept of willingness to pay. Chapter 6 examines the institutional aspects of the maritime 
sector and discusses technological, spatial and institutional substitution.
Chapter 7, provides cost structures for the Harbours Board and shipping 
companies and their pricing behaviour is assessed. A brief cost benefit analysis is taken 
to assess the relationship between shipping costs and freight rates. Chapter 8 discusses 
the market performance of the maritime industry in order to ascertain whether industry 
behaviour has produced desired economic results.
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Chapter 9 presents two significant market practices, namely vertical integration 
and collusion, and their relevance to the industry. Chapter 10 provides a summary, of the 
study and presents its conclusions.
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CHAPTER II
ISSUES OF REGULATION AND DEREGULATION:
A SURVEY Of THE LITERATURE
As indicated in Chapter 1 the aim of this thesis is to assess the impact of 
regulatory practices through the application of economic theory and a market (structure- 
conduct-performance) framework that recognises: structure, supply and demand 
conditions, the institutional and legal aspects of the industry's regulated status, cost 
structures and pricing behaviour, and the contribution of market conduct and economic 
performance, to the efficient allocation of resources in PNG's maritime industry. 
However, the application of this framework requires an understanding of the definition 
and rationale of 'regulation' and 'competition'. The over-riding objective here is to 
establish a perspective for subsequent analysis. Hence, in Section 2.1, a definition of 
'regulation' is presented and various rationales for regulation are reviewed. This is 
followed in section 2.2 by a review of the role of competition and privatisation. The 
various market frameworks developed and applied in the context of competitive analysis 
are considered in Section 2.3.
The final section of this chapter provides a review of case studies of regional and 
domestic significance in the light of the study’s perspective.
2.1 DEFIN ITION OF REGULATION
'Regulation' is public intervention to correct for market failure or to provide a 
substitute for competition. It involves the nomination of a single firm or a selected group 
of existing firms, as society's chosen instrument for performing the service in question. 
Society's reliance on conscious and explicit planning, results in there being monopolists 
or a limited number of selected firms in the industry on one hand and regulatory agencies 
on the other, under the cover of a complicated pattern of privileges, public duties and 
responsibilities. (Phillips 1965; Kahn 1971).
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2 .1 .1 Rationale for Regulation
There are a number of reasons for a government to intervene in an industry. 
These include allocative efficiency considerations such as the control of monopolies, 
externalities, market imperfections and second best concerns; technical efficiency matters 
such as the promotion of competition and prevention of wasteful resource use; destructive 
competition; and safety and equity considerations. (BTCE Paper no. 72,1985).
The orthodox economic rationale for public policy focuses on the circumstances in 
which markets cannot be expected to perform efficiently. There may be imperfect 
information, monopolistic elements, externalities and public goods or situations of market 
failure. As noted in the BTCE paper (1985) and in Ruppenthal and Stanbury (1976), 
public intervention also reflects non-economic considerations such as equity, coherence 
and safety.
Thus, market regulation typically arises when a government feels itself unable to 
achieve objectives which the market is unwilling or unable to deliver. It therefore sets up 
political, administrative and regulatory structures to achieve those objectives. The 
argument remains, however, whether such intervention yields actual improvements - that 
is, whether the gains in terms of a more efficient allocation of resources is greater than the 
costs of intervention and whether economic agents adapt their behaviour to public 
intervention.
Economic justifications for regulatory mechanisms rely, on correcting market 
failures, controlling externalities, and addressing social considerations.
A. Market Failure
Monopoly
Gwilliam and Van de Velde (1990) argue that market failure results from the 
potential for monopoly in the provision of some goods or services. This can arise 
because of some collusive or individual firm effort to suppress competition by 
institutional means. Monopolies granted by the government licensing entry (i.e. a 
licensed monopoly) to one business firm are of this type. Governments have been
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persuaded to offer such protection from competition by the prospect of some generally 
beneficial outcome, such as the assured and steady provision of a service. In other cases, 
a monopoly arises naturally when the cost of providing a service by one producer falls 
continually over the range of the market in question.
The problem with either a natural or artificial monopoly is that the profit 
maximising strategy of the producer does not coincide with the best interests of the 
consumer. Being, in effect, faced with a downward sloping demand curve the 
monopolist, as the only supplier in the game, can determine (both price and the quantity 
supplied). Profits will be maximised if the price or quantity is fixed so that the extra 
revenue gained by the last unit sold, the marginal revenue, equals the extra cost involved. 
At this point, the price will be greater than the cost of its provision and total revenue will 
be far in excess of total cost, the difference being monopoly profits. It would clearly be 
in the interest of consumers to have more of the good, to have output expand to the point 
where the price they pay, the average revenue, equals the cost of goods or service. The 
spur of competition is not available to expand supply and there is no incentive for the 
existing supplier to provide more.
Therefore, the role of the government is considered to be appropriate to judge 
from time to time whether the supposed advantages of controlled entry are indeed worth 
any limitation on supply and monopoly profits allowed.
Technical Efficiency
’Regulation’ or 'regulatory mechanisms’ have been introduced in many countries 
on the grounds of 'excessive competition' or 'destructive competition'. Rupenthal et al 
(1986, p. 14) argue that competition can be regarded as excessive in terms of economic 
efficiency when price levels and the supply of services may be unstable over time and 
prices could be uneconomically low because of excess capacity. Despite a viable level of 
demand, the equilibrium price can be too low for a firm's long term survival. Fluctuating 
service prices may cause a misallocation of resources, because of decisions sensitive to 
freight rates may be made by reference to temporary price levels.
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Since technology and tastes do change, and given freedom of exit and entry in an 
industry, one cannot expect stable prices even under perfectly competitive conditions. 
However, whilst it is possible to have markets with excessive competition in an economic 
efficiency sense (with prices below the long run costs of production), their economic 
significance is open to debate, (ibid, p.15-16).
Imprefect Information
Controlling any inadequate provision of information enables consumers and 
others to make more rational decisions. One reason for regulation in this regard is when 
advertising, for example, is not concerned with giving the consumer detailed information, 
and intermediaries who might provide information, such as consumer associations, 
shipping agents or retailers, often know too little about the products or are not in a 
position to provide such information, at least on a regular, usable basis. With more 
complex and expensive products, individual consumers are not in a good position either 
to make an evaluation or to draw on experience. (Tomasic, 1984). In most cases, 
however, these informational asymmetries are unescapable consequences of monopoly.
B. Externalities
Regulation can be used to ensure that prices reflect a firm's cost of production. In 
contrast, regulation can be imposed deliberately in order to cause prices to diverge from 
the private costs of production so as to improve the allocation of resources in the presence 
of externalities.
Externality refers only to the unintended or unplanned consequences of market 
transactions, i.e. the incidental effects and not the primary or intended effects. (Mishan 
1971 as cited in Ng 1985, p.166-7). Another possible additional condition is where 
externality refers to those benefits or damages that are not paid for.
Such externality can occur between producer-producer, consumer-consumer or 
producer-consumer. For example, an externality may exist when the utility function of an 
individual (or the cost to, or production function of, a firm) depends not only on the
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variables under his or her control but also on some variable under the control of someone 
else where the dependence is not effected through a market transaction. (Ng op.cit, 
P-167).
Externalities can also be of either a pecuniary or technical kind. In the case of a 
pecuniary externality, there are economic implications. For example, the provision of an 
improved road link may indicate a pecuniary externality since such an improvement might 
reduce transport costs for users, while a technical externality arises from a situation 
which society cannot avoid. This is a consequence of a production function that exhibits 
increasing returns to scale.
Externality can be unidirectional, where one's activity affects only one party 
(person B), or can be a reciprocal externality where both parties are mutually affected.
In sum, such externalities arise as a result of ill-defined property rights 
(ownership externalities), because of indivisibilities in the production process, or due to 
the nature of public goods (public good externality) where the cost of monitoring and 
charging for marginal units of the public good are prohibitively high.(Miller and Meiner 
1986.p.600). In this case, externalities are present when a utility/production function 
depends on a variable not under the control of the relevant consumer/producer and 
dependence is not effected through the market relationship. If the activity of a person 
exerts an external dis-economy on others, the level of that activity tends to be higher than 
socially optimal, and vice versa. (Ng 1983, p.185)
This is why externalities are a type of market failure, and hence pose a potential 
rationale for regulation in the name of economic efficiency. This is particularly where 
they are converted into linkage effects and then evaluated or, for inter-related projects, 
they are mutual effects and are therefore positive externalities. This is also the case where 
definite property rights are assigned to deal with negative costs and positive benefits, as 
in the case of a factory operator who is made fully accountable for the social cost of the 
operation.
Most economic literature on externalities stress the use of taxes and subsidies to 
ensure the socially efficient allocation of resources. Taxes can be imposed to equate
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privately perceived costs to true marginal social cost.
Conversely, when marginal social costs are less than marginal private costs, then 
a subsidised price will increase output toward a socially optimal level. Ng summarises 
the different methods quite accurately:
'a Pigovian tax/subsidy on the external dis-economy/economy according to 
the marginal external cost/benefit involved, mutual agreement with 
compensation between parties involved, pricing policy, and government 
regulation'. (1983, p.185)
Non-economic Considerations
There are three other general reasons for influencing the price and quality of 
transport or more generally of a service industry in an economy. (Sullivan, 1984). 
Motivated by prudence and compassion, the state acts to even out large disparities of well 
being between groups of the population distinguished by social or geographical position.
Equity
As an indirect method of redistributing wealth in favour of the poorer, some 
goods, regarded as necessities, are subsidised, encouraging more consumption than 
would be warranted by a price reflecting the cost of provision. Since target groups are 
seen as disadvantaged in terms of accessibility in many instances, such as being old, 
being too poor to travel, or being in peripheral regional constituencies, then public 
transport subsidies, or boat building support schemes, or road building, are in many 
cases undertaken with redistributional intent. However, such indirect efforts to achieve 
greater equity are not always effective and can invoke a paternalistic attitude. As Sullivan 
(1984) declares the selection of necessary goods presumes the preferences of the groups 
to be helped, possibly artificially encouraging the consumption of certain goods such as 
transport. This is an example of improved social utility. However, a blanket subsidy on 
certain transport services with the aim of a progressive evening out of welfare, can also 
go awry and prove regressive in its outcome. Hence, there is nothing to exclude the 
richer from enjoying the subsidised service to a greater extent than those for whom the 
benefits were intended.
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Promotion of National Unity
Economic efficiency is not the only rationale for regulation, although it is usually 
cited in the objectives of regulatory policy. For example, maritime grants are distributed 
to coastal provinces to support them to meet their sea transport costs. This is, in fact, a 
subsidy to provide low cost services to isolated communities.
One objective of government in regulating and controlling the provision of 
transport services and facilities can be to provide in the most efficient manner possible for 
greater geographical coherence of a nation. (Ruppenthal op.cit; Sullivan op.cit).
Similarly, regulatory policies may be used to achieve efficiency in public 
investments in transport infrastructure. Hence transport infrastructure is required to 
maintain transport networks for peripheral regions. However, these non-economic and 
redistributive effects sometimes alter economic priorities and, therefore, can pose difficult 
problems in formulating and evaluating transport investment programs.
Safety Considerations
Government intervention can be justified by the issue of safety. In these 
circumstances of market failure, there is a role for surveillance and oversight, typically by 
the government, to augment insurance and legal mechanisms. Shavell (1984a,b) and 
Kolstead et al (1987) in Moses (1990) suggest that ex ante safety regulation should be 
deployed in conjunction with ex post tort liability settlement to achieve the best possible 
correction to such apparent market failure. The introduction of such insurance and legal 
resources can therefore mitigate the problems of externalities caused by transport 
accidents and imperfect information. Items such as insurance premiums, consumer 
willingness to pay and other variables, are economic incentives for firms to provide safety 
and firms may deliberately choose higher safety levels to improve their business 
reputations.
Unfortunately, both in theory and practice, these economic forces are not enough 
to ensure optimal safety provision. The setting of insurance premiums is not tied to the 
safety record of individual carriers, but rather to the performance of the industry as a
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whole. Additionally, there are well recognised theoretical problems of moral hazard and 
adverse selection. It is difficult for consumers to perceive actual safety levels, and there 
is imperfect signalling back to carriers of consumer safety preferences. Any assumption 
that all segments of the transport industry are in the main equally safe leads to problems 
of imperfect or asymmetric information. Consumers may under or over estimate the 
probability of transport accidents because of this problem. (Moses et al 1990).
Regulation in Perspective
The foregoing discussion canvassed the essence of regulatory policy in the 
operations of the market. According to economic theory, a competitive industry is one in 
which there is 'free' entry and exit of firms. This means there are no legal restraints on 
entry or exit, as exist in regulated or licensed industries. Firms enter or exit solely on 
their estimates of profit or loss. (Miller et al 1986. p.357). Hence, government 
intervention is not necessarily required. However, when such an unrestrained market 
leads to a violation of the marginal conditions for Pareto optimality, we have what is 
called market failure. Similarly, if welfare maximum (where marginal social costs must 
equal marginal social benefits for all resource using activities), is not achieved then it 
means there are externalities. Therefore the objective of public intervention is two fold:
i) To correct for market failure; and
ii) To internalise or control for externalities.
This is the perspective of the study.
2 .1 .2  Regulatory Failure
Gwilliam et al (1990) and Rupenthal et al (1986), argue that the longer a 
regulatory regime is in place, the greater is the possibility of regulatory failures associated 
with distorted inducements and regulatory capture. However, whilst the present debates 
over the usefulness and performance of regulatory systems concentrate on issues of costs 
and benefits, considered from the point of view of economic and administrative
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efficiency, any universal condemnation of regulatory systems or of the poor economic 
performance of regulatory agencies, rests upon the following assumptions:-
i) regulation distorts the allocation of resources within the regulated firm;
ii) regulation distorts inter-industry competition;
iii) regulation raises prices to transport users, and also increases capital requirements 
of potential entrants to an industry. It thus protects existing incumbent firms;
iv) regulation protects inefficiency and hampers innovation; the regulatory agency 
fails to adjust obsolete regulations to changed conditions;
v) regulation is inherently associated with administrative delays and high costs to the 
interests concerned, due to the incompetence of regulatory authorities;
vi) regulation adversely affects competitive incentives;
vii) regulators become over-identified with the regulated firms and industries capture 
the regulatory agencies they are supposed to be regulated by; and
viii) there are inappropriate guidelines or objectives of regulatory agencies.
2.2 ROLE AND DEFINITION OF COMPETITION
There are several different views of competition and it useful to review them at 
this stage.
i) The Neo-classical View
Competition is characterised by a large number of sellers, complete independence 
of action, perfect standardisation of products, zero government intervention, and zero 
monopoly power. In addition to perfect competition, which includes all the above 
attributes of pure competition there is, in addition, perfect mobility of factors and perfect 
knowledge and foresight. (Kahn 1971 op.cit; Burke et al 1988.p.52). This means the 
competitive approach places enormous reliance on the market mechanism.
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ii) The Classical View
Smith in his writings in the Wealth of Nations (1776) in Burke etal (1988.p.28- 
30) introduced a problem into his economic system whereby the scope for competitive 
behaviour is progressively reduced with economic development. This assumption is 
attributed to his powerful use of the division of labour as an explanation of the amazing 
growth in the wealth of nations and points implicitly to a reduction in the space available 
for market relations. (Burke et al op.cit.p.50). This is in contrast to the Marxist view of 
competition as providing the source of the blind forces which drive capitalism forward in 
its erratic progress with a permanent clash of creative and destructive impulses. In the 
classical perspective, competition for customers is only a part of the total competition for 
capital and implicitly assumes that capitalist are forced to accumulate to survive.
i ll)  The Austrian View 
The elements of this common tradition include:-
i) a profound commitment to the principle of methodological individualism - 
entrepreneurship;
ii) the inevitable incompleteness of knowledge and information in the real world;
iii) a distrust of collectivism and any assumption that governments know better than 
the private sector, and
iv) a distaste for quantification leading to a belief that there are no numerical 
constancies in economics.
Here, the view of the economy is totally in flux. As Schumpeter (1942) put it, 
competitive capitalist markets are subject to a 'perennial gale of creative destruction' 
whereby any tendency to equilibrium (hence stagnation) is continually being defeated by 
market innovation. (Burke etal 1988 p.68). This dynamism is vested in the need for 
alertness to market opportunities as they arise and in this lies entrepreneurship.
Under this view, however, the neo-classical model of competition is seen as of
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little relevance in the real world, and sometimes positively misleading in its implications. 
Kahn (1971.op.cit) has identified four major reasons why concepts of pure or perfect 
competition is not ideal.
These include
i) economies of scale in production and distribution require that sellers be large in 
size and few in number;
ii) the effect of consumers' expectation in innovation in product and service quality 
and characteristics;
iii) effective innovations either require the absence of firms too large, too few in 
number or having monopoly power and require monopoly profits to fund such 
innovative efforts;
iv) competitive structures may, in the presence of serious imperfections of 
competition, be too pure in other respects resulting in entry being too free and 
rivalry too intense for optimum performance.
These characteristics of the market give rise to market failure or signal future 
failure. As noted previously, market failure can be corrected through public regulation. 
However, when an efficient market equilibrium is not reached, or the government 
response leads to even further deviation from social optimum, a response failure or 
regulatory failure will result meaning public decisions are unable to interpret signal 
failures or are facing biased signals. (Himanen et al 1992.p.l49).
Given the above consideration of regulatory objectives and of the virtues of the 




Deregulation has been used to denote so many policies that its very meaning is 
unsure. According to Shepherds (1990.p.505,515), the clearest definition is 'the 
replacement of government controls with effective competition'. In contrast 'privatisation' 
refers to the shifting of ownership from the public to private sector, i.e. getting the 
'government out of the market place', and permitting the entry of new rivals.
There are different explanations of the forces behind policies of privatisation and 
deregulation. Adamson,Jones and Pratt (1991), Bannister(1990), and Kay et al (1988), 
as discussed in Andersen (1992), define policies of privatisation and deregulation within 
the same broad categories:
1. Privatisation through the transfer of ownership of the public sector through sales 
of assets. These sales can be of whole undertakings or of parts of undertakings 
and can be carried out through management or employee buy-outs or through 
sales to the general public ;
2. Franchising or the contracting out of the provision of services previously 
collectively supplied or through publicly owned undertakings. This category can 
be seen as both a form of privatisation and as deregulation (e.g. through 
competitive tendering systems);
3. Liberalisation of market entry to previously regulated markets (which refers 
specifically to deregulation).
The following summary touches on only the main points of a large and growing 
literature dealing with privatisation and deregulation.
Kay, Mayer and Thompson (1986) and Rickard (1988), as noted in Andersen 
(1992), give the following reasons for privatisation from the government perspective:
i) the supply-side benefits of greater efficiency. These benefits from productive 
efficiency can be achieved by the introduction of greater competition, by giving 
management greater freedom from public sector control and forcing them to raise
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capital in the market, and by making management answerable to shareholders so 
as to maintain financial discipline. There is a belief that profit incentives and 
effective innovation between suppliers will produce competition;
ii) the existence of large shareholdings will give incentive to make returns and hence 
provide good service at a fair price so as to maintain efficiency and price restraint. 
This reduces the role of the state;
iii) there is a need to secure proceeds from the sale of state assets to finance 
government expenditure;
iv) to show how regulatory arrangements can be made which are tough, transparent, 
and provide full protection to customers as well as other businesses. Drawing 
from experience gained from poor regulatory performance, 'proper' regulatory 
regimes can be adopted which will encourage efficiency and not stifle innovation 
and particularly, technological innovation.
Ideological arguments can be found here, especially with regard to wider share 
ownership and a reduced role for the state.
Andersen (1992. p.180) summarises the defined objectives of privatisation/deregulation 
as:
i) improving economic efficiency and customer service, in part, through clarifying 
the role of the public sector,
ii) reducing public sector borrowing requirements (PSBR); and
iii) promoting wider share ownership. The primary criteria of privatisation is 
arguably the promotion of economic efficiency.
However, not many experts agree on the argument that deregulation/privatisation 
can be made explicable by a predominant reference to economic events. This was taken 
up by Derthick and Quirk’s (1985) and Kay and Thompson (1986) as cited in Andersen 
(1992), that the case for deregulation/privatisation does not have any sophisticated
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rationale, and that it lacks any clear analysis of purpose or effect. They argue that no 
objective outcome is no objective is effectively attained and that political goals have 
dominated, and thus subordinated, economic efficiency. This is the situation in most 
western economies where privatisation/deregulation has been widely practised. This 
argument for change is depicted in Banister (1990) and Rickard (1988) and summarised 
in Andersen as:
'First, the overall perceived failure of the public sector and welfare state 
(created after W W 2); and second, that the private provision of services is 
inherently more efficient, as there is a simple performance measure, namely 
profitability...' (1992,p. 181)
Central to the discussion of deregulation is the question of regulatory failure and 
market failure. Kay and Thompson (1991), as cited in Andersen (1992), noted that 
regulatory failure can be distinguished between escapable and unescapable failures. 
Unescapable failures are defined as following directly from the economic sector being 
regulated. As noted previously, they include natural monopolies and high sunk costs 
preventing competitive solutions, and information asymmetries as being the result of 
monopolies. In such cases, regulation is inevitable. The escapable failures follow from 
inappropriate methods of regulation, and where the suppression of competitive solutions 
have occurred, it would be feasible. According to Kay et al, the unnecessary suppression 
of competition has been an important source of regulatory failure.
However, it is argued that deregulation makes market failure even more likely and 
defines three types of market failure: first, where market outcome may be regarded as 
unsatisfactory; for example, because of information asymmetries or externalities; second, 
where competitive solution may be achieved, but where incumbents deter market entry; 
and third, in cases of natural monopoly and high sunk costs. Moreover, following 
Shepherds (1990.p.505), for there to be minimal market failure, there has to be effective 
competition. Hence, Shepherds (1990.p.42), Gwilliam (1989.p.42) and Ireland 
(1991.p.l53), have outlined four criteria to achieve effective deregulation.
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It should be noted that this analysis of deregulation is conditioned by the precise 
nature of industry organisation, and assumes that its initial market structure is 
appropriate.
The four criteria are:
i) market share should be below 50 per cent. The dominant firm's market share 
must sink below 50 per cent, and there must be at least four or five comparable 
competitors, before competition is effective.
It will be necessary to maintain continuing control to prevent monopolisation - the 
maintenance of price constraints, both against too high monopoly prices and 
against selective price cuts designed to eliminate smaller rivals. The firm will 
often condemn the restraints as unfair and crippling and will demand the right to 
compete fully. However the dominant market share makes this unwise, because 
competition is not yet effective;
ii) where there are bottleneck controls. Competition cannot survive independently in 
the presence of bottleneck controls through which one or several firms exclude 
others or overcharge for access to the market. Either such bottlenecks must be 
removed or placed in outside hands, or effective standards for, and control over, 
competitive practices must be developed. Once effective competition has evolved 
or is imminent, the regulatory controls on the formerly dominant firm can be 
removed. Hence the third criterion:
in) deregulation after competition. Regulatory controls are to be removed after 
effective competition is established. Premature deregulation is the cardinal error 
of deregulation policy.
After deregulation, the market is usually a tight oligopoly, which can easily move 
back to dominance. Thus, there is a strong need to apply strict anti-trust policies 
to mergers and strategic behaviour;
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iv) strict antitrust policies. Mergers must be carefully screened, and selective pricing 
tactics must be limited, so as to prevent a reversion to dominance. Entry barriers 
need to be kept low.
2.3 F R A M E W O R K S  TO AN A LY SE T R A N S PO R T  IN D U ST R Y  
STRUCTURE AND ITS RELATED PROBLEMS
In industry analysis, the tools of standard neo-classical microeconomic analysis
have been incorporated into the so-called structure-conduct-perfromance approach.
It is pertinent to review in this section the various market models used to identify
patterns of behaviour, and causal links and characteristics of an economy. There is a
great deal of industry policy directly related to the key industrial organisation
characteristics of both sectors and individual industries in an economy. A good example
of this is the approach of competition policy which is based on identifying a number of
structures, patterns of conduct and performance features of industries. (Caves et
al,1982).
The review carried out here is confined to market models. The market structure 
models which have been used in the analysis of industry structure, conduct and 
performance can be classified into the following broad categories:
A. Standard neo-classical market models;
B. The Thin market model; and
C. The Extended rivalry model.
Further sub-divisions within these three categories are presented in Figure 2 
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A. Neo-classical models
In this framework the various models of competition are presented.
Pure Monopoly - Dominant Firm
The general features of model are important scale economies, capital 
requirements, legal barriers (e.g. patent rights), that make potential entry extremely 
difficult. There is only one seller which is the price maker. Its substantial market power 
with no close rivals enhances its dominance in the market.
Monopoly can be extended in to discriminating monopoly where it sells the same 
product in two distinct markets, or into bilateral monopoly, where a monopolist sells to a 
single buyer (monopolist). Further, in the dominant firm model industry-price cost 
margins are predicted to be related to the market share of the dominant firm.
Welfare economic teaches us that monopoly is 'bad' and will result in the 
misallocation of societal resources. There is little or no competition at all. The estimation 
of welfare loss to society from monopoly power, is generally undertaken by estimating 
welfare loss triangles. However, the two most important variables influencing a 
monopoly is government regulation, and any substantial economy of scale. However, 
when a large firm becomes inefficient, regulatory provisions (anti-trust laws) forces the 
monopolist to sell (down the long term average cost curve) to independent suppliers.
Oligopoly
This imperfect competitive model reflects a more realistic structure. However, the 
diverse theories explaining this model differ in at least three important respects: in terms 
of the relevant structural characteristics of an industry; the nature of anti-competitive 
effects, and the form of relationships involved. (Kwoka 1978). The two dimensions of 
the model that are potentially important:-
The degree of supplier concentration. The relatively high level of supplier concentration 
in a market needs to be viewed in terms of two major factors. (Caves et al.1978). They
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are: a) the relationship between market sizes and; b) the extent of mergers/takeover 
activities. It is clear that at end of a period of relatively intense merger/takeover activities 
there has been a fall in the supplier numbers in some markets, and an increase in the size 
of the largest sellers.
Whilst this imperfect competitive model does explain why things happen, there is 
a presumption that it is narrow in the sense that it only considers rivalry amongst current 
competitors and potential entrants.
Monopolistic competition
This is a situation where there is effective competition arising from locational 
market access, image of packaging, forms of services been provided and many close 
substitutes. These features limit the market power of the sellers. The inelasticity of 
demand is therefore proportionally equal to market share.
B. 'Thin' Market Model
The thin market framework outlines six classes of transport market circumstances. 
It was developed by James and Gannon (1991) to analyse PNG transport markets. It is a 
framework that provides a useful way to identify levels of transport costs and to consider 
policy issues in the transport industry. The six classes are:
1. a commercially viable market for which effective competition exists, such as 
where there are several independent operators involved in road haulage along the 
Highlands Highway route; where there are one or a few operators but entry is 
open and the market is effectively contestable, for example, coastal and inland 
river transport freight movements by work boats. It is also marked by market 
operations being efficient in economic terms due to the absence of externalities;
2. there is a commercially viable and contestable market but market operations are 
economically inefficient. This could be due to the presence of externalities;
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3. there is a commercially viable market but it involves a highly concentrated market 
structure, and the markets are neither effectively competitive nor contestable. This 
is due to 'natural' ( i.e. scale or high potential sunk costs), or such artificial 
barriers to entry as licensing. However, due to effective regulation, real or 
threatened, monopoly power is not exercised and the outcome is economically 
efficient. The operation of ports and airports are possible examples of this;
4. there is a commercially viable market but it is neither effectively competitive nor 
contestable. Also, due to the exercise of monopoly power, the result is 
economically inefficient. This occurs along some of the major shipping and air 
routes, especially when competition from other modes is highly constrained or 
non existent;
5. the market is not commercially viable, but is justifiable on economic efficiency 
grounds. Hence, based upon the willingness or ability to pay, in terms of a 
common carrier or a public service at reasonable regularity, the potential revenue 
is below the cost of supplying the service. The shortfall of private financial 
profitability and net societal economic benefit may arise from various forms of 
private market failure. Such factors as information availability, risk, public good, 
and inter-generational factors may be involved;
6. the market is neither commercially viable nor justifiable on pure economic 
grounds. In this category, not only is the provision of transport services, and 
possibly the infrastructure itself, not viable on commercial grounds but the 
provision of transport also involves, at present value terms, total economic 
benefits that are less than total economic costs.
C. 'Extended Rivalry' Model
A broad definition of competition has been developed by Porter (1980).
'Extended rivalry' is introduced as a broad definition of competition, where firms have to
cope with five competitive forces:-
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i) The threat of entry- This will depend on the extent to which there are barriers to 
entry which are most typically : economies of scale, capital requirements, 
profitable channels of distribution, cost advantages independent of size, legislative 
or government actions, and product differentiation.
ii) The power of buyers and suppliers- both have similar effects on the competitive 
front. Buyers and sellers influence margins.
in) The threat of substitutes. This depends on the extent to which an organisation 
can legitimately regard itself as operating in a discrete market with a limited 
number of comparable competitors, as opposed to where there are potential 
competitors and a wide range of substitute products. This threat may take 
different forms.
iv) The extent of rivalry- Competitors in an industry are concerned with the degree of 
rivalry between themselves. Whatever their number, where competitors are of 
roughly equal size, there is a danger of intense competition as one competitor 
attempts to gain dominance over another. Conversely, the most stable markets 
tend to be those with dominant organisations within them.
2.4 IMPLICATIONS OF THE LITERATURE REVIEW
This section deals with the implications of the foregoing review of definitions and 
rationales for public intervention, deregulation/privatisation, and models of market 
structure.
2 .4 .1  Implication of the Review of Economic Models
Neo-classical microeconomic models have important implications with regard to 
approaches to market structure, conduct and performance. In the cases of dominant 
firms, oligopoly and monopolistic competition are applicable to maritime industry 
analysis. The industry certainly resembles certain characteristics of these models and 
hence falls somewhere between pure monopoly ( with a dominant firm) and perfect
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competition, although naturally there are limitations to such explanatory powers.
The models used in this study are confined to an ’Integrated Approach', which 
combines elements of the Extended Rivalry model and the Thin market approach. This 
combination, based on neo-classical macroeconomic analysis, can explain the broader 
competitive framework within the institutionally-complex thin market context.
2 .4 .2  The Definitions and Objectives of Regulation, Deregulation/ 
Privatisation and their Relevance to the Case Studies
A. Regional Case Studies
i . F eeder and  In ter-island a ir  and  sea  services f o r  island developing  countries
This study seeks to identify the internal transport services and infrastructure 
linkages problems. The lack of a well organised and co-ordinated transport system has 
been a possible obstacle to economic growth and development. An assessment of the 
needs of the outer islands has been made in the light of economic (to what extent can the 
services be profitable or self-supporting), social and cultural (to what extent do services 
affect the social and cultural life of community) and political (to what extent do services 
serve the political processes of the community).
These general economic, social, cultural and political disparities therefore require 
public policy. These policies should be conducive to minimising such difficulties.
The second series of these reports contained selected papers which addressed the 
following :-
a) problems of inter-island transportation;
b) the role of and prospects for informal sector shipping in inter-island and feeder 
services for small, remote islands;
c) the effects of transport arrangement on the human geography of outer islands;
d) IMCO ( The Inter-governmental Maritime Consultative Organisation) services of 
interest to island developing countries.
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The studies concluded that appropriate vessel-types are a common objective in 
order to create a compatible island trading network. The accessibility of credit facilities 
for investment purposes, and regulatory protection accorded the formal sector in terms of 
tax concessions, are of paramount importance. Therefore, it is useful need to review 
such government regulatory policies in order to ensure the survival and broadening of 
inter-island shipping services.
Because institutional settings are quite strong in these small island nations, 
regulatory capture is quite possible and in this context the notion of public policy failure 
is relevant.
B . D o m e s t ic  T r a n s p o r t  S tu d ie s
i. P ro v in c ia l B o a t Services S tudy (1983)
This study assessed the inter-island shipping needs of island communities. 
Requirements for appropriate vessels and related economics of operation were identified. 
It arose from the failure of the market and invoked a consideration of public policy to 
improve social and economic development in these regions.
ii. G overn m en t F le e t R ev ie w  S tudy (1983)
This study was basically undertaken to review the economic operations of the fleet 
in terms of efficiency and commercial viability. Established as part of government's 
policy to provide social and administrative services as well as being for hire and reward, 
it has cost the public 3 million kina annually to operate given insufficient revenue. Its 
inefficient operation has led to the selling of boats and services to village groups and 
business enterprises and this therefore makes privatisation relevant to the study.
iii. T ran sport O pera tion s P o licy  Study (1985)
This study provided a good background on how transport industries are currently 
organised and performing in the country. The study contained implications for
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institutional barriers and hence regulatory failure. Its recommendations called for the 
market to determine transport efficiency.
iv . P o r t D evelopm en t study II (1989)
This study reviewed the Harbours Board port requirements and project 
preparation. Investment requirements were forecasted based on cargo flow projections. 
A second component of the study addressed the institutional issues relevant to the 
Board’s commercial responsibilities. Its obvious implications were that the private 
market will fail to meet the desired objectives and only policy changes will make the 
Harbours Board more responsive to market circumstances. This was reinforced by a 
Management review which identified the constraints hindering its effective statutory role 
in the commercial world.
However, a recent tariff study identified the regulatory obstacles to the Board's 
pricing practices in the commercial realm. There has definitely been regulatory failure and 
appropriate modifications will enhance the economic efficiency of the authority.
v . T ran sport Efficiency Study (TES) (1990)
This study was a response to the government's intention of reducing public 
intervention to the minimum level necessary to maintain safety standards and to prevent 
monopoly profits. Such a comprehensive study is useful and identifies the areas of 
regulatory failure which can be avoided by appropriate institutional improvements. Its 
policy recommendations imply movement towards effective competition.
2.4.3 Implications of the Review of Regulation
De-regulation and privatisation to the maritime sector.
As defined by economists, the rational for public intervention is based on the twin 
objects of:-
1. correcting for market failure (signal failure); and
2. controlling for externalities.
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However, there are also other general reasons including such non-economic 
factors of safety, equity and geographical coherence.
Definitions and objectives of regulation are relevant to the maritime industry in 
Papua New Guinea. Since this is examining the broad extent of competition in the 
maritime sector, it is appropriate to ask whether the emergence of regulation is due to 
market failure, due to externalities, or both. This is an explicit objective of this study.
However, this is not to undermine the non-economic attributes of public policy, 
since they are important to the country because of the nation's internal geographical 
dispersion which requires government attention.
The other policies considered are deregulation and privatisation. Firstly, the 
notion of privatisation is relevant to the shipping industry, the case being that the formerly 
government-owned PNG Shipping Corporation (PNGSC) was sold to Steamships 
Group. The second case is the more recent sale of government fleet (workboats) to 
private groups and individuals. The shipping sub-sector is therefore very much part of 
the private sector.
Deregulation is relevant to some sections of coastal charter services (specialised 
services), and particularly to coastal inter-island and inland river workboats (freight) 
services. Entry is open and minimal government intervention suggests the presence of 
effective competition and contestability.
Thus, the level of regulation required in a public business enterprise in a 
developing country like PNG should be determined with care. Regulation of prices, asset 
revaluations, and the rate of return as targetted by the Harbours Board have both 
shortcomings and benefits. Their strict targets have given rise to cross-subsidisation and 
reduced revenue growth.
A similar consequences can emerge within the coastal shipping sub-sector. Given 
price, quantity and safety controls, it is one of the over-regulated industries in the 
country. If public control persists in approving charges which give no more than an 
adequate rate of return for the operator and does not reflect the underlying cost structures, 
then operators have no incentive to cut costs if any ensuing savings have to be passed on
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to users in their entirety.
An appropriate regulatory system would therefore involve consideration of crew 
levels, work practices and conditions, ship safety aspects and service quality as well as 
freight charges and it may be undesirable to control both price and quantity.
The government needs to make legislative changes necessary to facilitate efficient 
regulation by the Harbours Board and the government. It is important that operators be 
granted incentives to increase the efficiency of shipping and stevedoring services but the 
greater part of such benefits must flow through to users.
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CHAPTER IE
OVERVIEW OF THE MARITIME SECTOR
3.1 INTRODUCTION
Following on the review of literature in Chapter 2, the objective of this study is to 
apply a model that can powerfully explore the inter-relationships between market 
structures and any consequences of such inter-relationships that give rise to patterns of 
competitive behaviour in the industry. Given that this model has to be applied in the 
context of both domestic and inter-island maritime industry, the salient features of the 
industry are first described in Sections 3.1 and 3.2, and then an overview of the model is 
presented.
Where the sources of data used in this study are not given, it may be assumed that 
the data is the result of research, often interviews, carried out in the field by the author 
between February and April 1992.
Background
Papua New Guinea (PNG) has a land area of 462,000 square kilometres and a 
population in 1990 of 3.9 million.(DOT Reports 1991) It comprises the eastern half of 
the island of New Guinea (the 'mainland' with 60% of total land area) and hence borders 
West Irian (Indonesia). It has some 600 small islands, but most of the population is 
concentrated on the mainland. It is administratively divided into 19 provinces (each with 
its own provincial government). PNG has a rugged, mountainous terrain with many 
small, dispersed and isolated pockets of population; Only about 15% of the population is 
urban. The most important economic sector is agriculture, which accounts for about one 
third of GDP (US$3.2 billion in 1990) and 68% of non-mineral exports. During the 
1980s, GDP growth has been fairy low with an average of about 1%, compared to a 
steady population growth rate of about 2.3% p.a. Current estimates show the country 
has a GNP per capita of US$880, and a GDP growth of 9.3% p.a. (A sia  W eek: National
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and multilateral data, October 1992.p.l2). The previous 12 months (1991) exports have 
been estimated at US$1.6 billion.
Export revenue is due to mineral sector exports given that agriculture is mostly 
practised on a subsistence level. For example in 1988, mineral exports from Bougainville 
alone were estimated at 36% of total export earnings and contributed about 10% to the 
GDP. (AIBAD Economic issue, 1990 p.1-2). Given the dispersed population, access to 
transport is often a more serious constraint to agricultural production than are the 
physical characteristics of the land. This constraint forms an important part of 
government efforts to modernise agriculture in order to make it commercial and to 
develop the non-mineral sector. Many low value crops, such as rubber or copra, need to 
be concentrated close to transport facilities. Even in the case of high value export crops, 
current returns to farmers in remote, isolated areas are relatively low. The lack of access 
to urban markets also constrains the production of fruits and vegetables. (World Bank 
Country Study, vol. 1.1988, p.20). Thus improved transport linkages and the provision 
of rural infrastructure will bring pecuniary externalities and benefits to farmers and 
increase their returns. This means that reduced transport costs would induce competition 
between operators to provide efficient transport services between farms and markets and 
hence weaken monopolistic practices. On an economy-wide scale, reliable transport 
services, fuel, spares and other major production inputs, and of finished products to 
exchange points, can contribute significantly to productivity growth. (James and 
Gannon, 1991, p .l).
Government has therefore assigned a high priority to transport development as 
reflected in the Public Investment Program (PIP) which accounts for 18% of investment 
funds. About 72% of investment funds go to the roads sub-sector. With a slower rate of 
modernisation and given difficult topography, the development of the transport system 
has been limited. The road network totals about 21,000 km of which about 7% is paved, 
and which are mainly national roads which account for 24% of the total road network. 
The road network consists of a number of separate sub-networks which are located 
primarily in or near the main coastal towns and in the central Highlands. The road
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vehicle fleet totals about 52,000 vehicles comprising cars, and station wagons, light 
commercial vehicles, trucks, motor cycles, buses ( the fastest growing segment catering 
the rising demand for personal travel), and other trucks. Road traffic volumes are 
generally low, seasonal and over short distances. Travel demand peaks after the annual 
coffee, copra and cocoa sales. With the exception of the Highlands Highway which 
carries an average traffic volume of about 600 vehicles per day, most long distance traffic 
is by air for passengers and by sea for freight.(DOT Draft Seminar Paper, 1988, p.5). 
About 40% of the traffic on the Highlands Highway comprises heavy trucks and buses. 
Large expatriate-managed companies dominate 'for hire' road transport operations in 
areas served by the Highlands Highway. Local companies mainly operate as sub­
contractors. It is believed that the regulation of routes, tariffs and licensing may have 
been excessive, resulting in what is considered to be excessively high freight and tariff 
rates in the Highlands area. Awareness of this problem has led the government to 
consider alternative regulatory policies.
3.2 PO LICY  DEVELOPM ENT
Transport Sector Policy Agenda
The overall goal of the transport sector is the provision of an adequate, 
economically efficient, cheap and technically safe system of transport for Papua New 
Guinea, whilst at the same time ensuring appropriate levels of equity in the provision of 
infrastructure services and acceptable level of local participation in relevant industries.
Sectoral strategies and objectives are focussed on sub-sectors within the overall 
sector because of their specialist roles within the sector as a whole.
The Medium Term Transport Development Strategy recognises the importance of 
increasing GNP through increased economic efficiency, which in this context means a 
more optimal allocation of resources. The strategy also recognise the need to ensure 
adequate access to remote communities as well as ensuring an acceptable level of local 
participation in transport industries.
The main elements of the strategy include the following:
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• Increased competition;
• Minimum government in transport operations;
• Cost recovery policies;
• A managed subsidy policy;
• The allocation of investment capital to transport infrastructure;
• Performance targets.
These broad categories of policy objectives are consistent with the aims of the 
medium-term transport development plan. Deregulation of transport industries, 
investment plans, and new transport administration objectives are important government 
policy directions for the whole transport industry. This has laid the foundations for the 
transport policy agenda for the 1990s.
The Period 1988-1992
With the assistance of transport consultancy studies and reports, the role of the 
government has been to ensure a transport system that is adequate, economically efficient, 
and meets acceptable safety standards. This is governed by three important policy 
goals:-
• a low cost transport infrastructure system;
• safe and economic usage and adequate maintenance of infrastructure; and
• optimal configurations of vehicles and ships to effectively service the transport 
system.
Cost Recovery
The government has also introduced cost recovery where the objective is to 
recover annual recurrent expenditure once an asset has been established. Such recovery 
is to be derived from user charges in order to minimise hidden distortionary effects. 
Where there is some justification for subsidised transport services as a development tool
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or for equity purposes, then such subsidies have to be made explicit, be quantified and 
are subject to review, in order to ensure their purpose is being served. This applies 
across all modes of transport and for any intermediary solutions established via 
franchising or periodic competitive bidding. The overall goal has been to ensure effective 
and fair competition which would achieve alternative services at prices which people can 
afford.
Investment Goals
The overall goal of investment is to direct limited resources to programmes or 
projects which will show high economic rates of return over and above 10% for internal 
financing and 12% for external financing.
Human Resource Development
With regard to the relationship between human resource development and the 
shipping industry, two perspectives become clear. First, the private sector provision of 
transport services should benefit the people and encourage development, and secondly, 
human resource development must occur within the maritime industry. This interest has 
been vested in the PNG Maritime College for which operators are required to pay a 
training levy for the training of the maritime personnel.
Thus, the objective for the last five years has been to create an efficient and low 
cost private sector shipping base in Papua New Guinea, and at the same time 
endeavouring to ensure both improvements in safety standards and continued investment 
in new vessels, machinery, and human resource development.
Planned Legislative Amendments
Government is presently considering amending some of its legislation. For 
example, the Merchant Shipping Act has been reviewed to make it more responsive, so 
that it would improve regulatory responses to changing circumstances within domestic 
shipping. Regulations for safety governing marine inquiries, and investigations and
41
safety surveillance, have been reviewed according to the Australian Uniform Shipping 
Line Code. Also, a safety booklet has been published in English, Pidgin and Motu 
languages to inform the public about maritime safety.
Deregulation
Deregulation has also received some public attention.
To achieve a policy shift in the direction of change will facilitate national, regional 
and international traffic. The goal is to provide an efficient low cost private sector 
shipping base to enhance economic, social and cultural development in the country. 
However, whether conditions for effective competition exist is an important question 
facing the government. The government is still unsure whether the time is right to free 
the market.
Transport White Paper - 1992
A Transport White Paper (Volumes 1 and 2) has been produced based on the 
Transport Efficiency Study. The government has already approved it as a planning tool 
for infra-structure development and for transport policy formulation. The policy 
implementation phase would be over a 10 year period. Its main policy objectives are:-
• Price control in freight transport;
• Quality licensing;
• Axle load regulations;
• Anti-monopoly controls; and
• Safety Regulations.
3.3 M A RITIM E SECTOR
History
Traditionally, and up to the late 1960s and 1970s, coastal cargo was carried in 
both locally registered and overseas flagged vessels. The former were usually wooden
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hulled and had mediocre cargo handling equipment. The latter were vessels on the 
Australian/PNG run which up until the late 1960s, operated services subsidised by the 
Australian government and which were allowed to carry cargo between PNG ports.
The PNG coastal fleet expanded in the 1970s as overseas vessel withdrew from 
the trade but this expansion was in a haphazard fashion mainly due to a licensing system 
which only allowed a maximum of 12 months. This discouraged many owners from 
investing in new tonnage.
However, with the introduction of the Merchant Shipping Act in 1976, coastal 
shipping underwent a revolution. Shipping companies were encouraged to invest in 
modem ships and to enlarge their fleet because of the new 8 year maximum license 
period. From that time on, sea transport has improved in terms of reliability and 
efficiency. The major shipping companies at that time, most still operating today though 
as joint partners, included Steamships Shipping, Bums Philp Shipping, Consort Express 
Line, PNG Shipping Corporation, Pacific New Guinea Line or Pimco, Coastal Shipping, 
and Lutheran Shipping. Most of these companies were also involved in merchandising, 
retailing, transport and shipping agency work for overseas liner vessels.
The coastal shipping network extends to 18 relatively well-equipped sea ports, 
and 400 small river or sea landing points. Mining and forestry companies also develop 
their own ports. Each port serves different hinterlands and cannot substitute for one 
another. The shipping fleet comprises about 250 ships, with a total gross registered 
tonnage of 20,000 tons, and a large number of small coastal and inland river workboats 
which form a significant part of the domestic shipping industry.
Transport services rely heavily on highways, inter-island and coastal shipping for 
freight movement, and on air transport for long distance passenger movements. Road 
transport plays a dominant role for freight tons and ton-km, and for numbers of 
passengers but air transport dominates in terms of passenger-km. There is little or no 
competition between modes of transport but there is a complementarity between modes in 
terms of passenger transport. This is dictated by the internal physical setting of the 
country. However, in terms of freight movement, most cargo traffic consists of export
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and import cargoes with imports accounting for twice as much as exports, (discounting 
for mineral and log exports). Distances between some ports are large and volumes of 
cargo and number of passengers are quite small. Recent estimates (1989) place these at 
2,760 million tonne-km of inter-city freight (36.2% by coastal shipping) and 7,942 
million passenger-km (1.2% by coastal shipping). The only substantial movements occur 
in the Highlands and short distance routes in National Capital District (Port Moresby). In 
the 1980s, freight transport grew at about 8% p.a. by road and 7% p.a. by sea. Air 
freight growth was negligible. Passenger transport grew at about 9% p.a. by road, 1% 
by air, and by an insignificant rate by water. (James et al 1991, p.2)
However, there are limitations with regard to the road network in terms of 
coverage (i.e. 5.5 km per 1000 persons and 46km per 1000 square km of land area). 
There is an indication, also, that the transport system is inefficient and over-regulated. 
This has resulted in regulatory ’capture' where there is weak enforcement and the 
granting of exemptions leading to de-facto deregulation in specialised services and inter­
island workboat services. Also, as a consequence of regulatory policies, excess capacity 
and high tariffs have emerged. As pointed out by James and Gannon (1991), the 
deregulation of air services has seen private sector withdrawal from many routes due to 
inadequate management skills and adverse topography. This has also affected road 
investments due to high construction maintenance costs combined with low traffic 
volumes. It is traditional thinking that the provision of new roads will enhance personal 
travel and foster the penetration of imported goods into communities; hence jeopardising 
the market share of traditional crops (ibid, p. 2).
Thus, with the mineral boom and a likely boost to agriculture outputs, higher 
national income will provide a challenge to the government in terms of transport 
investment priorities. These pressures would be further exacerbated by non-economic 
and redistributive considerations of investment programmes linking regional centres 
with rural areas via roads, inter-island and air transport infrastructures. With an optimal 
infrastructure investment programmes such freight and passenger linkages will 
undoubtedly necessitate national economic growth and development.
Coral Sea
Figure 3.1 Base Map
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The Present Situation
Shipping N etw orks a n d  their- S pa tia l F eatures
There have been many changes in the domestic inter-island industry in terms of 
amalgamation and vertical integration between firms becoming paramount as economic 
circumstances have changed. This market structure has been induced by institutional 
factors as well as by the diminished effect of market forces.
The intention of this section is to illustrate the structural and spatial features 
resulting from these difficulties.
The Figures 3.1 to 3.7 illustrate the spatial 'framework’ of shipping services for 
the different geographic markets. Figure 3.1 is the base map showing the geographical 
location of the main ports and the inter-island network.
Figure 3.2 shows the maritime freight movements between the main ports. As 
depicted by the Figure, the main operators are Consort Express Line (CEL) for the main 
port-main port trade (in the south) but it also serves other main ports namely Kimbe, 
Rabaul,Kavieng and Buka and Kieta under normal circumstances.
Its service markets overlaps with the New Guinea Islands route which is a short 
route, mostly operated by Coastal, Lutheran (occasionally freight but competing on 
passenger runs), and the Pacific New Guinea Line (PNGL). This service is 
predominantly Lae-Rabaul-Kimbe-Kavieng-Buka and occasionally to Oro Bay. On the 
other hand, Lutheran covers the north completely, and the Joint Shipping Company 
(under Laurabada Shipping), basically covers the Papuan Gulf. In most of these 
situations, there is market failure and regulatory dormancy, thus resulting in these spatial 
route structures.
Figure 3.3 shows the cargo and passenger services along the coasts and for inter­
island. services. Again, the denser routes have competitors (over short routes) while 
long distance routes (main port-main port), require multi-stops as dictated by cargo and 
passenger needs.
Further, this data shows there is to be only a few large operators. In the case of 
workboats, there are large number of operators and the operation is in general profitable.
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Figure 3.4 illustrate passenger only services. The most dominant and viable 
passenger route is between Lae - Rabaul- Kimbe. This strictly passenger-only service is 
serviced by Lutheran vessels such as the MV Rita. As noted previously, the multi­
purpose vessels operated by Pacific NG Line and Coastal Shipping compete for a market.
Figure 3.5 shows the spatial extent of specialised services. Most are under 
permanent charter in a 'de-facto' deregulated market. There are about 6 permanent charter 
operators providing services to mining, construction, and oil companies. Others are 
mainly main port operators who lease under open charter for the transportation of any 
excess bulk cargo.
The pattern of intra and inter-island passenger and freight services is shown in 
Figure 3.6. This predominantly workboat operation forms an important segment of the 
main port to feeder, or feeder to feeder, service. In most cases, they are multi-stop 
services. Inland waterway services are also quite common but depend on the availability 
of cargo and passengers. This third level type of operation is quite substantial in the 
Milne Bay Province. The large number of operators are significant part of inter-island 
transport system in the province. The spatial route features are given in Figures 3.7a and 
b.
The photographs show the type of vessels and the method of cargo 
handling.adopted at this level.
3.4 OVERVIEW  OF THE MODEL
The framework undertaken in this thesis to analyse the Papua New Guinea 
maritime industry draws heavily from the 'Thin' market framework developed by James 
et al (1991) with support from the 'Extended Rivalry' model constructed by Porter 
(1980). This is to avoid any trap that might arise from a mechanical application of the 
Porter model. With this broader framework, competitive aspects, market failure or 
regulatory dormancy can be identified and policy questions answered. An overview of 
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Implications of the model
In a 'market failure' scenario, there is presumably little or no inter-firm rivalry or 
intermodal competition. There are institutional rigidities and externalities that prevent 
potential entry and competition in the maritime sector. Supply outgrows the demand for 
shipping or maritime services and hence price and quantity controls come into play to 
prevent overcharging and over-capacity provision. This therefore results in market 
integration and collusive practices. With market failure, existing regulations act as a 
market mechanisms to initiate 'competition'.
Secondly, in the 'with rivalry/effective competition' scenario, the ease of entry to, 
and growth in demand for, maritime services is met by the supply of services. The 
existence of inter-firm rivalry necessitates innovative strategies to maintain market share. 
In such a situation, a dominant firm's operations are closely monitored by independent 
operators. This can either make the firm act efficiently or not. Under exceptional 
circumstances, economic pricing should result and hence microeconomic efficiency.
Thus, the relative importance of the competitive forces identified in the 'Extended 
Rivalry' model, can be systematically related to certain identifiable influences. The main 
body of this thesis, Chapters 4-9, uses this model and is concerned with the inter­
relationships between market structure and conduct in the maritime sector. The study is 
mostly concerned with freight services by the industry's private sector, but it is important 
to note that government actions to regulate the economy and directly intervene in 
influencing market structure, conduct and hence performance, forms part of the 
environment in which competition takes place.
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CHAPTER IV
MARKET STRUCTURE AND SUPPLY OF SHIPPING SERVICES
Although competitive behaviour depends upon the motivations and decisions of 
individual firms, the general pattern of behaviour will be strongly influenced by 
environments in which firms operate. It is therefore important for this analysis to pay 
attention to the competitive environment in which suppliers of shipping services operate 
in geographically distinct markets. Business behaviour can then be related to the structure 
of the relevant industry or markets. (Shaw and Sutton 1976.p.l-3). In identifying such 
structures it is difficult to avoid a circular definition: the structure comprises those 
characteristics which are believed to be important for the determination of business 
behaviour. Thus, whether or not a particular characteristic is a relevant component of a 
structure is an empirical question, not a matter of definition, (ibid.p.3). However, there 
are some characteristics which are generally accepted as having a significant influence. 
Hence 'structure' refers to those factors that will determine and affect the economic 
performance of firms in the industry. Market structure is therefore, an aggregate concept, 
referring to certain ways in which each industry is structured or aligned. Experts claim 
that the salient dimensions of market structure pertain to buyer/seller concentration, the 
extent of product differentiation, entry conditions, and cost and demand conditions. To 
avoid any ambiguity, the following summarises the situation that:
'At times market structure has been defined much more broadly...so construed, 
market structure could embrace every objective circumstance- physicological, 
technological, geographical or institutional that might conceivably influence 
market behaviour. We do not espouse this concept of market structure here 
because a very loose and frequently ambiguous use of the idea of structure is 
involved, and also because meaningful inter-market comparisons and meaningful 
generalisations about the influence of structure of behaviour are effectively 
forestalled if the content of 'structure' is made so comprehensive that no two 
markets can be viewed as structurally alike...' (Kneafsey 1975, p. 8)
As noted previously, government action to regulate the economy and direct 
intervention to influence market structure, conduct, and performance forms part of the
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environment in which competitive rivalry takes place. This is the perspective to be 
adopted in this analysis. From this perspective, one can find that there are a number of 
characteristics of an industry and its environment that help determine the level of 
competitive rivalry in the industry. In order to determine the middle ground between 
excessive and inefficient competition, the components of market structure, the 
environment in which firms operate, and historical patterns and relevant institutional 
mechanisms that must be considered and these include concentration, the number and 
size of firms, diversity of competitors, entry and exit conditions, industry growth, 
intermediary intervention, and regulation.
The intention of this chapter is to discuss the components of the supply side of 
maritime industry. This includes actual and potential suppliers, who they are and how 
they are organised in the industry. Consideration will also be made in terms of the 
structural potential for competition either within the current competitive situation (for 
example, in contract for scheduled liner markets), or for profit-seeking companies 
already within the industry. Others have expressed the view that non-conference lines or 
independent operators, irregular operators and inter-modal firms should also be included 
as participants in the shipping liner market. When all such operators - major and 
incidental - are included, the number of participants in sectors are small. In economic 
terms the number is further reduced by cartel agreements. However, in a contestable or 
effectively competitive market, the small number of actual competitors involved in the 
process of price making will not deter potential entrants the number of which would be 
large from entering the market under favourable conditions. This is due to the inherent 
mobility of the requisite capital - the ships. As Dick (1987.p.41) argues that whether or 
not market structure is conducive to effective competition depends very much upon the 
ease of entry.
Subsequent discussion, however, will proceed systematically along the lines 
identified previously.
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4.1 MARKET STRUCTURE FACTORS
The Number and Equality of Competitors
When there are a large number of competitors in an industry, c e te r is  p a r ib u s , one 
would expect more competition. Under these circumstances, each firm considers itself to 
have minimal market power and acts as if its price cuts and marketing investments will 
have minimal effect on the industry. This will give rise to poor co-ordination between 
players due to their large numbers and hence give rise to uncertainty in the market place. 
The increasing uncertainty as to the relative costs and other operating factors of those 
firms, will heighten competition. However, in a concentrated industry, the dominant 
players will have substantial market control and this could result in exurbanite monopoly 
rents (economic profits). According to traditional thinking, this would affect industry 
performance and its contribution to general economic welfare.
4 .1 .1  Structure of Domestic Shipping Sector
It is important to divide the domestic shipping industry into the five broad 
geographic market segments. This is the appropriate level at which to examine supplier 
(supply of shipping services) concentration - at individual geographic service markets. 
These are:
1. Main Port to Main Port Service;
2. Papuan Coast Services (including Fly River);
3. North New Guinea Coast Services;
4. New Guinea Islands Services;
5. Inter-Island and Inland River Workboat Services.
Main Port Trade
In this trade, two distinct services can be identified. The main port to main port 
trade is divided into the southbound service (which covers Port Moresby to Lae, 
including Alotau, Oro Bay and ports of Kimbe, Rabaul and North Solomons (Buka and
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Kieta - under normal circumstances). The New Guinea island ports are 'add-ons’ as 
allowed by permits and by demand conditions which originate from either Port Moresby 
or Lae. A second feature is the southbound service which includes Lae to Vanimo 
including Madang, Aitape, Wewak and Lorengau. These are long haul routes and 
sometimes identified as the North New Guinea Coast services. This is predominantly 
serviced by the Lutheran Shipping Company (Luship). The southbound service is tied up 
by Consort Express Line (CEL). Its operational features are given in Table 4.1 and 4.2.
Table 4.1 Main Ports Trade - Consort Express Line
Owner/Operator Ship Name Function Ports Rotation Market Share
CEL Madang Coast General Cargo Pom/Alo/Oro/Lae/
Kie/Rab
Niugim Coast General Cargo Lae/Oro/Alo/Pom
Morobe Coast General Cargo Lae/Kie/Rab
PGN S Corp Lae Chief General Cargo Pom/Alo/Oro/1 .ae
Kie/R ab/ Ki nx Kav
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1 >  50%
Source: Data Source Transport Year Book, 1990.
Table 4.2 also deals with larger capacity vessels between 2200-2900 GRT, except 
the smaller Maneba (1000 GRT), which caters for general cargo and passenger services 
(being a multi-purpose vessel).
From table 4.1 and 4.2, two important inferences can be made:
i) the provision of the main ports services between Port Moresby/Lae/Oro Bay/ 
Alotau/ Kimbe/Kavieng, is shared exclusively between Consort Express Line, 
PNG Shipping Corporation (PNGSC) and Lutheran Shipping. Consort has three 
vessels that are on long term bare-boat charter, PNGSC has one vessel, and 
Lutheran has one multi-purpose vessel;
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ii) the marked difference in the number of vessels in each provides arises basically 
from Lutheran already owning Madang Coast and Maneba. The Shipping 
Corporation vessel is essentially on a lease-charter basis to pick up any extra 
cargo that may be available. The other two 'Coast' vessels are owned by the 
Century Group and Anton Lee Transport.
The total tonnage carried by Consort (three vessels) is estimated at 250,000 
tonnes per year and generates an estimated revenue of about 7.5 million kina . This is 
substantial given its monopoly status in the Port Moresby/Lae service where the majority 
of freight originates. This links with traditional reasoning where a small number of 
industry participants facilitate either formal or tacit collusion which leads to above normal 
profits. Their few number enhances co-ordination possibilities. In addition to this 
concentration effect there is the important aspect of market share. Consort Express Line 
has an approximate market share greater than 60 per cent. It is the market share of 
Consort rather than the degree of concentration that is the most important factor in 
determining profitability. It is also pointed out by Shepherds (1990.p.l 19) that market 
share is strongly associated with profit rates. This seems to be the main source of high 
profitability. Even when entry barriers are low, market share is still closely related to 
profit rates.
North New Guinea Coast (Northbound Service)
Ship operators serve about 30 ports. Some of these ports are served regularly 
(for example, Finshafen,Madang,Oro Bay,Wewak,Vanimo and Lorengau) while others 
are served only irregularly when there is sufficient cargo.
The operators have a combined fleet of various sizes dedicated to the service. The 
sizes are influenced by the nature of the route and the availability of shore-based 
infrastructure at the ports. Although the service is over-tonnaged, the provision of 
services is efficient. The dominant firm here is the Lutheran Shipping company. The 
point is that the Lutheran Shipping company, with a vested interest in Consort, has a
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guaranteed cargo, particularly trans-shipment cargo from Consort for onward shipment to 
northbound ports. Whilst this factor may be important for the possibility to impose 
market discipline on the services between main ports in the route, there is a general 
presumption that the presence of similarly sized operators in the main port/feeder or 
feeder/feeder services provides rivalry to Lutheran on these routes. There is a possibility 
that small operators vie for market leadership in these small routes, in the context of 
keeping Lutheran in the main port trade only, and reduce its market dominance in the total 
north coast market.
New Guinea Islands Services
There are presently two main carriers namely the Pacific New Guinea Line 
(PNGL) and the Coastal Shipping Company, with a total 12 ships of landing craft barge 
configuration (this type of ship is required because they often have to discharge cargo on 
beaches), plus two small operators, each with one small vessel. Although the operators 
schedule their vessels efficiently, the service is over-tonnaged. There is no evidence of a 
rationalisation of services due to licence restrictions which prevent the switching of 
vessels to more profitable routes.
Papuan Coast Services (Including Fly River)
There are three distinct operations, viz:-
i) Port Moresby eastwards to Milne Bay;
ii) Port Moresby westwards to Darn; and
iii) Port Moresby to Kiunga via Fly River.
The present Papuan Coast operators have a combined fleet of seven ships 
dedicated to the three operations (i-iii) - ships may be switched from one operation to 
others as and when their operation licenses allow this. Although the present services are 
irregular (on average, voyages last 10 days), they are considered to be reasonably 
efficient
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The most dominant common carrier is Laurabada Shipping company which has 
shareholdings from PNG Shipping Corporation and the Century Group of Companies. 
This serves the ports westwards to Kerema and Daru. A Western Tug Barge ( which is a 
subsidiary of the Century group) mainly services the mining and exploration companies 
with equipment and mineral shipments along the Fly River. However, it is mostly a 
contract carrier. PNG Shipping Corporation also operate services under the title of 
'MOLES' - which is also a contract-oriented service.
Inter-island Workboat Services
There is quite a large number of owner operated, family or corporative 
association- operated vessels servicing the industry. Most workboats operate on an 
inducement basis. Although cargo to specific destinations is often irregular, most 
workboats presently looking for business appear able to find continuous employment. 
Typically these boats are operated in small fleets and most commercial operators own two 
or three boats. These boats offer the only service to many smaller or more remote ports. 
They are consequently an essential part of the coastal and river shipping industry and are 
economically efficient.
Implications
In the Main Port to Main Port trade, there is definitely a monopoly operator, and 
Consort Express Line, with requisite capital back-up from Lutheran, Shipping 
Corporation and Anton Lee Transport, concentrates its resources on the trade quite 
efficiently. This enlarged market share induces sufficient profits to maintain high 
investment prospects. In collaboration with the Lutheran Shipping Company, it has a 
convincing monopoly on both the northbound and southbound routes. This implicit 
arrangement between the two operators gives rise to what is called a 'protected' duopoly. 
The stability of this duopoly minimises any competition from potential rivals.
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On the other trades, such as the Papuan Coast service, the Laurabada Shipping 
Company is the only common carrier, with substantial capital input from the Century 
Group and Shipping Corporation.
Thus in the above cases, there is substantial market failure or allocative 
inefficiency, although technical efficiencies have been realised.
In the New Guinea Islands trade, the two competitors are of similar size and this 
implies there is more competition over the shorter distance routes between Lae to Rabaul 
or Rabaul to Kimbe. The over-tonnaging could be attributed to the easy entry conditions 
inherent in this trade. The existence of smaller independent operators could provide 
some uncertainty in the market and could thus generate competition on the feeder routes. 
Thus fringe firms have a substantial effect on the overall stability of the market.
Finally, in the inter-island workboat service, the large number of firms or 
enterprises of roughly similar equal size generate considerable competition, but very little 
direct rivalry between the firms. Here, competition is intense in the sense that individual 
operators find it difficult to charge a price higher than that of their competitors, since the 
output of a single firm in terms of passengers and freight is minimal relative to the total 
market. This is illustrated by the fact that the market price set is a maximum of 54 and 
minimum of 49 kina per tonne/cubic metre. The operators are price takers rather than 
price-makers. The presence of effective competition and efficient utilisation of vessels 
imply technical and market efficiencies.
The primary market structure of the domestic maritime industry is therefore 
marked by a small number of operators with greater possibilities of co-ordination or 
collusive arrangements. These oligopolistic features are dominant in the industry and 
give rise to unbalanced inter-firm competition or competition in the market.
Economies of Scale
Economies of scale result from returns to scale but can be caused by changes 
outside the firm's control such as a change in the input price due to a change in the 
industry's rate of output. This point is commonly referred to as the minimum efficient
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scale (MES). If the minimum efficient scale is large, the new entrant may have to be so 
big that the older firms are bound to retaliate.
The existence of economies of scale in the main ports trade is the factor which 
justifies the dominant position of the Consort Express Line in the southbound service and 
Lutheran Shipping on the northbound service. The same can be said of other firms where 
economy of scale benefits have been exploited.
However, the current operations in the main port to main port trade are 
characterised by a containerisation level of 30% which is likely to rise to 80% in near 
future. Given the generally small volume of cargo and the small number of ships that are 
required to operate each of the services, it is believed that the current vessels are of an 
appropriate size for the trade. The hypothesis is that if 'plants’ in the size range x are 
surviving or increasing their share, then they must be efficient in all activities. 
(Shepherds, 1990, p. 230-31). This therefore suggests that the present size of vessels 
gives a crude approximate variable for MES. Ship size is given in terms of capacity 
(GRT) to a corresponding level of containerisation in Table 4.2. The problem, however, 
is that ship crew numbers vary between the largest vessels (2,750 dwt) with 15 crew, and 
smaller vessels (350 dwt) carrying 8 crew.
The three vessels (plus an extra for excess cargo) of similar design and size, 
provide an efficient shipping service in this trade. Companies with small size vessels 
intending to enter this trade would definitely suffer from losses of technical efficiency 
through having ships that are sub-optimal in size. Arguably, it may be that the smaller 
plants or vessels are significantly less efficient or indeed that the larger vessels are above 
the optimum size. Or, it may be that the cost function is such that the unit cost rises by 
little at sub-optimal levels of outputs. This relationship is shown in Figure 4 below.
This graph illustrates that the economy of scale would be exploited at the lowest 
possible unit costs, noted as A C  . If this market was served by two producers, each 
with a market of 1/2 MES, each producer would have costs higher than A C. Thus, 
having only one supplier in the area would serve consumers best by giving them access to 
services provided in the most efficient manner possible. In this sense, a monopoly would
6 4
be the 'natural solution' to serve the market. However, the problem with this is that by 
allowing only one seller or producer in a particular market, we have created a monopoly. 
Economic theory shows that a monopoly would have low costs through technical 
efficiency but with high prices- i.e. with allocative inefficiency. In a large populated 
market with many firms, there would be price competition but costs would be high.




Source: Oster, 1990, p. 293.
I m p l i c a t i o n s
Conceptually the barriers to entry are considered an important structural 
characteristic of an industry. The competitiveness and performance of an industry are 
generally assumed to be strongly influenced by its entry conditions. Ease of entry is an 
important factor influencing effective competition.
In the case of a monopoly situation that has been created, and for technological 
reasons, investment is typified by activity-specific capital (i.e. relevant to the market been 
serviced). This therefore necessitates the regulation of the monopoly to protect shippers 
and consumers from the excesses of monopoly but allowing them to reap benefits from 
low cost operation. This is indeed vital because shipping costs (total operational costs of
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supplies) are significantly important for operators conducting their scheduled services to 
geographical markets and regional markets.
If the MES is a significant fraction of the total market, it will be difficult for a 
newcomer to get a foothold in the industry. (CTPA Review, 1988, p. 258). Entry and 
exit by fringe firms are largely irrelevant to the position of the dominant firm. In some 
sectors of the main port trade, this is the case, but where markets or routes have 
overlapped (e.g.in case of services to Kimbe and Rabaul and Kavieng), competition from 
independent operators on this trade can force the dominant firm to behave competitively 
or to perform at an optimum level. This threatened entry can be used on the dominant 
firm’s monopoly routes. However, the problem is the cost of producing which must be 
borne by these independent firms as retaliation for them seeking to enter the monopoly 
markets. This implies a distortion in the allocation of resources from a social point of 
view.
Therefore, economies of scale can provide important barriers to entry in the case 
of main ports trade. They may appear unimportant in other trades, although in the 
substantially smaller market, the question of economy of scale, especially for small boats, 
has featured prominently in the ’de-facto' deregulated, inter-island workboat industry.
On the main ports trade, the present level of containerisation is only 30% of cargo 
but the economy of scale for the ships is likely to be exhausted at around a maximum of 
80% containerised cargo. The other four services vary from almost zero to about 10%. 
This is unlikely to rise substantially on these services as many of the small jetties and 
wharfs are not built for containers.
Product Differentiation
The nature of the product or service is an exogenous source that is embedded in 
the underlying conditions of the market. Because they exist outside the leading firm's 
control, they are fundamental causes that cannot be altered. (Shepherds, 1990, p. 274).
Product differentiation appears frequently as one of the factors explaining market 
dominance and/or the ability of existing leaders to preserve their dominance against
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competitive inroads. Product differentiation loses much of its competitive significance if 
competitors can eliminate it by simply replicating the physical characteristics of the 
product. It must be permanently specific to the firm rather than to the product or service 
which the firm produces. Its effectiveness depends upon the size and marketing 
experience of the existing firm. In a regulated industry marketing policy is an important 
strategic element.
Implications
Discussions with shipping companies makes it clear that efforts are made to 
establish a distinctive product identity by particular companies. Consort Express Line 
maintains a regular weekly service to southbound ports including such New Guinea 
island main ports as Kimbe, Rabaul and Kavieng, and sells its services on a pre-space 
booking basis for shippers over short routes. Another unique service feature is the trans­
shipment it makes onto Lutheran for northbound ports. However, the most distinctive 
service feature is that containerised cargo is likely to increase from 30% to 80% over the 
next 3 to 5 years. As noted previously, economies of scale would enhance the inherent 
efficiency of the productive process and consequently offer potential benefits to 
consum ers. This segment has required considerable investm ent to achieve 
improvements. The company appears to have stevedoring firms already operating at the 
main ports of Lae and Port Moresby, its monopoly route. Its association with other 
shipping agents and stevedoring firms at other main ports, on a debt or equity basis, has 
given it access to terminal and conventional stevedoring and agency services nationwide.
On the other hand, independent operators such as PNGL. Coastal Shipping or Pimco 
also have conventional stevedoring and agency services at Lae and Rabaul ports. 
Lutheran has stevedoring facilities in Lae and Madang. However, it appears that most of 
the shipping services on the coast are standard.
The ability to advertise frequency and scheduling also provides options to 
shippers deciding to ship their cargo.
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Finally, but most importantly, the product of established operators as a group is 
'differentiated' from that of prospective new entrants simply by the fact that they are 
already there. This idea of credibility which is costly has historical significance in that it 
is built up over many years before it becomes a trade mark, and could be costly for a new 
entrant to establish.
Whilst these could not foster a particular service image in the shipping industry 
and serve as a significant barrier to new entry, there are three inherent characteristics of 
established firms and the services they provide that a newcomer would find difficult to 
emulate and that could conceivably reduce competition:-
i) the provision of an integrated service package of conventional stevedoring, 
shipping agency, freight forwarding and overland freight transport services;
ii) nationwide coverage provided by major shipping companies in collusion; and
iii) the credibility that past performance endows established operators.
Capital Requirements
Capital requirement is related to plant or firm size, and to capital intensity.
The most general cost advantage is cheaper and more ample capital, which the 
established firms may have because of greater size and security. This 'size barrier to 
entry' especially inhibits entry into large, capital-intensive industries where the minimum 
efficient scale is large. Other cost advantages are patented processes (legal barriers), 
special access to raw materials and favourable locations. (Shepherds, 1990, p. 247).
Capital requirements in the shipping industry
The amount of capital needed to purchase 2500-3000 deadweight (dwt) capacity 
vessels is about 2150-2250 kina per dwt (1990 prices). To construct a general cargo 
ship of 60-85 metre length overall, the required investment is estimated at 6.75 million 
kina. It would be even higher for multi-purpose or specialised ships. With the
68
appropriate fittings and associated elements the total cost rises to around 8-10 million 
kina.
A general cargo ship of 30-60 metre length overall would be 300-1500 dwt. If 
fitted with a 10 tonne capacity crane, it would cost about 3000-3300 kina per dwt (1990 
prices) to construct. At end of the scale the total cost is about 5.20 million kina.
Passenger vessels with a carrying capacity of 300 passengers would cost about 
4100-4150 kina per dwt.
For a workboat-type vessel, the cost varies between 3600-4500 kina per metre 
(for 7-10 metre boats); 4500-5500 per metre (for 10-15 metre length overall for ships of 
survey length); and 5500-7500 per metre for 15-20 metre ships. These are wooden boat 
construction costs. Steel boats cost an additional 50% but are not a popular alternative.
The costs indicated for all different vessel categories will vary according to 
specifications regarding special features, lifting capacity (cranes, derricks,etc) and engine 
types and sizes. Prices will also vary according to world demand for any specific ship 
type.
As noted by the 1990 Transport Efficiency Study (TES), the coastal vessel at the 
end of their useful lives are either scrapped or sold. If sold for scrap, their value is only 
about 10% of the cost of a replacement vessel. If,however, they are sold as working 
ships, they can be sold for as much as 25-30% of their replacement costs. For purposes 
of costing, therefore, it seems reasonable to assume that a vessel purchased new will have 
a residual value of about 25% of the cost of its replacement cost. Workboats are 
considered to have working lives of about 20 years and no residual value. (TES Report 
1990, p. B:72-77).
Financing Costs
Shipping companies wishing to purchase large vessels will normally seek finance 
on the international market. Loans are normally in foreign currency, typically the US 
Dollar or Japanese Yen. The actual interest rate will often depend not only on the 
prevailing commercial interest rate for loans in the currency, but also on the ability of the
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manufacturer to generate preferential terms for customers. The TES study has assumed 
an average interest rate of about 8.5% per year over the life of the vessel. Loans for 
'workboats' are, however, assured to be at the prevailing 1990 rate for Kina (at a 
minimum of 15%).
Apart from capital costs, there are various other elements of cost over the 















These fixed and variable costs will also vary according to the type of ship, type of 
cargo carried on a route, distance and crew levels.
Therefore, in the main ports trade, the intrinsic capital requirements are relatively 
high. The development of an 'entry level' vessel capacity capable of carrying 80-85,000 
tonnes per annum would require an investment of about 6-7 million kina plus extra for 
specialised features.
Secondly, there is the substantial capital investment required for stevedoring and 
cargo handling equipment. The total approximate financial requirement would fall 
between 0.5-1.5 million kina, including mobile and immobile equipment. These are 
additional capital needs that elevate the entry level to the total industry, and mean a 
potential entrant needs to enter the industry with two products or services rather than one.
Thirdly, there is the notion of security required to acquire international loans, 
since it is the borrowed rather than the equity capital that becomes important. The
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question of risk bearing and/or to gamer a risk premium gives an additional risk which 
provides an impediment to entry.
However, despite the overlap between economy of scale and capital requirements, 
focussing specifically on the question of the need to raise entry capital does help to clarify 
two issues:-
Fixed and Sunk Costs
The high durability of firm-specific capital (fixed cost) does give rise to sunk 
costs, which make entry more risky. When entry necessitates incurring large sunk costs, 
this may discourage entry attempts. Sunk costs may include advertising (defensive 
advertising) to create brand loyalty, investment in equipment that has no other uses, and 
spending to create a marketing network. However, if all initial costs could be recovered 
immediately on exit, the amount of capital required to enter the market should be 
irrelevant to the entry decision.
Exit Conditions
Firms find themselves locked into a market when the resources they have acquired 
have little or no resale value or profitable alternative use. Their existence generates two 
effects. Firstly, it deters new entrants almost as effectively as entry barriers and 
effectively rules out the 'hit and run’ player. It also powerfully modifies the competitive 
behaviour of existing firms. Table 4.3 shows the level of exit and entry barriers that 
influence business behaviour.
Six examples of exit barriers that are likely to deter potential entrants have been 
identified by Burke at al (1988.p ). They include the following:- •
• asset specificity;




government pressures to stay in;
corporate commitment or lack of economic opportunities to move elsewhere. •
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Asset Specificity
Oster (1990) argues that all corporate organisations require some fixed assets to 
conduct their enterprises. The two distinctions between assets are:-
• the extent to which fixed assets are used, or, the ratio of variable costs to total 
costs within the industry; and
• the specificity of assets used from a strategic perspective.
One of the fixed assets of a shipping line is its ships. Ships have no alternative 
uses besides being used to carry passenger and freight traffic. In this sense, a vessel 
might be considered a specific asset from the perspective of the shipping line. On the 
other hand, if one thinks about the shipping market as having geographic component, the 
specificity of the asset diminishes considerably. However, regulatory restraints prevent 
the internal transfer of vessels between routes, and, if there were to be a transfer, it could
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only be accomplished either by the initial shipping line, or through the competitive resale 
market.
Thus, commercial organisations with large amounts of specific assets find exit 
from particular markets difficult. These assets have low opportunity costs (i.e. low 
economic costs).
In the case of the Consort Express Line, which is a monopoly in the main ports 
trade, the tie-in business connections with stevedoring companies at Lae and Port 
Moresby is a ’brand* of business linkage specific to its company. The vessels are 
specific for the trade to avoid under capacity utilisation on other sectors, and the 
information about the workings of any particular geographic market is also an important 
specific asset. This argument also applies to other shipping lines suited for other 
geographic markets. Curtain Brothers Marine (CBM) is mainly a specialised carrier on 
contract with mining, construction or exploration companies, carrying homogeneous 
cargo and also has specialised vessels, private suitable wharf facilities and associated 
operations, which are features prominent to the company. Hence, their heavy reliance on 
specific assets encourages such shipping lines to remain in the industry even during 
economic downturns because these assets have low opportunity costs. However, the 
resultant intense rivalry during recessions helps them cover at least part of their fixed 
costs.
Similarly, substantial direct investment in stevedoring equipment, machinery and 
inescapable lease payments by stevedoring companies operating terminal facilities at 
Harbours Board ports (i.e the main ports), increases the barriers to exit. The major 
stevedoring companies such as Port Services, United Stevedoring (CEL), Ray Stewart 
(CBM) and Kimbe Bay Shipping are within this category, at Port Moresby, Lae and 
Kimbe ports.
Fixed Costs of Exit
The most significant fixed costs of exit are often termination payments made 
under labour agreements. Such agreements work to minimise this cost. In periods of
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troughs with minimal cargo turnover at the waterfront for company A, permanent labour 
is reallocated on hire to company B which is experiencing a peak. Through the process 
of labour reallocation, company A can recover wage costs thereby minimising its costs. 
Further, 7% of wages is diverted into superannuation funds as savings for workers after 
retirement or retrenchment. Such institutional arrangements are covered under the labour 
agreements registered with the Employers Federation and the Government. Both the 
waterfront workers and seaman are members of the Papua New Guinea Waterside and 
Seamans Union (PNGWSSU).
Inter-firm Relationships
Some companies within the industry with branch networks at major ports and 
centres consider such coverage as a marketing advantage and maintain some unprofitable 
branch operations. Century Group, Consort Express Line and Steamships Group have a 
widespread branch network and view this as an important marketing point. This is 
characterised by the importance of stevedoring interests to shipping business and agency 
networks that preclude comprehensive exit.
Minimal opportunity- Corporate commitment
Almost all common carriers in the liner operations regard shipping and 
conventional stevedoring as 'core' businesses. Similarly, for the contract carriers, they 
regard specialised charter services as their ’core' businesses.
Since many of these companies have existed in the industry for the last 20-30 
years, and have competed against one another in many and varied sub-markets, co­
operative mechanisms have had time to grow and develop. However, in spite of 
externalities in the form of imperfect information and uncertainty, these organisations 
have committed their assets to the conduct of their enterprises to provide both economic 
and uneconomic services for a considerable period of time.
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Government and social restrictions
In the face of uneconomic operations and loss making resulting in the threat to 
withdraw services, it is only natural that political and social pressure may bear upon any 
company wishing to exit a market. An obvious example is the difficulties engendered by 
the Laurabada Shipping Company's decision to reduce its services to Gulf and Western 
ports. With physical constraints of a siltation problem preventing the berthing of vessels 
alongside the wharf, operators are now providing time-charter services instead of the 
regular fortnightly service. This has triggered political and social reaction pressuring the 
company to return to its regular services.
Implications
Shipping companies in the maritime markets have found themselves locked into 
markets for which they have acquired resources suitable for specific routes and 
geographic areas. Although the geographic market component is vital to the internal 
shipping network, transference to other specific services is relatively difficult. Even if 
resource shifting does occur, the investment would neither increase in value nor reduce its 
costs when applied to a different market.
The central argument is that the decision to use specific assets, as well as existing 
corporate commitments, fixed costs, inter-firm relationships and government and social 
restrictions, affect the firm's interaction in the maritime market. These are part of a 
complex strategic process. The problem with high exit barriers is that the prospect of 
achieving over capacity will be greater as the shipping market matures over time.
4.2 IN STITU TIO N A L FACTORS
Institutional mechanisms are developed to improve the ability of firms to co­
ordinate. Some of the facilitating devices have already been discussed in the previous 
section. This section assesses the notion of intermediary intervention because it is a 
distinctive feature of the shipping industry.
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The line agency or shipping agency system forms an integral part of the structure 
and development of the industry. Unlike general freight handling, routes for shipping 
services are sometimes highly variable, non-repetitive and unpredictable. Since this 
greatly increases the potential for costly empty back loads and constrains the market size, 
the establishment of inter-firm relationships to circumvent these problems has been a 
natural evolution. This has required co-operation by participating carriers in the form of 
joint ventures, and some central control through which activities could be co-ordinated. 
Thus, the agency system evolved to accommodate larger geographical markets through 
contractual arrangements with several agents positioned throughout the national market. 
This is the primary structure of the industry today.
Intermediary Intervention in Shipping Industry
The most important intermediary intervention in the market for shipping services 
is obviously the ship's agents, although there is a possibility that commodity board 
actions or decisions may also act to constrain or foster the introduction of alternatives. 
(CTPA Review, op.cit., p. 307-8)
A classic example of the industry are the organisational relationships illustrated in 
Figure 4.2. The principal company is the Century Group which is owned by Bums Philp 
and P & O (Australia) through Robert Laurie Company (RLC).
The Group has a special projects division specifically formed to enhance the 
group's transportation service to companies engaged in the development of natural oil and 
mineral resources. The objective is to offer a customised service to both developers and 
producers alike. The service can cover any requirement from the consolidation of project 
cargo at overseas locations for transportation to site, to individual sectors of the total 
route, from point of entry to the exploration or production area. This service is achieved 
through the cross co-ordination with the services offered by Century's associates, 
principals, subsidiaries and joint venture companies through the one local point of 
contact, the Special Project Division (SPD).
7 6
Figure 4.2 Inter-firm  Relationships in Century Group
Siemens Plessey PanalpinaOil &
Airport Division Energy Division
Source: Century Group, 1992.
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Thus, it is apparent that Bums Philp, the Steamships Group, and the Century 
Group of Companies (CGC) have vested interests in each other's operations. Since the 
market is substantially small, there are overlapping interests between these integrated 
firms through the positioning of shipping agents and conventional stevedoring services.
4.3 OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
This section identifies the environment that help determine the level of competition 
in the industry. The two most important environmental factors are government 
regulation, and supply and demand conditions or industry growth.
Government policy and regulations
Government actions inevitably condition the environment in which market 
conduct is determined, and the government may intervene directly to influence market 
structure in specific industries.
Firstly, government macro and microeconomic policies can affect the level of 
demand facing industries, and indeed the entire economic climate. Examples often cited 
include import taxes and purchase taxes, international trade policy concerns the level of 
tariffs and import quotas as reflected in (import taxes and customs duties). According to 
industry participants, the import duty levied upon an imported vessel ranges between 8% 
(for cargo vessels), 3-4% for fishing boats, 100-129% for pleasure crafts/boats, and 30­
35% on ship spare parts, life rafts,etc.
Secondly, there is entry regulation. Coasting trade licensing requirements affect 
both the structure and conduct of industries. Industry participants have to meet 
conditions required before coastal trading licences are granted. The most important 
conditions are the appropriateness of vessels with due regard to changing trends in the 
type and volume of freight traffic to be handled, and vessel condition and safety aspects.
Thirdly, there is price control policy. Price agreements, sanctioned or prohibited 
through price control, affects sections of the industries, as do the breakdown of resale 
price maintenance or other discriminatory pricing practices.
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If price control regulation reduces the price which operators can charge to a level 
below a monopoly price, then it has the same effect as limiting the length of a franchise or 
permitting entry. Regulated prices or lower prices may mean private firms will want to 
wait for the market to grow until they can recoup the initial sunk costs. Market growth is 
therefore important in influencing competition.
Market Growth
Porter (1980, p. 164) argued that industry growth is one of the key variables in 
determining the intensity of competition in an industry. It sets the pace of expansion 
required to maintain market share, thereby influencing the supply and demand balance 
and the inducement the industry offers to potential entrants.
Growth in the Domestic Shipping Industry
As noted in Chapter 3, imports and exports generate the largest volume of freight 
traffic for transportation modes. Imports account for twice as much tonnage as exports 
and those that are shipped are handled via main ports. A small proportion of cash crops 
like copra and cocoa also originate from feeder ports to the main ports. The proliferation 
of small-holder agricultural holdings and retail outlets derived as spin-offs from nearby 
mining projects, have encouraged freight and passenger movement between smaller and 
feeder ports. Similarly, access to credit facilities and participation in the cash economy 
are but some of the underlying reasons why freight and passenger movement between 
coastal communities have gradually grown over the years. The principal explanation, 
therefore, would be the induced tonnage effect from development oriented projects 
thereby influencing demand for shipping services. This is illustrated in the Tables in 
Appendix A.
Although major ports like Lae and Port Moresby have experienced substantial 
cargo turnover in the last decade or so, some produce and project-oriented ports have also 
picked up due to mining and agricultural projects. However, despite these freight traffic
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movements, it is premature to say that some sections of the shipping and waterfront 
industries have experienced rapid growth in recent years.
With this growth in import cargo which has dominated domestic and inter-island 
freight traffic, and with the growth of development related projects, the demand for 
shipping transport has increased relatively. However, although price control and entry 
regulations have provided relative ’control' on the behaviour of firms in this small 
maritime market, growth in number of participants particularly as cross traders has still 
overtaken freight volume giving rise to this imbalance. Hence, the next chapter 
specifically examines the demand for freight transport with regard to the analytic concept 




THE DEMAND FOR SHIPPING SERVICES
5.1 INTRODUCTION
The Concept of Demand in Partial Equilibrium Analysis
As noted in the previous chapter, demand conditions are an important element of 
market structure. In economics the quantity of any commodity demanded is primarily 
determined by its price. At a higher price, a lesser quantity will be demanded than at a 
lower price, all other things being held constant. This is the law of demand. That means 
the quantity demanded of any commodity is inversely related to that commodity's price, 
all other things been equal. The horizontal summation of these individual price/quantity 
relationships gives rise to market-clearing, or equilibrium, where there is no net tendency 
to change as market forces are balanced. However, a change in price will cause a 
movement along the demand curve (i.e. a change in quantity demanded), all other things 
being constant. In essence, such partial equilibrium analysis allows us to focus on the 
freight shipping market and view it in isolation from other markets. The problem, 
however, is that the dynamics of demand for shipping is not fully captured in static partial 
equilibrium diagrams.
Just as general equilibrium analysis does not allow all other things to vary, partial 
equilibrium analysis does not require all other things to be held constant. This is because 
there are other variables besides price that affect the demand for freight transport. These 
variables include the price of all other goods (particularly close substitutes or 
complements), income, population, aspects of service, and development-related 
activities. Changes in these non-price variables will cause a shift in the demand curve 
(referred to as a change in demand). Something must be exogenous (i.e. determined 
outside the system) or 'given' for us to start the analysis.
Static demand curves are used to illustrate the methodological issues.
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5 .1 .1  The Demand for Freight Transport
Freight transport involves the movement of goods from point A to point B. It 
allows for the bringing together at a specified location those resources used in production 
processes as well as providing access to markets for the resulting products. The demand 
for shipping transport (or any freight transport), is derived, that is, it is a means to an end 
and not an end in itself. Freight shipping is demanded, since goods are demanded at 
locations where they can be used - that is, the derived demand is dependent on output. 
According to Pearman et al (1985), shipping creates a value by creating place and time 
utility. Place utility is made when goods are moved to the locations where they can be 
used; and time utility is created when goods arrive according to schedule. That is, 
ordinary or Marshallian demand is derived by maximising a representative firm's output 
and results in a simultaneous increase in consumer utility. This gives both income and 
substitution effects for price change. Other variables such as like taste, service quality, 
time, specified degree of security, safety and speed that continually change and hence 
affect the demand for freight transport are therefore important. Such factors also include 
certainty of timing, freedom from interruption, avoidance of damage, pilferage and 
availability of ancillary services. Thus, shippers might rank available transport quite 
differently depending on preferences in maximising utility. In many markets, 
particularly for higher valued freight and passenger travel, quality variables may be more 
important than price.
5 . 1 .2  Freight Rates and Service Quality
Studies have, however, confirmed the general view that rates and quality of 
services both pull in the same direction. The non-price attributes of most importance to 
shippers in influencing shipment choice or allocation as a whole were: speed of delivery, 
or the reliability of meeting scheduled arrival time at a destination as correlated with transit 
time; availability of capacity when required, correlated with frequency; low loss and 
damage level ( i.e.avoidance of damage, deterioration, loss and theft), provision of 
special containers, provision of shipping networks, low packaging costs, regular
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collection of consignments, good customer relations, performance of services on 
delivery, and avoidance of rate and service comparisons. (After Sharp 1970 in Gwilliam 
& Mackie 1980; BTCE Report No.75, 1992, p. 26).
This is not peculiar to transport. Product differentiation, as noted in chapter 4, 
constitutes an attempt to meet more satisfactorily the demand for a particular characteristic 
or group of characteristics for some consumers at least, than any alternative product, 
whilst retaining an acceptable performance in other respects. That is, the demand for 
freight is determined by a complex hierachy of choices. This hierachy can be structured 
on the basis of the time lag involved affecting decisions in response to changes in the 
transport system or market situation. A simple hierachy is shown in figure 5 below.
Figure 5 Choice H ierachy in Freight Transport 




5 .1 .3  Decision M akers in T ranspo rta tion  (Shipping)
There are many individuals, firms and institutions whose decisions interact to 
affect the movement of goods and individuals. Pearman et al (1985, p. 3) have identified 
three groups:-
i) providers of shipping services;
ii) users of shipping services, and
iii) government.
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In the previous chapter we identified the number and type of operators in the 
maritime market. There are common carriers servicing liner operations for hire and 
reward, contract carriers carrying 'homogeneous' cargo under contract provisions with 
mining and construction companies, and private carriers (mostly in the workboat sector) 
who operate own-account as well as on cash inducements. These are individuals, 
business firms and other joint ventures that form part of the supply-side.
The operators, in undertaking the function of meeting demand, will incur costs; 
the shipper and receiver will incur various logistic costs (i.e. inventory and order 
processing costs, etc). If publicly provided infrastructures are used, transport 
movements may place costs on society (external costs).
The government's policy decisions about transport services affecting the 
movement of goods and persons has also been analysed briefly. The intention of this 
chapter is to assess the demand for shipping freight services in the context of the 'Derived 
Demand' model, and examine how it affects industry structure and competition.
5 .1 .4  Users of Shipping services
Ship users (shippers or receivers) are a group of decision-makers that affect the 
movement of goods and persons. In freight transport, users are shippers and receivers. 
These shippers could be individuals, groups or corporate firms (and can be both shippers 
and receivers). The actions of the users of the services constitute the demand for this 
service. However, unlike the production of a physical commodity, a transport service 
will not be provided unless those who demand the service take part in its provision. 
Specifically, even though operators are willing and able to transport goods, the actual 
movement of freight will not take place unless shippers are willing to ship goods, or 
receivers are willing to receive goods. In shipping, for example, the receiver will have to 
enter into a multi-order contract or ordering routine with a ship operator, thus making the 
choice of supplier more of an intermediate-run decision than either the decision on mode 
or shipping size. (Pearman. op.cit; Gwilliam & Mackie 1980; Abdelwahab et al., 1992,
p. 58).
5.2 NON-PRICE ATTRIBUTES
5.2 .1  Service Quality
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According to Lancaster's approach, a product is viewed as a bundle of 
characteristics. Consumers derive utility from the characteristics embodied in the product 
or service rather than from the product per se. Hence, quality embodies such dimensions 
as performance, features, reliability, conformance, durability, serviceability, and 
perceived quality. As noted earlier in the chapter, these could include primary non-price 
attributes contained in each unit of priced attribute or as a subjectively weighted average 
of characteristics. They all incorporate the concepts of characteristics and quality of a 
product. Lancaster argues that the quality of a product will improve if there are increases 
in the quantities of some characteristics per unit of the product or service.
The measurement of service quality in transport involves the identification of an 
appropriate theoretical framework and a consistent approach for a variety of service. 
Given data limitations the construction of these measures involves significant 
approximations.
Lancaster's theory of consumer demand which views goods or services as 
bundles of characteristics, provides a framework for analysing the concept of quality. 
There is current debate over the relative importance of subjective and objective 
components in the concept of quality.
Neo-classical theory specifies conditions for levels of quality that maximise social 
welfare. For a variety of reasons as noted earlier, actual quality may diverge from these 
levels. The measurement of service quality in transport will focus on indentifying 
changes in quality levels over time and comparing them between firms.
BTCE (1990) identified 29 aspects of service quality that are applicable to 
transport and communications services indicating that service quality is a complex and 
multi-dimensional concept. However, those aspects relevant to the focus of this study 
and which may affect consumer utility, should approximate a measure of service quality. 
Measures of service quality do complement usual pricing, and financial and productivity
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measures. However, as pointed out at the outset, the approach of WTP is used to 
estimate consumer and society benefits.
5 . 2 .2  Willingness To Pay (WTP)
From previous discussions, it was assumed that the demand for freight transport 
is relatively elastic. Given the obvious difficulties of obtaining cross-sectional data to 
permit a measurement of elasticities, the WTP concept is being adopted to estimate 
consumer willingness to pay which would, in turn, reflect those benefits for the 
consumer and for society. This involves consumer valuations of service variables such 
as safety, quality and other factors influencing demand. It is probably the most relevant 
methodology to evaluate benefits and costs to consumers and society as a whole.
In pure neo-classical, economic theory specifications for social welfare 
maximisation are given. In each case, the optimal level is at the point where the marginal 
cost of increasing quality is equal to consumers' willingness to pay for a marginal 
increase in service quality. This assertion is an over-riding objective in welfare 
economics. Here, important implications include willingness to pay or the ability to pay, 
given prevailing income distributions and the distributional effects of pricing policies 
aimed at optimal resource allocation being ignored. This presumption is based on the 
view that an elected government is responsible for redistributing income through the 
tax/transfer system, and this can be done effectively. That is, if there are any divergences 
from the pure neo-classical theory, then the government may intervene through initiatives 
such as community service obligations.
Implications of WTP
In practice, however, the quantity of a product such as a service may diverge 
significantly from the social optimum specified by neo-classical theory. These 
divergences may reflect the impact of factors such as imperfect information or monopoly. 
These factors, as noted previously in Chapters 2 and 3, can affect supply and demand 
relationships and hence social welfare.
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Society's benefits would be higher than individual demand curves and would 
arise from economic development projects centred around coastal and peripheral island 
communities. The improvement of agricultural, and particularly plantation, production 
and fisheries extension networks would occasion growth in transport investment and 
growth in the demand for shipping services. Even mining ventures generating 
employment opportunities in these island communities provide a net positive growth in 
the demand for shipping services. There is a tonnage effect that encourages competition 
and efficiency among operators. These result in lower prices and safe efficient services. 
Thus, there would be net societal benefits arising form such economic development 
activities.
5 .2 .3  Relevance of service quality
With regard to the domestic transport, shipping services are important for the 
quality and distribution of customers' goods. Service frequency and regularity and 
'freight rates' are considered important in the choice of shipping services, that is, both 
rates and quality have the same weight. This is more evident in 'highly contestable' 
markets where two or three operators are providing shipping services. The availability of 
alternative supply is important for the service from Lae to Rabaul, to Kimbe, to Kavieng 
and to Oro Bay. These are mostly short routes and therefore scheduling efficiency is 
extremely important.
The same principle could be attributed to the main ports trade but again, the 
importance to consumers of efficient shipping and stevedoring services tends to 
undermine a shipper's negotiating position.
Similarly, with regard to workboat services the large number of operators reflect 
effective competition and the minimisation of market control. They are all price takers of 
the 'standard' charge that been set collectively irrespective of cargo type or distance. 
Thus, the willingness to pay for service quality between shippers varies, not in terms of 
price but in terms of other influential variables affecting their utility. This is due to the 
derived nature of the demand for the shipping services.
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5 .2 .4  Volum e of Custom
In this case attention is focussed on the types of shippers (receivers) using freight 
services. The different types of users arise from the geographic market boundaries within 
the domestic and inter-island network. With respect to main ports and large secondary 
ports, there are business firms with significant resources and market intelligence, large 
enough to consume significant proportions of a supplier's output. Most of them are both 
shippers and receivers of bulk and non-bulk shipments over long or short hauls.
S h ip m e n ts  o n  L in e r  s e r v ic e s
Manufacturers and Distributor Companies
The most obvious users of this category include brewing companies such as 
South Pacific Brewery (a manufacturer of beer and soft drinks in cans and botdes), with a 
total monthly shipment of 10,000 tonnes/cubic metres of palletised cargo to ports in 
Kerema and also between Lae and Port Moresby with an outward shipment of 100,000 
tonnes and 90,000 tonnes of inward cargo on both Lutheran Shipping and the Consort 
Express Line (Shippers Council, 1992). Shipments to other ports are also made on these 
companies. This is definitely a two way trade, and can be depicted in the diagram below:
Figure 5.1 Price & Quantity Relationship fo r Large Shippers such as S. P. Brewery
88
A distinction needs to be made here because many shippers of this category use 
common liner operation carriers, while oil companies, such as Mobil and Shell Oil use 
contract carriers, either permanent or from the open charter market and derived from liner 
operations. For example, Lutheran Shipping, under open charter ships about 80,000 
litres of oil,petrol and kerosene in drums per month from Lae port to Shell depots in 
Popondetta at the normal coastal freight rates of about 45 kina per tonne/cubic metre 
meaning, 80 cubic metres at 45 kina or 3,605 kina over a distance of 108 nautical miles. 
This situation suggests that there is a shortage of supply of specialised vessels.
Amalgamated Packaging (NG) Pty Ltd ship a freight value of approximately 
12,000 revenue tonnes per week or 24,000 per month. Most of this is containerised 
cargo (i.e 10 full container load being 20m3 x 10= 300m3 and 4 nine metre containers per 
week). This shipment occurs between Lae and Port Moresby and from Lae to other ports 
serviced by Lutheran.
Fletcher Manufacturing ships 63 cubic metres per month on Consort, Pacific New 
Guinea Line, and Lutheran. The total monthly freight value is about 6000 kina.
BHP Lysaght (PNG) Pty.Ltd uses 20 cubic metres (hull) of cargo per month at a 
value of about 8,500 kina, using it uses Consort, Coastal Shipping, Curtain Brothers and 
Pacific New Guinea Line (PNGL).
Pacific Industries Pty Ltd despatches 135 cubic metres of cargo out of Rabaul on 
Coastal Shipping, Pacific New Guinea Line or Consorts. Wills (PNG) Limited ships a 
monthly freight of about 600 cubic metres at an estimated value of 8000 kina. These 
monthly shipments account for about 80% of shipping space. The major operators used 
include Lutheran Shipping out of Madang and Consort out of Lae.
Economic Implications
From information provided by the small number who have responded to a 
questionaire sent to a representative sample of some 20 shippers and receivers, it has 
become obvious that there is no one operator nor shipper (receiver) that raise any 
concern. Arguably this could be due to the scheduling and 'information provision'
89
efficiency of the suppliers that might influence these demand patterns. In most cases, 
cargo is transported across longer distances on a quite irregular basis. Also, as is 
revealed by the data, the portion of transport costs relative to total production costs 
ranges between .11% (at the lowest level) and 4% to 10% at the relatively higher level).
This leads to the argument by Gwilliam & Mackie (1975.p.53) that for most 
manufactured goods, transport costs represent a very small proportion of the total 
delivered costs of production. Consequently the demand for freight transport services as 
a whole is relatively insensitive to changes in transport costs. The short run price 
elasticity of demand (i.e the responsiveness of quantity demanded to changes in relative 
price) as a whole is relatively low. In the short term, when the location of producers and 
consumers are fixed, there are no close substitutes for transport as whole - i.e. no 
substitution effects.
However, in the long term, factors may vary and higher price elasticities may 
apply. Trade patterns may change in response to variations in transport costs, and 
production activities may be relocated. It may be that government investment decisions 
on transport infrastructure could encourage this relocation of activities in order to reap 
benefits from economies of scale in operations, thus improving social welfare, or, in the 
case of operators, any expansion of supply by acquiring larger vessels (to reap economy 
of scale benefits) would meet such increases in demand.
Bulk Shipments on Contract Carriers
Contract carriers are specialised shipping operations tendering their services for 
charter. Chapter 3 has outlined the spatial structures of their services. They operate 
dominantly under permanent charter arrangements with construction and mining 
companies, exploration or 'MOLES'. Oil companies such as Mobil and Shell also charter 
specialised tanker services from within the available suppliers internally or from overseas 
under contract agreements. Price dispersion does exist for 'homogeneous' bulk cargo 
and also, for charter vessels with similar specialised features, and for carriage of similar
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goods. This is the reason why consumers buy at different prices from different 
operators.
Oil Companies
Shell Oil Company ships 600,000 litres of fuel or gas oil on MV Pactara 
(chartered permanently from Pacific Tank Ships P/L) to Misima mine. This is the full 
capacity of the vessel. Logging companies such as Stettin Bay Lumber Company 
(SBLC) of Kimbe and Ribunan Hijou Logging Company of Port Moresby also receive 
bulk fuel shipments from Shell. At other times, shipments are made on the Consort 
Express Line as fuel in drums out of Lae to Kimbe or Rabaul.
Shippers to places like Wasu, Finschafen, Siassi and other outlying small coastal 
communities also receive petrol, kerosene and diesel in drums from Shell. The shippers 
at these places meet the costs of freight after purchasing at depots with full approved 
tariffs applying.
Most of Shell’s bulk shipments originate from Madang servicing areas such as 
Popondetta (Oro Bay), in competition with Mobil Oil in terms of bulk fuel supply.
Mobil Oil, on the other hand, utilises Consort and Lutheran, and uses Allan 
Estates (Pimco Shipping) to carry excess capacity. Otherwise it uses a vessel 
permanently chartered from Dilmun Navigation (Aust) Pty.Ltd to meet its shipping 
demands. The charter rate is about 3,100 kina per day. Table 5.1 gives the volume of 
bulk shipments shared between the four carriers out of Lae.





30,000 Aviation Alotau 639 F/N
20,000 Fuel Oro Bay 350 F/N
20,000 Fuel Aitape 976 monthly
20,000 Fuel Wewak 699 monthly
14,000 Fuel Lorengau 674 weekly
10,000 Fuel Finschafen 140 monthly
114,000 3,170
Source: Mobil Oil Co., Lae
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Bulk shipments are normally tendered out as a franchising solution, to low cost 
bidders to transport supplies at given times. However, for more dangerous and highly 
flammable liquids such as Avgas, Mogas, motor spirits, and DPK (Duel Purpose 
Kerosene), premium rates are being charged. Again, the specialised nature of the trade 
and cargo-type demands a premium price. The willingness to pay for these features are 
important components of the bulk shipper's derived demand for shipping transport. The 
speed and frequency of delivery to meet the rising demand for fuel are highly significant. 
In such a situation, the shippers lack bargaining power and are therefore subject to 
operator terms and conditions, but the safety variable remaining important.
Mining Companies
Ok Tedi Mining Company charters 3 bulk carriers under a time-charter basis from 
the PNG Shipping Corporation (PNGSC). All vessels are under a 10 year lease basis. 
They transport copper-ore concentrate down the river for export purposes. The MV Svan 
Borg Guardian is also hired from Curtain Brothers Marine (CBM) for transporting project 
specific cargo to the mine site and township. The cargo originates from Townsville and 
is then shipped to Lae for onward transportation to Kiunga. Some of the CBM vessels 
also ship similar cargo for Misima mine in Milne Bay Province.
Cheveron (Niugini P/L) charters bulk ships from PNGSC under a spot-hire basis 
with charges range between 2000-4000 kina for the Lake Kutubu Oil Project. Similar 
transport services under the concept of the above mentioned MOLES (Mineral Oils 
Logistics Expediting Services), provided by PNGSC usually for the shipment of costly 
equipment, is common. The ships can carry an average of 10,000 tonnes of project 
equipment at any one time between ports or locations.
Timber Companies
As noted previously, the timber companies and construction firms also control a 
substantial share of bulk shipments. The growth in this trade is high in the initial stages 
when new areas are being opened up for development purposes.
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One of the significant features of this type of shipper is the presence of positive 
transaction costs. The 'homogeneous' tradeable commodities are governed by contractual 
obligations - that is, tradeable goods, terms of settlement and conditions are all laid down 
by the authorities of exchange between shipper and charterer. These rules and conditions 
regulate the shipping activities between the parties. Moreover, the permanency of 
contracting agreements minimise externalities of information, divergent interests, and 
spatial dislocations. Figures 5.2 a,b approximate the changes affecting demand.
Fi g u re 5.2 Effect o f Bulk Shipments on Price
pi Pi
excess excess demand = supply shortage
capacity
At Pz, excess demand is experienced and suppliers either maintain price at 
Pz and extend output to qz", or 'equilibrium' is reached at Px as ships under 
permanent and open charter meet the demand at qx".
N o n - B u lk  W o r k b o a t  S h ip m e n ts
The users of the inter-island workboats fall into three categories: -
i) Provincial Governments;
ii) Small retail or plantation owners; and
iii) Subsistence farmers and/or individuals.
P r o v in c ia l  G o v e r n m e n ts
Provincial governments are one of the major customers of workboat services. 
The government charters larger boats to transport relief supplies to out-stations, health 
centres, hospitals, patrol posts and schools, as well as to local constituency as part of
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elected representatives commitments to their people. The charter rates vary between 300­
480 kina per day dependent on the size of the ship.
W hilst charter services are competitively priced, a 'standard' freight rate of 54 
kina per tonne (cubic metres) at the top bracket, and 49 kina per tonne as a minimum price 
exist.
B u s in e s s  V e n tu r e s
Retail outlets or plantations also utilise great a deal of shipping space for the 
shipment of consumable items. Plate 5.1 illustrates this class of shipper and the types of 
cargo being transported. Fuel are mostly in drums, and in many cases, these goods do 
not belong to one person, but because the ship provides a multi-stop transport service, 
they belong to a variety of minor shippers. These multi-stop port calls at even small 
feeder ports are important determinants of shippers' demand for transport services and it 
affect consumer utility. The major backhaul cargo is copra on workboats to the main port 
at Alotau from local plantations. The charges are variable ranging between K 2, to K 3 or 
K 5 per bag of copra. Similar charges also apply in other island dominated regions of the 
country where workboats play a significant freight transportation role. Figure 5.3 
illustrates the effect on demand of this type of shipper.
F igure 5.3 Dem and (W TP) o f Retailers fo r workboat services
9 4
S u b s is te n c e  F a r m e r s
Small irregular shippers are a characteristic of this last group of ship users who are 
small subsistence producers of cash crops using transport to markets at nearby patrol or 
mission stations, such as Salamo, Misima, Losuia or Alotau. Shipments of wooden 
artifacts from Trobriand islands to Misima is another growing trade using workboat 
services. The demand and price relationships is given in the Figure 5.4.
Figure 5.4 Price & Dem and Relationship for m inor shippers
The commercial practices of negotiation that sometimes occur in main ports trade, 
have little application to the workboat inter-island feeder transportation network. The 
freight charge is 54 kina or 49 kina per tonne, though understandably most charge the 
maximum price, and is a rate set collectively as the freight rate. Since they are small- 
volume shippers, operators do dictate terms and conditions of shipments. There is little 
leverage to demand price concessions, freight absorptions and other special 
considerations. The rates are in fact non-negotiable.
However, although there are alternative modes available to service remote 
communities, the prices of services and the degree of accessibility determine the level of 
their utilisation. The willingness to pay for a faster service is minimal due to market 
imperfections.
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5 .2 .4 .1  Relevance of Volume of Custom
Transportation is an intermediate input and its demand is a derived one, depending 
on its productivity and efficient utilisation.
The physical output produced by liner or workboat services, namely freight 
transport services, cannot be stored or adjusted rapidly. The revenue potential of 
shipping space is therefore irretrievably lost if unsold. This situation has the following 
implications:-
• marketing experiments become more risky. It is difficult and costly to alienate the 
market if only temporarily;
• more generally, costs in the form of lost revenue of even a temporary loss of 
custom, mean that stable patronage is of relatively greater importance to the 
shipowner;
• ship operators may use extra ordinary measures to attract custom which may 
include rebating or other immediate attempts to steal customers from rivals. 
(Davies. 1983). Over the longer term, the persistent existence of unused space is 
likely to encourage strategic policies of cargo attraction that may include pricing 
incentives to non-traditional commodities and market development initiatives.
The significance of the above factors is that they indicate reasons why the industry 
may have developed such practices as ’loyalty ties', collusive arrangements, market 
sharing arrangements, and rate differentions rather than any calculated restraint on trade, 
although the latter is also obviously contributory to particular interests of profit-seeking 
firms. Possibilities for this option are a function of the industry's wider competitive 
environment.
Flexibility of Production
In liner shipping, capacity reductions are very difficult to introduce to the market 
as these normally require the withdrawal of individual vessels, and this in turn will
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usually reduce the supplied frequency of services. Consequently, output reductions will 
simultaneously reduce the quality of service and therefore may tarnish user perceptions of 
the carrier concerned, especially if it means adding to the user's inventory costs. 
(Davies, 1983).
The inability of carriers immediately to change the physical volume of output 
supplied, coupled with the need to supply its target market with demonstrable services, 
poses additional difficulties to the output dimension.
The volume of cargo commanded by a customer will be effective in improving its 
negotiating position if there are substantial fixed costs in the supplying industry. It would 
be detrimental to a supplier to 'allow' a buyer's decision to switch his or her custom 
elsewhere. For this reason, one might expect that volume would carry most weight in the 
shipping and stevedoring sector.
Power derived from the control of volume will be unequally distributed between 
shippers in the main ports trade and may have cross-subsidy implications where some 
users are cross-subsidising those with special rates.
In most aspect of the industry, suppliers tend to be concentrated more than 
shippers. Concentration is highest in main port operations where collusive arrangements 
are relatively common.
5 .2 .5  Quality of Information
As noted previously, imperfect information or monopoly can affect service quality 
or volume of custom and hence social optimum.
Imperfect information
Consumers generally base their assessment of service quality or safety of existing 
suppliers on limited information. Large firms with extensive marketing networks have 
limited information on services to feeder ports, and likewise, shippers in feeder services 
have little information of services in the domestic main ports trade. In the case of safety, 
consumers will not obtain direct information about safety quality unless the carrier’s
9 7
performance as revealed by accidents or reported pilferage of cargo, is available. These 
information costs or transaction costs require resources of time and money.
Thus any assessment of quality would be partial and imperfect and hence they 
will often adopt various second best strategies to choose between competing services, 
that is, prices may be used as an indicator of quality.
Whilst good information can make co-operation easier, imperfect information will 
induce asymmetries between suppliers and shippers, to the degree that sellers are more 
informed about product quality than buyers. According to Tirole (1989 in BTCE p.15), 
if quality of product or service raises producer's costs, and level of quality is ascertained 
after it is bought by the consumers, then sellers may have an incentive to reduce quality to 
the lowest level possible to maximise profits. This will occur between one-time shippers 
who cannot claim under legal processes. This situation is depicted in Figure 5.5.
Figure 5.5 Effect o f Externalities on Demand for Shipping Freight Services
On the contrary, if buyers are better informed than sellers, then they can induce 
more price-cutting, since detection and retaliation by suppliers will be slower. This tilt 
towards buyers is most likely to occur in markets where an alternative supply of similar 
capacity is available, thereby enabling the buyers to easily comparison shop. Figures 5.6 
a and b show the effect of these changes in prices.
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Figure 5.6 Absence o f Externalities & Effect on Prices
Maintaining price at (competitive level) Py produced extend resources to 
meet this interest demand.
Generally shipping information on schedules is quite good. This can be between 
shipping agents and potential shippers in the main ports and secondary feeder ports.
The provision of information to the shippers on aspects outside the regulatory 
authority's responsibility is, however, severely limited.
M in im is in g  d iv e r g e n c e s  f r o m  o p t im a l  q u a li ty
In situations where consumers have imperfect information there are several factors 
available to move closer to the theoretical optimum either by improving information to 
consumers or by providing incentives to producers. These factors include: •
• repeat purchases which offer consumers some means of monitoring quality;
• the provision by the producer of a full warranty for the quality of the product in 
order to improve the firm's competitive position;
• the protection of brand names and the effects of poor quality on a producer's 
broader reputation;
• dissemination of information about quality by consumer organisations through 
channels such as consumer magazines;
• the provision by regulators or trade associations of an objective measure of quality 
in one or more dimensions (for example, through product labelling);
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• the existence of independent product certification, supplier accreditation and
national standards procedures. (BTCE Report, 1989, p.15)
W hilst the above factors are mostly applicable to the consumer good 
manufacturing sector, their relevance to service industries like shipping can be addressed 
through governments setting minimum standards for service safety quality or input - i.e. 
through shipping safety regulations. However, if minimum standards are set too high, 
then consumers may be adversely affected as their preferred combination of price and 
lower service quality may not be available. Similarly, the provision of information 
through trade associations such as the National Shippers Council (PNGSC) or the Ship- 
users Committee can minimise information deficiency and such externalities as social 
costs of accidents.
The Role of National Shippers Council
The PNG Shippers Council (PNGSC) has a membership base of some 54 
shippers, mostly importers and exporters. The types of membership are shown in Table
5.1 .
Information provision between the shippers themselves is quite weak due to the 
fact that the council is still going through a learning curve at this initial stage. However, 
the Council does provide a fortnightly information bulletin to all members advising on 
current trends developing in both the overseas and coastal areas of the shipping industry. 
Freight rate information, shipping services schedules and the types of shipping capacity 
available, are some of the important information provided to shippers.
The Coastal Ship-Users Committee meets every six months with the Coastal 
Shipowners Association to consider applications for freight rate rises, size of the intended 
rise, the general trends of changes in shipping technology and the impact these factors 
will have upon the shippers and consumers of goods. This may directly benefit those 
members of the Council who are users of shipping services between domestic main ports
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Table 5.1 Shippers Council Membership
i .... .
A. Type A Class with an annual subscription of K400
Copra Marketing Board (CMB) - main exporter of copra to overseas markets.
Angco Coffee - coffee exporter.
Coconut Products P/L (CPL) based in Rabaul is also copra and related products 
exporter.
Kundu Coffee (Lae) exports coffee.
Strettin Bay Lumber exports logs.
Commoddity Development (Rabaul).
PNG Forest Products based in Bulob deals with plywood.
B. Type B Class - 38 members paying a yearly subscription of K200 - Coastal Ship-users
PTC
Shorncliff




































C. Type C Class - Groups of Associations with a yearly fee of K350
PNG Palm Oil Producers Association 
Coffee Industtry Board 
PNG Growers Association 
Cocoa Board (PNG)
Forest Industry Council (FIC)
Coffee Industry Association
D. Assodate Members
Milne Bay Estates — PNG Harbours Board 
Department of Transport Nominee 
Department of Finance and Planning Nominee
ALL MEMBERS HAVE SAME VOTING RIGHTS. PRESIDENT IS JOHN NIGHTINGALE OF 
AGMAK PACIFIC (COCOA EXPORTERS) BASED IN RABAUL.
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but not those involved in inter-island operations. This difference arose due to a lack of 
communication between the Council and the remotely-placed rural growers. Time, 
financial and physical factors are significant constraints to effective information 
provision.
This therefore leads to an important presumption that the shippers in the inter­
island sector will differ in their willingness to pay for service quality (including safety, 
performance, rates, reliability and efficiency), from those in the main ports sector which 
includes the other four geographic markets).
5.3 CONCLUDING REMARKS
As noted at the beginning of this chapter, service quality and other variables do 
influence demand for shipping services. In the main, for domestic shipping routes by far 
the most important factor is efficiency in scheduling which is dependent on such factors 
as frequency, reliability and security. For relatively contestable sectors, price and 
efficiency are important quality characteristics in explaining demand for transport, 
whereas in sectors dominated by monopoly or oligopolistic market structures, the level of 
service quality will generally differ from the level that maximises net social welfare 
measured as the difference between gross value to consumers and production costs. 
There can be a mix of service quality levels at different prices.
However, with regulatory provisions establishing minimum levels of safety 
standards, inputs and price control regulations, these externalities are minimised. The 
willingness of consumers or shippers to pay for these services are maximised if rates and 
safety standards reflect reduced production costs. Hence economy of scale benefits have 
been exploited. Information on schedules of ship sailings also assists customers in 
planning and in making decisions about timing of shipments.
In the inter-island workboat sector, prices and safety factors are relatively 
unimportant. The subjective assessment of service qualities differ between consumers 
due to information deficiencies and externalities. The dominant characteristic of the
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service is marked by the multi-stop port calls. This service quality is an important factor 
determining demand for workboat transport.
Thus, with these approximations for demand confronting the shipping firms, their 
objectives and cost conditions (to be discussed in chapter 7), determine how much output 
a firm will produce. As noted in Chapter 4, the maritime market only supports a few 
large operators who happen to be benefitting from economy of scale operations. With 
this given scenario, lowered unit costs for producers will therefore maximise consumer 
willingness to pay (WTP) for these services. However, if monopoly conditions prevail 
then there will be varying WTP at different sets of prices.
Since this analysis is taken from the perspective of shippers and operators, the 
processes of exchange that occur in the market place should be assessed concurrently 
with institutional dimensions. The role of the next chapter is basically to specify this 
institutional setting within which freight transportation services are traded (or exchanged), 
since they affect the incentives to produce and the cost of transacting.
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CHAPTER VI
INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF THE MARITIME INDUSTRY
6.1 INTRODUCTION
In Chapter 5, demand for shipping services was estimated using static geometric 
diagrams to support the analysis. They give only the equilibrium points but not the exact 
positions of supply/demand relationships.
In reality, shipping companies are buyers of stevedoring services, who in turn, purchase 
raw materials, labour occupancy leases on land and port facilities, and capital equipment, 
those who sell to them therefore influence shipping and stevedoring efficiency, pricing 
practices and profitability.
Similarly, stevedoring companies and ship agents influence the performance and 
profitability of shipping companies, whilst the Harbours Board (or the local port authority) 
and waterside worker unions occupy position of power in relation to the providers of 
waterfront services in the country.
In PNG, nearly all landside infrastructure required by the domestic and river 
(including inter-island) shipping services is provided by:-
i) Harbours Board;
ii) Provincial Governments;
iii) Private Businesses (including Mission Stations); and
iv) Village organisations.
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6.2 PAPUA NEW  GUINEA HARBOURS BOARD (PNGHB)
The Board is an autonomous government corporation, the administration of which is 
vested in the Minister for Transport. The actions and responsibilities of the Board are defined 
in the Harbours Board Act. The Minister for Transport exercises the power of appointing the 
Board, and Board policies can, therefore, be easily adjusted so as to satisfy any prevailing 
political exigency.
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The power of the Board hence has two sources:-
i) its control over port facilities and infrastructure; and
ii) its general statutory role as the body responsible for: the management, regulation, 
operation and control of the declared ports; the movement of shipping in such ports; 
the provision and maintenance of lightships, buoys, piers, jetties, landing stages, 
slips, landing ramps and platforms in such ports; and the machinery and installations 
used in connection with such ports.
6 . 2 . 1  As a Com mercial L andlord
Almost by definition, waterfront activities are carried out within port boundaries, and 
shipping companies utilise the port facilities supplied at the main ports.
As a landlord, the Board leases the operations of its port facilities to various 
stevedoring companies.The stevedoring companies provide all necessary cargo handling 
equipment and are responsible for both the shore and ship-side handling of cargo. The Board 
is responsible for the provision and maintenance of civil engineering infrastructure. It also 
provides for markers, buoys, beacons and leads for the use of shipping. Although the Board 
determines proper locations for these facilities, these are also provided and maintained by the 
Maritime Division of Department of Transport. It also acts as a pilotage authority, as defined 
in Part VIII of the Merchant Shipping Act.
Monopoly
As the monopoly source of major port facilities and quay-side land, it is in a position 
to extract licensing fees, or lease rents, from those tenants who must locate there. In all 17 
main ports, an average of two stevedoring companies are accommodated per port, with three 
in larger ports such as Lae and Port Moresby. The licensing periods vary between 3 and 5
years.
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However, the Board does not have the same incentives to exploit its position as a private 
owner has. By law it is required to make contributions to consolidated revenue by being 
required to make a return on all their revalued assets. As noted earlier, it does not receive 
financial assistance in terms of a budgetary grant from the national government and thus 
operates as a commercial entity. Nevertheless, the existence of monopoly power creates two 
dangers:-
i) If the port is required to meet stringent financial performance conditions, it can 
achieve this by tariff increases rather than controlling costs;
ii) It becomes possible to cross-subsidise within the port, opening the possibility that 
rentals from captive tenants will be used to pay for mistaken investments elsewhere, 
or, if cross-subsidise do exist, there are temptations to levy the excess charges on 
income elements as well as on wharfage and other charges, forcing the use of 
facilities at prices which would exceed stand-alone private costs. This is in fact the 
current situation with some Board facilities.
6 . 2 . 2  A B roader Policy Role
The Harbours Board affects the structure of the waterfront and domestic shipping 
industry in many ways apart from its pricing practices for ground and terminal rentals, 
wharfage and berthage charges. Its "competition" policy via franchising solutions and 
investment decisions, and the roles it does not undertake, are both of considerable 
importance.
The Board takes the risk of the provision and ownership of berths, jetties and related 
facilities, recovering their costs out of a usage-based, multi-part tariff. The present tariff is 
based upon vessel characteristics, cargo volume, commodity classification, time and rentals. 
In particular, a distinction is made between:-
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i) charges and vessels (berthage paid by shipowner and cargo dues (i.e. wharfage paid 
by consignee);
ii) overseas and coastal cargo;
iii) agricultural and manufactured commodities; and
iv) small vessels and larger vessels.
The result of this complex system of charges is that average charges per tonne 
shipped or landed vary according to average ship size and type of cargo handled at each port. 
These are shown in Table 6.1.
Table 6.1 1989 Overseas and Coastal charges
Overseas Coastal
Lae K5.26/tonne K1.67/tonne
Port Moresby K5.98/tonne 1.63
Rabaul, Madang, 
Kimbe, Kieta 4.23 1.50
All other Ports 4.82 2.48
Source: Port Tariff Study 1991, p. 73.
Table 6.1 shows that the difference between rates for the ports of Rabaul, Madang, 
Kimbe and Kieta, and other ports result from the proportionately higher agricultural exports. 
The higher Port Moresby overseas rate reflects the cargo levy of 18t per tonne and lower 
discharge/load rate of cargo exchange, of 73.72 tonnes/hour compared with the Lae rate of 
92.07 tonnes/hour. The higher coastal rate for ’’all other ports" reflects the greater proportion 
of imports and higher wharfage rates.
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This means that with a uniform tariff applied over such widely varying ports in terms 
of marketing or operational situations, it is unable to use price either:-
i) as a means of recovering the costs of specific investments which benefit particular 
users, or
ii) as a means of encouraging users to limit their demands in congested conditions, or
iii) to encourage the efficient use of congested facilities.
This complexity in the two-part, commodity based, tariff creates a heavy billing 
commitment, without a compensating gain in increased revenues. If cargo volume is 
sufficient, its costs are covered. If not, it risks incurring a loss. (Tariff Study, 19, p. 11). 
This therefore, does not reflect the basic simplicity of the Board's landlord relationships with 
its users.
Port Development Policies
For the most part, the port development policies adopted have tended to increase its 
competitiveness in the port sector. The extension and improvement of berth facilities have 
been aimed at increasing the number of operators active in port at any time. Lae now has 
seven wharf and berth facilities to accommodate vessels for rapid turn-around, and the same 
applies to Kimbe, Port Moresby and other ports.
However, the leasing strategies have not been conducive to the easy replacement of 
one terminal operator by another. There used to be a specific agreement existing that covered 
shore handling at the Port Moresby port. As result of World Bank or Asian Development 
Bank funded studies, namely the Transport Efficiency Study (TES), the Harbours Board 
Management Review Study, and the Second Ports Development Study, licensing criteria have 
now been reviewed and are based upon performance- based contracts up to a maximum of 5 
years. The awarding of an extra two licences to Curtain Brothers and United Stevedoring in
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Port Moresby is an indication of this competitive drive. Furthermore, the implementation of 
the Port Management Information System (Portmis) should enable the Board to set 
productivity standards. Competitive bidding (franchising) has been called for to operate 
container terminals and this could be used to generate considerable competitive pressure: -
"The competitive bidding for leases... would ensure, first, that the 
opportunities for providing port services went to the most efficient 
operators and, second, that all concerned were encouraged to maintain and 
improve their efficiency in the knowledge that, otherwise, they would stand 
a very good chance of losing the business within the foreseeable future".
(CTPA Review.op.cit.p.332).
In the large main ports like Port Moresby, Lae or Rabaul, longer leases are necessary 
to encourage operators to undertake a large proportion of the capital costs of terminal 
development and for operators to meet the capital costs of their stevedoring and cargo 
handling equipment. For small ports, short to medium term lease-life would be sufficient, but 
the problem would be that a large proportion of terminal development costs are to be borne by 
the Board. It charges licence fees which range from 2000 to 750 kina per company per year. 
A longer term lease would cost a company some 10,000 kina over five years. The renewal of 
permits is based on appraisal reports by port managers and are submitted to the Board for 
final approval.
Small Ports
In ports like Aitape, Samarai or Bialla, agents are operating wharf facilities under an 
agency basis, in return for a commission from the Board. As argued in the Tariff study 
(1991.p. 15), consideration should be given to allowing the use of these ports by vessels of 
less than 150 GRT for a quarterly fee, payable direct to the Board with the right to stevedore 
such ships at these ports freely available to ship-owners or their agents.
Thus, both development and leasing policies fall within the traditional scope of the 
Harbours Board as "landlord". Apart from encouraging the development of additional 
facilities, or facilitating serial competition, there are two basic strategies that the Harbours
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Board can adopt to encourage competition in the stevedoring industry: the specification and 
enforcement of pricing and/or performance standards, and the co-ordination of the 
disenfranchised (CTPA Review, 1988, p.332-33).
6 .2 .3  Specification and Enforcement of Pricing or Performance Standards
In the case of the PNG Harbours Board, it should utilise its powers as a landlord and 
as a statutory authority to ensure that service providers perform at what is deemed to be a 
competitive level. Leases could embody appropriate performance standards or the licences of 
stevedores failing to perform could be revoked. Management preparedness and skills should 
be important elements in supporting a firms experience and credibility when it comes to the 
renewal of licences.
6 .2 .4  Co-ordination of the Disenfranchised
This concept involves the Board in co-ordinating the interests of those parties, 
principally shippers, whose well-being is affected by the efficiency of port operations but 
who have no direct commercial relationship with the service providers. This role which is 
equivalent to the shippers council in that it exerts a "countervailing power" to those shipping 
companies that have a direct commercial relationship with the waterfront industry. The 
Harbours Board is aware that such a service is an implicit one either knowingly or 
unknowingly provided given its social significance with regard to its relationship to the state, 
and given the control it has over the efficiency and productivity standards of its tenants at the 
ports. This is an indirect pressure which can bear on the waterfront service providers to 
improve productivity and hence achieve a fall in transport costs and reduced prices of 
consumer goods.
However, one limitation is that both the Board and the stevedoring industry are 
subject to price control. The Board operates under government instruction that it should 
charge a uniform tariff, and the stevedores operate under price control regulations. These
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continue to have a direct influence upon port performance. One initiative would be for the 
Board to address such issues and convince the government that its control of the efficiency of 
ports should be unfettered by such external factors.
6 .3  PRIVATE PORT FA CILITIES
Besides Harbour Board facilities, there are a number of facilities provided by 
government organisations and other private agencies. PNG Defence Force (Navy) operates 
two wharfs; the Fisheries Department operates 78 such facilities; the Department of Transport 
has 13 such facilities and the Provincial governments, operate 78 such facilities.
Generally these are only small piers and jetties for their own and public use. There 
are also about 500 privately owned facilities.
These organisations include:-






According to Joy (in Strategic options for Transport. 1991.p.349), such a diversity of 
port operations require a clarification of the role and responsibilities of the Harbours Board, 
and resistance to the idea that it must protect its own facilities in markets where competition is 
feasible, so as to generate revenues to support socially needed facilities elsewhere.
The advantages of private berths arise where there is sufficient volume and the 
greatest of these are savings in stevedoring charges by allowing an operator to avoid the
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Association of Licensed Stevedoring Company's (ALSC) schedule charges. The operator 
therefore gains from:-
i) relief from Harbours Board berthage, wharfage and related charges;
ii) if it does not hold stevedoring licence, relief from the standard charges levied by 
members of ALSC on all ports regardless of ship size and difficulty of loading;
iii) avoidance of Harbour Board operational restrictions, such as- loading of drummed 
fuel cargo after sunset, which have the greatest effect on smaller coastal ships 
operating to regular timetables.
Whilst these private facilities have provided for operations with fees either charged or 
not charged; they have provided an alternative which some ship-owners have inherited for 
historic reasons. More recently others have established their own private wharfs outside the 
control of Harbours Board. (Joy. 1991, p.349).
This therefore depicts a variant countervailing power exercised by particular 
enterprising ship-owners by investing to obtain this cost advantage by achieving shipping 
capacity and stevedoring services at a lower cost and providing competitive pressure on the 
rates charged by others. This action provides an impetus which implicitly or explicitly, 
discourages the Board from exercising monopoly power in forcing the use of facilities at 
prices which would be higher than stand-alone private costs.
6 .4  LA BO U R
Internal labour market theory as advanced by Miller et al (1986) and Ricketts (1987) 
show that the institution of a set of standard contracts "encourages co-operation" between 
employer and employee. However, inherent ambiguities in contractual provisions can restrain 
comprehensive interpretation due to the problem of bounded rationality. This therefore 
requires the establishment of arbitration procedures to settle disputes that concern the
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interpretation of vague provisions. Such a procedure is an integral part of an internal labour 
market, and is closely associated with the role of trade unions or other employee- 
associations.
Labour organisations such as trade unions are legally and structurally constituted to 
behave as a collusive actor in the labour market. This position of power enhances a trade 
union's legal and bargaining rights in relation to monitoring an employer's commitment to its 
implicit obligations, thereby reducing "shirking" and increasing employee confidence in the 
operation of the internal labour market.
With worker welfare improvement of paramount importance, trade unions collectively 
bargain to establish minimum wage rates below which no individual worker may offer his or 
her services.
In the PNG maritime industry, trade union involvement is not unfamiliar. The 
Waterside Workers and Seaman's Union (WSSU) is an example of organised labour in the 
waterfront and shipping industry.
An analysis entails two possibilities. Firstly, the PNGWSSU is seen here as a 
monopoly seller of labour services to stevedoring and shipping companies employing all 
members in the union.
This means the only way it can "sell" all those workers is to accept a lower wage rate. 
However, the union could use the average wage rate without further reducing employment. 
This could be feasible in Harbours Board ports where there are more than one licensed 
stevedoring company, each with differences in the volume of labour they buy for their 
specific purposes. The "discounted" price is the established minimum wage rate for 
permanent waterside workers.
Secondly, the PNGWSSU can maximise the wage rate for a given number of 
workers.
The assumption is that PNGWSSU wants to maximise the wage rate for a portion of 
the union’s members, perhaps those with limited opportunities. The provision in the
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stevedoring Awards to pay casual workers a slightly higher wage rate relative to permanent 
employees is an example of such an arrangement within PNGWSSU. (see Table 6.3).
The average weekly earnings for the workers ranges between 100 to 150 kina at the 
main ports and private facilities. Table 6.3 compares the differential wage rates for the 
differential classifications. The figures are given for the 1988/89 and may be subject to 
consumer price index effects over the past five years.




Saturday and  
S unday
(public holidays)
Double time  
(1/2 in excess o f  
7 hours) Sunday
Stevedoring Superintendent 3.55 4.91 6.27
Senior Clerk 2.72 3.76 5.18
Foreman 1.93 3.15 4.38
Boss-Boy (C) 1.49* 2.64 3.80
Tally Clerk (P) 1.48 2.40 3.32
Drivers (P) 1.59 2.50 3.42
Winchman (C) 1.41** 2.48 3.56
Labourers (C) 1.27 2.20 3.14
Source: Stevedoring Companies, 1988/89. CPI increases over the last five years affects these figures. 
* relatively higher rate compared to permanent tally-clerk.
The award wages are lodged with the PNG Employment Federation who negotiates 
for improved employment conditions including wage rises every twelve months with the 
stevedoring companies.
Discussion with some industry participants show that the present wage rates have 
increased K1.80 to K2.16 per hour, registered casuals and permanent employees range 
between 80-150 per stevedoring company. The traditional method of village gang system 
employing casuals is a widespread method of employment used by all stevedoring companies
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throughout the country. Larger companies employ about 600 men from villages, to 210 men 
from smaller firms at small ports. Table 6.4 records the number of stevedoring companies 
and their labour requirements.
Tab le 6.4 Registered Casuals and Permanent all ports 1992 (Coastal/overseas)
Company Location Permanent Casual Total
Port Services POM 165 165
United Stevedoring POM 17 N/A 17
Curtain Brothers POM N/A N/A -
United Stevedoring LAE 20 60 80
Rabaul Stevedores LAE 37 50 87
Rieback Group LAE 80 600 680
Meto Investments LAE 4 - 4
Curtain Brothers LAE 6 N/A 6
(Voco Point)
Coastal Shipping Co. LAE 6 6 12
Lutheran Shipping LAE N/A N/A -
Rabaul Stevedores RABAUL 30 50 80
Century Group RABAUL 10 120 130
Coastal Shipping RABAUL 25 N/A 25
Meto Investments RABAUL N/A N/A N/A
Kimbe Bay KIMBE 12 60 72
(Shipping Agency) 
Meto Investments KIMBE 3 10 13
Century Group MADANG 6 12 18
Rabaul Stevedores MADANG 14 210 224
Alotau Stevedoring ALOTAU 25 35
Sepik Coastal Agencies WEWAK 35 46 81
21 5 0 5 1 2 2 3 1 7 2 8
Source: Stevedoring Firms.
Note: Some of the figures are subject to change as companies change internal structures in response to 
prevailing Harbours Board ports and private facilities were not able to be obtained due to time and financial 
constraints.
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However, it is estimated that the total number of registered casuals and permanents 
for the whole waterside industry throughout the country may range between 3,000 to 3,500 
workers. This restricted labour organisation explains why the waterside workers union has 
substantial market power in a small maritime market like Papua New Guineas.
It therefore plays a strategic role in the export and domestic shipping industry. It is 
not only the waterfront employer whose profitability suffers if an industrial dispute disrupts 
the waterfront. The employers customers and its customers’ customers also bear the effects 
of the economic loss.
Modem container ships for example, in the range of 2-3000 GRT such as the coastal 
vessels operated by CEL, can cost more than K8,500 per day. This is even higher for 
overseas container couriers and provides a significant incentive to a shipowner to ensure that 
stevedoring and cargo handling is uninterrupted. This is probably the reason why shipping 
companies have a vested interest in stevedoring. That is, those leasing both vessels and 
containers, the cost would be slightly higher. However, the immediate costs are faced by 
shipowners and shippers alike. This also has a damaging effect upon the reputation of the 
shipping company.
Under such circumstances, the shipping companies with vested interests in 
stevedoring attempt to circumvent a stevedore and direct negotiation with waterfront labour is 
seen as highly essential, if it avoids increased stevedoring costs.
The second most important characteristic of industrial relations on the waterfront has 
been inter-union co-ordination to control the exit of unionsed labour.
Stoppages have ranged in duration from 1 to 14 days, but once a year, the the last six 
months. Disputes are not always concerned with members own conditions and items of 
employment. For example, in May 1990, the PNGWSSU threatened to boycott goods from 
Sir Hugo-Berghauser’s companies, a small-goods wholesaler/retailer in Port Moresby. This 
action was in support of the PNG Commercial Workers Union (PNGCWU) who were 
involved in a dispute over the sacking of 40 workers from that company. Such an ability to
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mobilise union power across the board to constrain the dismissal or mistreatment of members 
is an important factor. This inter-industry union co-operation is a strategic role enhancing the 
position of power and profound leverage across the wider community for the union 
movement.
6 .5  STEVEDORING
'Stevedoring in Harbours Board posts is in the hands either of members of the 
Association of Licenses Stevedoring Contractors (ALSC), or by local shipowners. 
Shipowners who stevedore their own ships may use either privately-owned berths or 
Harbours Board berths'. Role of Association of Licensed Stevedoring Contractors (ALSC). 
There are four basic tasks accorded to the ALSC. They include:
i . to maintain the prescribed standard of stevedoring;
ii. to maintain liaison with other stevedores in the country;
iii. to maintain involvement with shipping and stevedoring industry, and;
iv. to set prices in conjunction with price controller (government).
They achieved their first increase in eleven years in 1992 - that is, a 5%  rise in 
handling and stevedoring charges across the board.
Discussions with industry participants show that members only apply the ALSC rates 
set in conjunction with the government for their services, and this makes bargaining with 
users of stevedoring services difficult.
Since pricing practices are influenced by the ALSC and the government, pricing 
competition is rare except among independent stevedores with sufficient volume. The 
manner of stevedoring, size of throughput and handling, better equipment, labour 
punctuality, and staffing are some important aspects for competitive performance.
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Another major characteristic is that there prevails an element of trust that surrounds 
client preference and the stevedoring relationship which is built up over many years.
ALSC members are protected by price control and this rigidity creates market niches 
for stevedoring operators at Harbours Board ports. The set standards and licensing 
requirements are potential impediments to entry and competition. As Joy (1991) puts it, 'the 
existence of price control over some items, and the strength of the waterside workers union, 
together make the glue which keeps the ALSC cartel together', (p. 342)
6 .6  SH IPPIN G  COM PANIES
The PNG Coastal Shipowners Association is a shipping service-supplier organisation 
specifically for 'inter-firm co-operation'. Its role is to mobilise supplier-power in relation to 
freight rate setting, safety requirements, policy issues and general information sharing.
Moreover, the membership, which in theory should be automatic for all shipping 
companies, is never open to competitors, in particular, to certain independent operators who 
are potential entrants in the shipping business who wish to extend services to other areas. 
There is an element of bias in the membership composition of the association. Companies 
with vested interests in each others' operations and those with good 'co-operation' records 
make up the bulk of the membership.
Such membership co-operation can filter down to establishing greater control in the 
market segments the suppliers are licensed to serve, thereby exerting wider authority over the 
shippers. However, those outside the association appear to be rivals whose authority is 
experienced through the setting of competitive market rates, below approved tariffs, thus 
providing options for the shippers.
Coastal shipping is vital to all ship-users and is important for the quality and 
distribution of their products. Obvious interaction exists between buyers and sellers on 
defined geographical trade routes where trade cartels are structured on that basis, and prices 
are set and published with reference to routes. Since shipping services are not storeable, this
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enables a buyer to build up stocks of inventory. This is more obvious in cases where 
waterfront disruption affects the loading and unloading of cargo from vessels.
The shipping industry is linked to the waterfront industry and this form of market 
conduct enhances supplier power and hence acts as a check against the buyers' industry 
performance and ability to purchase services. This will be discussed further in Chapter 9.
Present shipping services are adequate for demand. This suggests that shipping 
companies are not obliged to contend with other alternative suppliers available to the buyers' 
industry. Instead they enhance their adequacy in order to maintain their competitive drive.
Workboat Services
In the workboat industry, the buyers range from individuals to provincial 
governments. Large business enterprises, for example, in Alotau (Milne Bay Province), also 
use these smaller vessels to ship orders to remote islands, more or less on an agency or 
freight forwarding arrangement.
Since there is a greater number of suppliers, shipowners either registered with 
Cheongs Supermarket to serve areas along the coast to Wanigela, or Alotau Enterprises for 
weekly services to North East Coast to Oro Bay and Tufi and services to Losuia, Woodlark, 
Esa'ala, Ferguson and Goodenough Islands, Misima, Tagula, Rosselle Islands and along the 
Suau coast.
A large portion of inter-island traffic goes through Alotau Enterprises — a 
merchanise-grocery wholesale that acts as a freight forwarder at both ends, whose services 
are partly, and in some cases wholly, covered by a 7.5% commission received from the 
workboat operators. The uniform freight rate of K54 per tonne (m3), implies a slighdy lower 
net cost to a shipper who would otherwise have to meet all basic forwarding costs including 
documentation.
Such as standard tariff enhances cartel formation amongst the small workboat 
operators. They have access to wholesalers who accept cargo on their behalf, in order to
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maintain continuous employment. Business in partnership with large enterprises makes 
cohesion between small operators stronger. This is, particularly so for charter and weekly 
services.
Table 6.5 Container Depot Operations: Port M oresby and Lae
P ort D epot
Estimated M arket \ 
Share (1991)






Lae Riback Stevedores (Overseas) 100
Rabaul Stevedores (Coastal) 25
United Stevedoring (Coastal) 60
Pacific NG Line/Pimco 15
Recently being awarded stevedoring licenses by PNGHB to service coastal operations.
6 .7  THREAT OF SUBSTITUTE PRODUCTS (SERVICES)
All firms in an industry are competing, in a broad sense, with industries producing 
substitute products. Substitutes limit the potential returns of an industry by placing a ceiling 
on the prices firms in the industry can profitably charge. The more attractive the price 
performance alternative offered by substitutes, the firmer the lid on industry profits. (Porter, 
p. 23).
Identifying substitute products is a matter of searching for other products that can 
perform the same function as the product of the industry. Within the domestic shipping 
industry, a range of substitution possibilities needs to be considered. This section looks at 
the possibilities under three major groupings: technological, spacial and institutional.
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6 .7 .1  Technological Substitution (Intermodal Competition)
The Transport Efficiency Study (1990) noted that the three modes available for 
internal transport, ie. road, ship (both coastal and river services) and air, compete on only a 
few routes, VIZ:
• air and road transport services on the routes within and between points in the 
Highlands, and around Lae, Madang and Wau;
• air and ship transport services can only compete for traffic on routes between the 
coastal cities and towns. The actual competition for passengers is limited to:
—  between Lae and Rabaul, and
—  between Popondetta, Lae, Finschafen, Madang and Wewak
Although competition between freight services is geographically more widespread, 
the actual volumes of cargo transported by air is small and the actual extent of competition 
between the two modes is limited); and
• the only route in which there is competition between road and sea transport is between 
Lae and Madang. This is also the only route on which there is competition between 
road, ship and air.
The main routes where feasible technological substitutes exists are given in Table 6.1 
and Table 6.2.
Passenger Transport
Competition between sea and air on routes show that the majority of passengers travel 
by the more expensive air services. The study noted three main reasons why this is so:
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Table 6.1 M ain Routes where Interm odal Competition Exists: Freight Transport
A ir
Tonnes
Road Sea A ir
P ercent
Road Sea
A ir vs Road
Lae - Goroka <1,200 100,000 . <1 >99 _Lae - Mt Hagen <1,200 200,000 . <1 >99 .Lae - Mendi <400 10,000 - <4 >96 .Lae - Wau N/A 50,000 . N/A N/A .Lae - Wabag N/A N/A - N/A ' N/A -
A ir vs Sea
P. Moresby - Lae <4,000 93,000 <4 >96
P. Moresby - Popondetta <400 - 3,700 <10 . >90
P. Moresby - Alotau <200 - 11,300 <2 - >98
P. Moresby - Wewak <400 - 9,700 <4 . >96
P. Moresby - Vanimo <1,200 - 400 <75 . >25
P. Moresby - Rabaul <800 - 12,900 <6 - >94
P. Moresby - Kavieng <40 - 1,100 <4 - >96
P. Moresby - Kimbe <150 - 6,600 <2 . >98
P. Moresby - Kiunga <2,000 - 71,000 <3 - >97
A ir vs Road vs Sea
Lae - Madang <2,000 6,000 16,000 <8 >25 >75
Source: TES Report, 1990, p. A-82.






Air vs Road  
Lae - Goroka 9,600 250,000 4 96
Lae - Mt Hagen 11,600 200,000 - 5 95 -
Lae - Mendi N.A 100,000 - N/A N/A -
Air vs Sea
Lae - Rabaul 13,000 - 1,600 90 . 10
Lae - Wewak 8,400 - 1,600 84 - 16
P. Moresby - Daru 9,000 - 6,000 60 - 40
P. Moresby - Kerema 9,000 - 18,500 33 - 67
Lae - Finshhafen 3,000 - 2,500 55 - 45
P. Moresby - Lae 42,000 - 200 <99 - <1
Lae - Popondetta 600 - 9,200 6 - 94
Air vs Road vs Sea
Lae - Madang 7,000 100,000 3,500 6 91 3
Note: All the above statistics are the sum of both directions.
Source: Department of Civil Aviation Statistics, (the Consultants have interpreted these data in order to
make estimates of volumes of cargo on particular routes - the figures shown are only estimates 
and should not be considered definitive); Department of Transport statistics (for marine transport 
volume); various origin/desitination surbeys and traffic counts for road transport volumes, TES 
Report 1990, A-83.
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• the limited number of vessels offering scheduled passenger services;
• very lengthy journey times for sea travel (short seas journey enjoy a higher relative
patronage than do the longer voyages); and
• the poor standards of passenger accommodation on most vessels.
Lae to Finschafen is an interesting example of how air and sea transport compete for 
passenger traffic, and of the effect of cost and travel times on passenger modal choice. On 
this route, the standard airfare is 46 Kina and there was, until recently, sufficient air 
passenger traffic to justify a six days a week service (101 seats per week in each direction). 
Since Lae airport has now moved to Nazab, which is an hour's drive by road from the city, 
and the sea ferry time has been reduced from nine to five hours with the fare being 9 Kina for 
a single trip. Talair have found it necessary to halve their service from six to three return trips 
per week and now offer only 57 seats per week in each direction. Between Port Moresby 
and Kerema the sea passenger fare is set by the shipping operator at 40% of the air fare to 
maintain the price advantage and share of the market. (TES, 1990, Vo. 13)
Freight Transport
The majority of freight travels by sea, because of the higher air freight rates. The 
only route with a substantial volume of air freight is Port Moresby to Lae, an average of 
about 2,000 tonnes per year in each direction. This is because there are no international 
flights to Lae and because Lae is a large centre for manufacturing industries. There is a 
significant volume of air freight from Port Moresby to Kiunga, about 1,000 tonnes per year 
in each direction, because the sea journey to Kiunga is a 72 hour trip across the Gulf of 
Papua and onwards up the Fly River. The main air freight cargo are essential supplies such 
as food and spare parts to Ok Tedi mines.
The only real competition between road and sea transport is between Lae and 
Madang. The present cost of sea freight on this route is 36.50 Kina per tonne. The present 
cost of road transport is about 80.00 Kina per tonne. Road transport costs are high because
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some sections of the road are in very poor condition and large trucks cannot travel in wet 
weather. Presently, some 17,000 tonnes of freight (the total for both directions) travels by 
sea. This may change when planned improvements to the road are made. (TES, 1990)
Substitution between sea and road for freight movement from Lae to Madang has both 
short-term and long-term dimensions. In the short-term, the relevant issue is the extent to 
which sea transport and road transport services are substitutes, given the existing fleet of 
vessels and trucks serving the route.
The Lutheran Shipping Company which ships all trans-shipment cargo from the 
Consort Express Line at Lae, to Madang and other northbound services have vessels 
appropriate for the trade. They will stay with the route under all conceivable circumstances. 
However, the planned improvements to the road would enhance the reduction in relative cost 
of road to sea freight and a greater proportion of cargo can be expected to travel by road, that 
is, if the road provides all-weather access.
The long-term dimension of substitution possibilities relates to me selection of vessels 
by shipowners and truck choices by haulage operators. Lutheran Shipping and other 
independent operators' decisions about vessel technology to be employed on particular routes 
may both be affected by and also influence the costs and structure of the waterfront industry 
as well as the costs to be borne by the cargo-owners (is. the shippers).
The haulage operators' decisions on appropriate trucks for road transport may affect 
the costs and structure of the shipper's industry (ie. the large enterprises) and small shippers 
(ie. individual to small retailers).
This long-term substitution possibility may influence competitive behaviour between 
operators within the two modes and affect their bargaining powers.
Vessel Types
Containerisation of both the overseas and coastal trade has grown in recent years. 
Container penetration of overseas trade is now close to saturation at approximately 80% of
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dry cargo net of bulks and vehicles. Container penetration of the coastal trade has increased 
substantially since 1985, with the introduction of five specialised 3,000 Dwt coastal container 
vessels into the inter-main ports fleet and 1,200 Dwt container vessels into the feeder ports 
fleet. (Black and Bradshaw in Strategic Options for Transport Development in PNG, 19... 
p. 285)
This long-term substitution possibility exists to substitute break-bulk vessels for 
container/multi-purpose ships. There appears an increasing shift to more flexible 
technologies, thus opening up expanded possibilities for substitution between terminal and 
conventional stevedoring services in the long-term.
However, whilst this potential would be sufficiently realised at Port Moresby, Lae, 
Kavieng, Oro Bay and Rabaul ports, and in particular, the principal hub ports of Lae and Port 
Moresby, the short to medium term dimension entails that present vessels in other routes 
appear suitable for the trade and for the waterfront and shipper industries.
This containerisation of trade is continuing to have a major impact on Papua New 
Guinea Harbours Board facilities.
6 .7 .2  Spatial Substitution
In terms of cargo volumes, the most important situation in which this substitution 
possibility is realised is in the competition that exists between Port Moresby and Lae and 
Rabaul and Kimbe for cargoes originating in, or destined for, the hinterlands of the smaller 
ports.
Consort Express Line weekly shipments between Lae and Port Moresby illustrate the 
growing general cargo movement between the two hub ports. Even the majority of container 
cargo for the other southbound ports are shipped through Lae. Lae port serves a much wider 
port hinterland, including the whole highlands region and immediate areas.
Shipments to other produce and mine-oriented ports were handled through the Lae and Port 
Moresby ports until recently, when a private port facility built by Curtain Brother Marine
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(CBM) diverted sufficient project cargo to this private facility. This has not only affected Lae 
port but Port Moresby port is being by-passed by CBM vessels sailing directly to the Gulf 
ports of Ihu, Baimuru and Kikori carrying seismic survey equipment as well as up the Fly 
River to Ok Tedi, supplying the mine and the township.
CEL which utilises Harbours Board facilities at Lae usually trans-ships cargo onto 
Lutheran Shipping vessels northbound to Madang, Wewak, Aitape and Lorengau. Luteran 
shipping uses its own stevedoring and port facilities at Madang and Lae.
Whilst the spatial dimension is critical to the services provided by shipping companies 
between ports, in the five geographic market segments, the same effect triggers through to the 
waterfront industry, that is, terminal and conventional stevedoring. This obviously 
influences the competitive pressure on the shipping operators as well as the stevedoring 
companies.*
The need to make an additional port of call by independent operators such as Coastal 
Shipping, Pacific New Guinea Line and other smaller operators, influenced by the volume of 
cargo that can be mustered, which provides an important incentive to keep prices down and 
performance up.
In the same way, stevedores maintain competitive discipline in the ports of Port 
Moresby, Lae, Rabaul and Kimbe to ensure compatible economic operations between 
shipping and stevedoring.
Whilst port facilities are provided under a statutory monopoly of the PNG Harbour 
Board, stevedoring operations are under different companies specifically entitled to work 
cargo carried only by associated shipping companies. Inter-port rivalry is likely to be more 
marked in terminal than in conventional stevedoring operations.
However, private port facilities already available in Lae (Curtain Brother, Luteran and 
Coastal Shipping), Rabaul (Coastal Shipping, Pacific New Guinea Line) and Madang 
(Luteran Shipping Company) have an impact on the spatial development of the inter-port
* The geographic spatial framework are shown in figures in Chapter One.
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transfer of domestic and international cargo. The theoretical issue of rivalry between 
stevedores in these ports is of little practical interest, since the companies operating there are 
generally the same.
Whilst the possibility of the inter-port transfer of cargoes is unlikely to be a major 
influence on shipping service-supplier behaviour, it is vital to the rivalry between Harbours 
Board ports and private port facilities.
6 .7 .3  Institutional Substitutions (Intermodal Transfers)
There are substitutes for shipping and waterfront services that are technically similar 
to those offered within the industry and are performed at the same port.
Most shippers transport their cargoes by containers and generally they are stuffed and 
destuffed at the points of origin (or destination) of the cargo. Some LCL (less than container 
loads) are, however, stuffed and destuffed on the wharfs (TES, 1990) Some imported bulk 
goods such as rice and grain are loaded into containers (often in bags within the container) on 
the wharf. This is packed and loaded onto container trucks for onward travel by road.
To avoid infringing axle load legislation, the fully loaded containers are partially 
unloaded and excess goods transferred to another container. This is common practice, when 
moving heavy loads from Lae to destinations in the Highlands. In yet other cases, heavy 
loads bound for destinations in the Highlands beyond Mendi and transported to either Mt 
Hagen or Mendi, are then reloaded onto smaller trucks since roads are in poor conditions and 
bridges are small with weight limitations.
The container terminal at Goroka is still being used for cargo which arrives in Lae on 
a ocean bill of lading and which is then transferred to a road transport bill of lading, to avoid 
disputes over responsibility for the cargo. However, customs facilities are still maintained at 
the terminal.
A similar arrangement has also been instituted at the private port facility in Lae at 
Voco Point. This ensures liaison between stevedores and Customs Department to improve
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the rate of cargo exchange and clearance of goods from the wharf. Such institutional 
arrangement is an option resulting from a PNGHB tariff study in 1990. (Port Tariff Review, 
1991) Stevedores will have to provide secondary protection for cargoes under their physical 
control.
Whilst containerisation has improved inter-port shipment and handling, particularly at 
major ports, it has had little impact on influencing the behaviour of some sections of land 
transport operators and the road haulage industry in general. Axle load restrictions and 
specific bridge weight requirements on some major highways have had an impact on the 
substitution of FCL for LCL shipments. Similarly, small ports with unsuitable port 
infrastructure for container handling and movement have intensified the struggle for market 
share by reducing the total volume of break-bulk cargo available for the stevedores and 
associated activities that are available in those ports. However, road transport's importance 
for local collection and distribution at both ends of the sea journey has been significant. 
Under such circumstances intermodal transfer has made the capitulation of stevedoring and 
shipping industry easier.
Implications
The availability of substitutes acting to threaten entry can improve the performance 
behaviour of incumbent operators in the industry. In this analysis, the substitution threat 
which appears relevant to domestic shipping and related industry activities are: •
• substitution between shipping and other modes of internal transport. This bears more 
heavily on road and air transport for bulky shipment, and on conventional stevedores 
as the containerisation of cargo to hub ports increases;
• the spatial framework developed by the shipping movement of freight between 
Harbours Board and private port facilities;
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the mild effect of changes to LCL from FCL on the large trucking industry for the 
highlands region and terminal operators at larger ports.
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CHAPTER VII
COST STRUCTURE AND ECONO M IC PR IC IN G
7.1 IN T R O D U C T IO N
The previous discussion centred on the institutional arrangements within the entire 
maritime industry and the effect these structures have upon industry behaviour. In 
economic theory, under most circumstances, supply is a positive function of price. The 
amount of transport offered at any price level will, however, be heavily influenced by the 
costs involved, that is, in reality some pricing decisions are determined by producers as 
part of their corporate objectives. The factors which essentially influence such pricing 
decisions are mainly elasticity of demand (as estimated in Chapter 5), excess capacity and 
cost structures. This chapter attempts to accommodate various costs components 
associated with supplying shipping, stevedoring or port services, and examines the 
ultimate pricing policies that are adopted.
7.2 COA STAL SH IPPIN G
The Transport Efficiency Study (TES) noted that the most important cost elements
>50%
5 -1 0  %
9 - 30 % (larger ships); 41-53% (workboats). 
7-15% (main port); 15-20% (workboats)









• stevedoring costs and 
cargo handling costs
• overheads
• port costs: 2.2 - 3.2%
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These costs are determined in terms of toea per tonne, toea per tonne-km, toea per 
passenger-km, toea per tonne-nautical mile and toea per passenger nautical-mile as 
appropriate.
The TES analysis (given in Table 7.1) shows that at higher load factors, the unit 
costs does decline. This appears to be true in all the main geographic markets. These 
relationships are depicted in Figure 7.1.
Figure 7.1 Operating costs o f Coastal and R iver Vessels
Source: Adapted from TES Report 1990, p. B-97.
This relationship conforms with the theory that under circumstances of increased 
use of ship capacity, the average cost of the ship falls steeply. As argued by Button 
(1983), over the short run, whatever that may be, some costs are clearly fixed and result 
in a falling short-run average cost of ship-use until capacity is reached.
Given the present state of the art in terms of analysis, the aggregate demand 
function, as noted in chapter 5 is depicted by the WTP with respect to relative elasticity 
of demand. In the freight shipping services, the volume of freight carried and the costs
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involved in carrying these cargo, will determine the extent of an operator's market areas. 
This justifies the present scenario of geographic markets areas in which routes are based.
Freight Tariff Structures
Before considering the pricing practices of shipping companies, it is essential to 
consider the government controlled rate structures for shipping companies in the different 
geographic service markets. As identified by the TES study, there are two components to 
the freight rate structure. Firstly, there is a fixed charge component which varies by 
commodity, and then there is a variable charge which is independent of commodity. The 
details are given in the Appendix A.
However, the analysis shows that in both the Main ports and New Guinea Islands 
trades, the fixed charge varies from 21 kina per tonne for basic village foods (this rate 
applies to the obnoxious cargo in the case of New Guinea Islands trade), to 38 kina per 
tonne for hazardous and obnoxious cargoes for main ports, and 110 and 180 kina per 
tonne for refrigerated cargo, in both the main ports and for the New Guinea islands 
trades, respectively. A variable charge is about 0.86 toea per kilometre. The same 
applies to the New Guinea Coast services (i.e. similar to main ports).
In the Papuan Coast trade, a fixed charge varies from about 25 kina per tonne for 
basic village food to 38 kina per tonne for hazardous and obnoxious cargo; with a 
variable charge of 3.0 toea per kilometre. In the Fly River and Strickland River areas, the 
fixed charge varies by about 40 kina for basic village items to 50 kina for obnoxious and 
hazardous cargoes, with a variable charge of 5.0 toea per kilometre.
Pricing Practices
There is obviously price control on the freight rates in the main geographic 
markets and uncertainty overshadows the likely effects upon price-cost margins and 
consumer welfare. Davidson et al (1967) argued that most rate structures are not 
immutable. They are being continually altered by significant changes in a particular 
mode, technological changes and so on, and who wins or loses under these
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circumstances is therefore unpredictable. However, direct controls over prices in the 
domestic shipping industry are probably related to the main objectives of price-cost 
margin control. At the heart of the system of price control would be, presumably, the 
twin concepts of 'allowable cost rises' and 'reference profit margins' to prevent 
exorbitant monopoly profits. As Domberger (1983) has hinted, allowable costs should 
comprise labour, materials, fuel, and certain fixed costs per unit of output. However, 
which proportion of that cost increase is allowable is difficult to predict because of 
significant changes in the costs. The government is not in a position to be able to 
undertake this horrendous task. This is compounded by imperfect information and the 
presence of other externalities. Hence, government regulation is imposed to correct for 
these externalities.
Main Ports Service
It was noted that shipping companies give their regular customers first call on 
available space and are granted rebate on an 'agency basis' up to 25 per cent of the freight 
tariff to their largest volume customers. These price cuts are offered relatively more often 
to large shippers than to small buyers. This is due to the payoff from increased business 
from a large shipper for any given price reduction is greater than that from a small buyer. 
Such dual or differential pricing is discriminatory when shipping capacity is being fully 
utilised.
Papuan Coast Service
The tariffs levied in this market are considerably higher than in other ports. 
Environmental factors such as negotiating a river during certain seasons when it is quite 
slow, a large number of reefs or the poor quality of shore-based infrastructures, incur 
additional costs which must be covered through higher charges.
In the case of bulk cargo shipments, not including fuel oil, rates are negotiable. 
Some discounting is, however, given when the shipper, or customer company, can 
provide a similar discount for its own services, or when 'agency agreements' exist.
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Some oil companies are given discounts in return for discounts on the price of bunker 
fuel and companies with agency agreements will get rebates. It is not believed that 
discounts and rebates ever exceed 15 per cent.
North New Guinea Coast Service
In this case there are seven distance codes out of Lae, and five commodity 
classifications. There are two rates. One is based on volume and the other is based on 
weight. The rate used is whichever produces the larger revenue. Special rates have also 
been set for small quantities of freezer goods and vegetables, and there is a bulk fuel 
surcharge for long items and for high value cargoes, such as coins.
Tariffs are not in this case related to distance. Agency type agreements are 
believed to result in 15 -20  per cent rebates for company's largest buyers. On the route 
between Lae and Madang, for example, substantial discounts of about 20 per cent are 
given to all customers and agency agreements can increase the effective discount to a 
maximum of 35 per cent, in order to compete with road tariffs. Shipping companies are 
presently offering to ship general cargo at about 30 - 35 kina per tonne. This discounting 
lowers their rates compared to road transport, in order to compensate for trans-shipment 
costs and less regular services.
New Guinea Islands Service
Maximum tariffs for this service were gazetted in 1988. Specific rates are quoted 
for specific journeys. Customers are charged according to which measure will generate 
the most cargo. There are seven categories of general cargo for which there are different 
tariffs with bulk cargoes subject to negotiation. There are three categories for 
containerised cargo. Small quantities of refrigerated cargo are charged 18 toea per kilo. 
It appears that discounts are rarely given to large regular customers on this service. 
However, as little as 5 - 10 per cent is given to large customers. This market segment is 
probably the most 'contestable' sector in the main ports trade. The route from Lae to 
Kimbe to Rabaul is a relatively short distance.
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Work Boat Service
The smaller ports, on the coast and rivers, while sometimes served by larger 
operators on an inducement basis, are mainly serviced by 'workboats', some of which 
operate on their 'own account'. No published tariffs exist for this level of shipping and 
trade is conducted on a cash basis, often 50 per cent when discharged. Most wharfs used 
are privately owned, although occasional charges for berthage and wharfage are made, 
sometimes at Harbours Board rates, but this is not common practice.
Typical charges for the carriage of freight on workboats vary according to the 
volume of goods, and often depend on any particular problems in the area, for example, 
difficulties in loading and discharging the cargo. In some cases, dinghies are an 
important component of this transport chain. The rates are largely independent of 
distance. Most of the cargo originates at the home port and the cost of carrying it is no 
different whether it is discharged at the first or last port of call the voyage.
Typical freight rates are:- '
i) 45 - 50 kina per cubic metre for quantities in excess of a cubic metre and for a 
distance of anything from 100 to 500 km. However, recent fieldwork interviews 
indicate a flat rate varying between 49 kina (for agency work with Cheongs 
Supermarket) and 54 kina per tonne (with Alotau Enterprises), anywhere in the 
Milne Bay area;
ii) 3 - 5  kina per 50 kg bag of copra produce, equivalent to 100 kina per tonne, for a 
distance anything of 100 to 500 kilometres. Empty containers are charged 8.90 
kina per drum and full drums about 16.42 kina.
iii) On the Fly River, 125 kina per cubic metre for quantities of cargo in excess of a 
cubic metre and for distances of anything from 100-250 kilometres, including 
Lake Murray.
iv) In Manus Province, the freight charges on similar workboats are 38 kina per cubic 
metre (tonne) for general cargo, 3 kina per bag of copra and 5 kina per drum, 
whether empty or full.
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Assessment of Shipping Costs and their Relationship to Freight
Rates
Liner shipping involves large investments of capital in relatively specific 
equipment for a long period of time. As noted in chapter 4 and at the beginning of this 
chapter, a high fraction of total expenditure is incurred in capital costs including 
purchasing the vessel or leasing it on a bare-boat or time-charter basis, and this 
expenditure is represented annually by the financial provision for depreciation. Another 
substantial portion of expenditure is incurred in putting the ship to sea.
The cost of actually loading and unloading the ship at the destination port is two 
fold: i) the call costs at the ports plus additional costs per tonne of cargo. When the ship 
is not fully loaded, additional costs of conveying further cargo between predetermined 
ports of call is low. Variable costs are considered to be very small compared with fixed 
costs. Fixed costs form a high proportion of total costs. The relative burden of fixed and 
variable costs, and the extent to which such commitments are inescapable, are important 
determinants of pricing policy.
However, it has been argued that low variable costs give rise to indeterminacy in 
the market for freight because, under conditions of free entry and competition, each 
operator would be induced to cut rates down to variable costs. No firm would be able to 
cover costs, because the variable cost is so much below average cost. This expectation of 
what is sometimes called 'ruinous competition' lies behind many arguments for 
condoning cartels and market sharing agreements.
Trade Markets
In all geographic markets, except for inter-island workboat services, all prices are 
regulated under the Prices Regulation Act. Understandably, the role of regulation has 
been to correct for market failures arising from monopoly and associated economic rents, 
and to minimise externalities. As noted previously, such pricing policies are based upon 
the twin concept of distance travelled and commodity type which has two aspects to it in 
that different prices are charged for different geographical markets, and the fact that there 
is an element of cross-subsidy.
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In the earlier discussion, it was noted that volume- related discounts or rebates are 
being given to large, regular shippers. Further price-cuttings were also prevalent in cases 
where inter-modal competition existed, in particular between sea transport and road 
transport. This is common in the North New Guinea Coast and on feeder routes. Where 
agency agreements have existed, there is a higher level of discounting or rebating. 
Similar arrangements also exist among operators and oil companies. If rebates were 
given for fuel prices, then rates were in turn lowered. Thus three implications can be 
deduced, as follows:-
i) volume-related discounts exist in all markets (although rates do vary between 
firms);
ii) approved tariffs are at the maximum;
iii) approved tariffs are low.
These can be illustrated in the following diagrams:- 
Figure 7.2 Maximum Government Price (Pg)
Under the approved tariff, the ship-operator is quite prepared to provide shipping 
services to ship cargo traffic at Qg. This represents a net welfare loss resulting from a 
higher government price, assuming that stockholders, gaining income from the higher
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controlled price, will have the same marginal utility of income as consumers losing 
income by paying the higher tariff. Under these conditions, suppliers will charge a price 
above costs and maintain it, will maintain excess capacity (i.e. extend output), and will 
discriminate as best they can between 'markets' (i.e. commodities, routes, and shippers) 
and thus seek to maximise long-run profits.
The area ABC represents the lost consumer surplus arising from the 'high' 
government price. At Pg, much of this consumer surplus is transferred to the operator 
(producer) of shipping services. The triangle ABC depicts this deadweight welfare loss.
Similarly, paying a 'higher' controlled price (Pg) is essentially subsidising those large 
shippers with a 'market' price (Pm). As indicated earlier, the derived nature of demand 
for transport is relatively elastic, as discussed in Chapter 5. Hence, buyers with large 
elasticities do receive discounts, which is quite the opposite of peak load pricing for a 
public utility, whereas small quantity shippers are charged Pg. This situation illustrates a 
special case of predatory pricing. Figure 7.3 shows this relationship.
Figure 7.3 Cross - Subsidy Effect
Shippers charged Pg are cross-subsidising those with special rates - Pm. 
Although the assumed WTP is the same, due to the same demand curve, two
effects are obvious:-
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i) those faced with price Pm, ship cargo traffic at Qm (demand Qm) and therefore 
have a higher consumer surplus;
ii) Pg in this case is a subsidy.
It can therefore be argued that the dual pricing existent here indicates predatory 
pricing behaviour. Secondly, the government's intention of correcting for imperfections 
in the marketplace is distorted by setting Pg above Pm (market price). This will be the 
market WTP which is equal to Pm.
A  L o w e r  G o v e r n m e n t  P r ic e
This relationship is shown in the Figure 7.4 comparing the points of equilibrium. 
Figure 7.4 Effect o f A Low er Government Price
At Pg' there will be Qg' demanded and supplied. However, there would be a 
tonnage effect, as noted in chapter 5, due to this lower price. Suppliers either extend 
output to meet this excess demand, thus causing a disequilibrium, or try to form cartels to
raise pnces.
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C a p a c i ty  F a c to r s
With price control, the government has set a maximum tariff that has to be 
charged. In most cases, the suppliers would confront loses at relatively low load factors. 
These low load factors may be due to competition, availability of excess capacity or 
inefficient operation. At higher load factors, dominant firms may earn 'substantial' 
profits. Since they are the only suppliers for a particular route, shippers have no 
alternative but to ship with them at a 'high' price. Large volumes and regular buyers 
usually attract rebates that enhance supplier capacity utilisation rates. As load factors 
increase, average costs fall and the economy of scale is exploited. This is depicted in 
diagram below.
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Small volume or low load factor routes would experience losses or contemplate 
higher prices to cover true costs.
However, the costs of volume and low load factor services may not be high, 
since the situation is often unclear due to joint and overhead costs. Moreover, the 
technology of supply often adjusts to maintain service at lower costs and prices. Whilst 
larger capacity coastal vessels have cut back on their services to smaller feeder ports and
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outlying communities, workboat services have emerged to take their place on the many 
'thin' routes, at lower cost than those of partially filled larger vessels.
D is ta n c e  F a c to r s
This section utilises the present price structures to examine the impact they have 
upon shippers over a given distance. This methodological illustration is shown in 
Figures 7.5 - 7.10 for the different geographic service markets.
In each of the diagrams, there is an obvious similarity where shorter hauls are 
being subsidised by longer hauls. In the main ports trade, the costs to shippers and/or 
operators in the middle distance routes tend to be higher than those in shorter or longer 
distances. This is shown in Figure 7.6.
Figure 7.6 Cost & Distance Relationship in Main Ports Trade (without cargo handling 
charges) (1989)







In the New Guinea Islands trade (Figure 7.7), costs increase as distance 
increases, even with large load factors.
Figure 7.7 New Guinea Islands Trade- Cost & Distance Relationships a t Given Load  
Factors (1989)
1. Total Distance = Assumed no voyages to post sector x Actual Distance (N.M) in a 
year
2 . _  , . Unit Cost x Total Distance x Total CargoTotal cost to society =--------Bale Capacity x Load Factor------ x 100
A similar situation occurs in the Papuan Gulf trade where costs rise over longer
distances as shown in Figure 7.8.
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Figure 7.8 Papuan Gulf Service (300-500dwt) (1989)
The North Coast trade shows an interesting situation (Figure 7.9) where costs 
increases then falls and then rises again at different stages of the voyage.
Figure 7.9 North Coast Trade (300-500 dwt), (1989)
6,000 12,000 15,000 1&000
DISTANCE (NM)
LEGEND; 0.65 Load Factor
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Implications
It would therefore appear that a cross - subsidy element, as discussed earlier, exist 
within the fixed government price or freight rate. The general trend is that this special 
tax, within the fixed-component, is higher on the long distance routes and this 
compensates for shorter hauls.
This is not alien to transport. Pareto conditions can not be satisfied because of 
prevailing institutional restrictions such as monopoly or market failure, investment 
indivisibilities, and such externalities as congestion or pollution.
In the main ports trade, for example, there is a huge cargo traffic passing through 
middle distance routes, but shipper costs are quite high compared to shorter distances. 
As noted previously, the full utilisation of excess capacity would lower the marginal costs 
for operators, and the granting of discounted prices is sought to meet demand 
fluctuations.
Situations where costs increase with distance may be attributed to low volume and 
inefficient capacity utilisation or other institutional constraints.
Hence, this leads to the four major factors attributed to these variations in the cost 
distance relationship:
i) variable cost of operators
ii) fixed cost of operators
iii) capacity factors and route distances
iv) controlled price, which has both fixed and variable components as noted already.
Therefore, it can be argued that the institutional solutions have short-comings and 
significant adjustments are highly necessary. If there is to be an improvement in shipping 
services this may take the form of improved port facilities or more efficient ships, or it 
may be administrative or institutional, perhaps involving a relaxation of high freight 
rates, stevedoring or port charges, or the raising of low rates, as identified in previous 
sections.
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7.3 P.N .G . HARBOURS BOARD (PNGHB)
PNG Harbours Board cost structures are an important factor in the analysis of the 
appropriateness of existing pricing systems and the development of alternative systems.
In the Transport Efficiency and Tariff Review studies, it was discovered that 
costs include depreciation on historically revalued assets, maintenance and operational 
expenditures and rate of return costs. Five of the main ports, namely Port Moresby, Lae, 
Rabaul, Kieta, and Madang, incur about 76.3% of the Harbours Board's annual 
operating and maintenance expenses, with Port Moresby and Lae accounting for 25.4% 
and 26.8%, respectively of total operating and maintenance costs. Unit costs per 
revenue-tonne range from 2.737 kina at Vanimo and 3.392 kina at Lae to 7.78 kina at 
Daru. In general, costs per revenue tonne fall with throughput, Vanimo and Buka being 
the exceptions.
The average unit cost for all ports is 4.806 kina per revenue-tonne. Lae as the 
largest port is 42% lower than the average at 3.392 kina per revenue-tonne.
Cost structure
The Tariff study (1991.p.26) also found that, at present, port charges are based on 
vessel types and for cargo. This is shown in Table 7.2.
Table 7.2 Cost structures
coastal vessel
overseas vessel > 600 G RT
on the ship 24.0 % 13.2 %
on the cargo 76.0 % 86.8 %
Source: Port Tariff Review Report, 1991, p. 26)
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From Table 7.2, it can be seen that only 24% and 13.2%, respectively, of port 
charges bear upon the efficiency with which the ship is unloaded. The remaining charge, 
being based on tonnes, is impervious to any variation in stevedoring output. This shows 
the relationship between port tariff and stevedoring efficiency.
Stevedoring and cargo handling costs
The costs for stevedoring and for cargo handling at both Port Moresby and Lae, 
fall within the range of 2.50 kina to 2.80 kina per tonne. On average, the operating costs 
per tonne for both functions are roughly equal. Detailed costs and charges are given in 
the Appendix.
The reason for some ports having high stevedoring cost structures could be 
attributed to high inefficiencies. High costs may be reflected in over-capitalisation, high 
wage rates and possibly high labour levels.
7 .3 .1  The Assessment of Harbours Board Pricing
Public authority pricing policies are influenced by the fact that the authority belong 
to government. The pricing of such services would generally be determined by using 
different criteria from those applied in the private sector, given the wider societal interests 
of governments.
In Chapter 6 it was noted that the PNGHB operates in a near monopoly situation 
and thus possesses substantial market power over the users of port services. However, 
given public ownership, it does not have the same incentive to exploit its position as 
would a private owner.
The present tariff is based upon vessel charactersitics, cargo volume, commodity 
classification, time and rentals. As noted in Table 7.2 a distinction is made between 
charges on ships (berthage paid by ship, including small and large vessels) and charges 
on cargoes, wharfage paid by the owner of the cargo; including overseas and coastal 
cargoes or agricultural and manufactured goods.
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Discrimination Between Export, Import and Coastal Cargoes
Discrimination between export, import and coastal cargoes appears to have little 
basis in port authority costs. It appears to be in part the result of an inherited tradition that 
port authorities should support local industries. These wharfage charges allow them to 
impose discriminatory pricing.
The differences in overseas and coastal rates are proportionally higher for 
agricultural exports which have a higher wharfage rate. It would appear that any 
objective of encouraging exports by lower wharfage rates is unlikely to be effective, and 
according to economic rationalism, is hardly a role the Board should attempt.
Furthermore, the wharfage charge penalise transshipment traffic which by the 
very nature of the charge, must be paid at least three times whereas direct imports or 
direct exports only have to once. This is the major component of the tariff because of the 
'hub and spoke' operation within the country.
There is also an additional administrative cost associated with implementing 
berthage together with wharfage since the volume of cargo loaded and unloaded needs to 
be co-ordinated with the berth times of vessels.
Financial Performance
Over 80 to 90% of the Board's revenue is generated by six ports with two ports 
accounting for seventy per cent. When revalued assets are accounted for, over one third 
of net operating assets are found in the 'other ports' category which handles less than 10 
per cent of the Board's traffic. This is shown in Table 7.4 .
The extent of operational efficiencies can also be assessed in the following 
Figures 7.10 and 7.11. In the case of operating costs and revenue relationships over a 
nine year period from 1983-1991, the Board goes through a business cycle where large 
improvements in financial performance in the mid-term (i.e. late 1980s) certainly 
compensates for poor performances in the early 1990s. As noted previously, Lae and 
Port Moresby ports show dominant performances with small improvements by Rabaul,
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Madang, Kimbe and under normal circumstances, Kieta, as depicted in Figures 7.10 and 
7.11 respectively.















Lae 1520 6810 27.8
Pom 1320 4073 16.9
Rabaul 400 608 4.2
Madang 170 413 3.4
Kieta 340 404 4.4
Bialia 80 118 5.1
Vanimo 30 35 .6
Lorengau 30 -1 .2
Samarai 30 -9 .3
Alotau 250 -24 4.2
Buka 30 -24 1.3
Aitape 30 -77 1.3
Kimbe 390 -114 8.5
Kavieng 80 -148 3.9
Darn 30 -149 .2
Oro Bay 110 -195 4.2
Wewak 220 -237 4.4
Source: Port Tariff Review Report 1991, p. 25.
Further cross-subsidies also occur between overseas and coastal shipping with
respect to wharfage and berthage charges. Table 7.5 show this level of cross­
subsidisation.
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Figure 7.10 Financial Performance by Port, 1990
Source: Data from PNGHB Financial Statements, TES,1990
Figure 7.11 Financial Performance by Time Period (in years), 1983 to 1991
Source: Data from PNGHB & Tariff Study Report 1991.
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The Influence of the 7% Internal Rate of Return
Besides its regulatory and statutory responsibilities, the Board is also required to 
meet a given financial target every year. This target can be regarded as the major driving 
force behind the economic and financial policies of the Harbour Board.
The Asian Development Bank (ADB) requires a rate of return of 7 per cent be 
achieved from net revalued assets. The Department of Finance & Planning (DF&P) 
requires an overall rate of return on historic costs of between 16 and 22% as well as a 
12% return on new investments.
W hilst this is highly laudable from the point of view of commercial 
responsibilities, or is a desirable accounting practice, carrying it to an extreme where 
current-price recovery is sought on assets where the market is unable to support such a 
policy is questionable and means it is not consistent with the general principle of cost 
recovery as required by the government for the transport industry as a whole.
Implications of Rate of Return and Cross-Subsidy Policy
i. 7  p e r  cent rate o f  return
This policy when applied across the board requires the Harbours Board to recover 
from all users the cost of:-
• obsolescent investments, where, for example, the need for the scale of a 
port's facilities no longer be necessary because of extension of road 
networks, or
• social investments, where many benefits are in the form of gains to those 
who are not direct users of the port.
To apply such a criterion across the board so as to include assets that are not likely 
to be replaced in their original form and thus do not demand full cost based pricing 
indicators, is to apply an ex post facto financial penalty for an investment which is either 
no longer required in its original form, or was mistaken, in crude financial terms, and is 
unable to deliver the value of its community benefits through pricing.
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Tab le  7.5 Present Extents o f Subsidies in PNGHB Carges, 1989
Revenue from Wharfage
Annual Revenue Generated 
(Million Kina)
Additional Revenue Generated 
if All Cargo Charged Same Tariff 
(Million Kina)
Imported cargo 8.477






Tota l 11.124 4.510
Note. 1. The same revenue, as is presently generated, would be generated if all types of cargo were charges 79 per cent of the tariffs 
which are presently applied to overseas imports.







x hrs at Berth)
Implied Time at 
Berth (Million 
Metres LOA x hrs)
Overseas shipping 3.108 60 5.180
Coastal shipping
< 20 metres LOA 0.020 9 0.22620.50 metres LOA 0.115 12 0.958
> 50 metres LOA 0.182 15 1.216
Tota l 3.425 7.580
Note: 1. The same revenue would be generated if all types of shipping were charged 45 toea/’metre LOA x hour'.
2. The present tariffs are equivalent to an annual 0.46 million kina subsidy from overseas to coastal shipping.
Source: PNGHB detailed profit & loss statements for 1989.
However, the recovery from capital in social investment by prices for assets 
supplied that have a low elasticity of demand for their services, is a credible policy 
objective, and explicit recognition must be given to port users willing to pay to cover such 
investments. This therefore requires the attention of both the national government and 
aid donors.
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S u n k  C o s ts
Particular ports which fall under this category include Alotau, Kimbe, Kavieng, 
and Oro Bay. These ports do not meet the criteria of revaluing assets at current prices 
because of their diminished earning power that is unable to support the amortisation of 
investment. Hence to meet such criteria as a rate of return of 7 % on top of the required 
price to achieve an amortisation target definitely weighs heavily on port users. This can 
restrict use of facilities, increase the wastage of assets and is a deadweight welfare loss 
for port hinterlands.
From an economic point of view, an appropriate rate of return is available on 
alternative investments of equivalent risk in the private sector. Port investment does carry 
a degree of risk, in that the volume of cargo handled, and therefore revenue, is closely 
related to general economic conditions. Thus, the rate of return on assets should exceed 
that of long term risk-free investment, such as the real long-term bond rate.
The historical costs of port assets with a prolonged life span and other major 
assets will generally be below those values based on prices current during the accounting 
period. It is therefore, contended that under such circumstances, the rate of return on 
historical cost will overstate the economic performance of the Board.
ii. C ro ss-S u b sid y
As noted earlier, cross-subsidy does exist between charges on ships and cargo, 
and between larger and smaller port operations. Lae and Port Moresby, for example, 
have had an average revenue over the three years from 1989 to 1992 at 13.41 million 
kina and an average annual expenditure of 7.75 million kina, with an operating profit of 
73 per cent. At the 15 smaller ports, annual revenue has been a total of 5.87 million kina 
with average expenditure being 7.13 million kina.
Cases where surpluses are applied to recover sunk costs elsewhere, have a clear 
resemblance to some Harbours Board facilities. In either case, prices are kept above 
average costs in order to maintain profitability, and, at the same time, to reduce
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competition from private port facilities at high volume, high revenue ports like Lae, Port 
Moresby and Rabaul.
Given economies of scale, marginal costs are below average costs so that prices 
need to exceed marginal costs if a financial balance is to be achieved. The pricing 
systems which set prices above marginal cost and are based on the value of the service or 
on the Ramsey pricing principle where price in excess of marginal cost is inversely 
proportional to consumers’ elasticity of demand are examples of price discrimination. 
This therefore inhibits competition and creates undesirable outcomes such as the 
provision of alternative port facilities and a likely fall in user-level at the Board’s facilities.
7 .4  CONCLUDING REM ARKS
Thus, the present tariff policy does not guarantee the maximisation of revenue or 
the growth potential of the Harbours Board. Its abilities to recover costs, ration demand 
for the use of facilities or to encourage the efficient use of port facilities. The imposition 
of this uniform, multi-part tariff, irrespective of cost differences, demonstrates price 
discrimination. This is not in fact peculiar to any monopoly operator.
The important point is that the Harbours Board price policy neither maximises 
revenue nor growth of the industry. There is, therefore, a need to modify the Board’s 
pricing policies so that they truly reflect the costs.
In the earlier sections, we analysed the pricing of coastal shipping operators. 
However, as the prices were controlled by the government, it was assumed that they 
were either too high or too low. The next chapter gives an assessment of the level of 
freight rates and their influence upon private returns to the shipping firms.
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CHAPTER VIII
DOMESTIC SHIPPING INDUSTRY PERFORMANCE
8.1 INTRODUCTION
Various objectives can be used to consider economic performance. The discussion in 
this chapter focuses on economic efficiency in the domestic shipping industry, and this has 
two aspects, namely, technical and allocative efficiency. Technical efficiency is concerned 
with producing a given output of goods or services at the lowest cost. Allocative efficiency is 
based on the maximisation of community welfare through the production of an optimal mix of 
goods and services as measured by how a community's resources are allocated between 
different kinds of outputs, what methods are used to produce the output, and how the output 
is allocated among members of the community.
Economic Performance
It has been argued that performance is a function of the structure and behaviour, both 
internal and external of an organisation. As noted in previous chapters, 'structure' includes 
several elements, 'behaviour' covers a wide range of an organisations actions, 'internal 
organisation' includes diversification, mergers, integration and collusion, and 'external 
conditions' include changes coming from outside the industry such as shifts in demand, 
changes in markets, new opportunities for better technology and the regulatory climate. The 
previous chapters have assessed some of these aspects in the context of the maritime 
industry.
Market performance, therefore is an appraisal of how far the economic results of an 
industry's behaviour fall short of the best possible contribution it could make to achieving 
these goals ( Caves etal, 1987,p.98), that is, industry performance is judged on its economic 
results. The Schumpeterian view asserts that if the economic performance approach to
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competition is accepted, it is possible for an industry consisting of one or only a few firms to 
display a socially acceptable degree of competition if it performs well economically, for 
example, if X-inefficiency is absent, technology progress rapid and prices do not diverge too 
markedly from marginal cost - i.e. prices should reflect marginal costs. Tisdell (1982, p. 
373).
Firms and agencies in the domestic shipping industry have been subject to some 
degree of regulation and differing types of market structure. Differences in market structures 
arise both from historical regulatory decisions, or operational environments, and from 
independent factors associated with internal decisions by the company's management. The 
intention of this chapter is to analyse the effects of these different market structures and 
conduct on market performance, and to offer some comments on the selected impacts of 
current regulatory practices in the shipping and stevedoring industry. That is, it will deal 
with aspects of market performance of the industry and what features of market structure or 
conduct seem to affect it.
The perennial question then arises as to how to evaluate market performance. One 
way, according to Kneafsey (1975), is to emphasise static economic efficiency, or the extent 
to which observed prices and costs correspond to long-run minimum costs. A second 
yardstick of market performance is the magnitude of technical innovation that is central to any 
study of costs and production. Some observers contend that there will always exist beneath 
the surface several important relationships between technology, costs and market 
performance). Another measure of market performance is the rate of return on investment 
earned by the industry.
However, one of the common methods of evaluating static efficiency of an industry is 
to determine its profits. This yardstick is used here to assess the performance of the domestic 




Because profits play an important role in production and supply, it is necessary to 
define what is meant by profit. In accounting, profit is total revenue less total cost, with 
depreciation on buildings, machinery and equipment included as costs. In economics, profits 
are divided into two categories.
i) Normal profits: this refers to the minimum return to the labour, capital, or other 
inputs, contributed by owners of a firm and needed to keep the inputs in a given 
productive activity. This is same as implicit costs, and they are exactly the same 
whether or not resource owners take an interest in where their resources are 
employed. (Peterson, 1989, p. 106).
ii) Pure profits:these defined as the return above all costs, both explicit and implicit. 
Pure profits exist because knowledge is imperfect and the future uncertain. If there 
were perfect knowledge with certainty, resources would gravitate to where returns 
would be highest. Or conversely, as resources moved out of low return activities, 
there would be a fall in profits. When the earnings of each resource became equal in 
all activities, every resource would earn what it could in the next best alternative. 
Hence there would be no pure profits.
Because of market imperfection and uncertainty, pure profits, or economic profits, 
exist to provide incentive for entrepreneurial risk taking (ETR), where there are possibilities 
for gain and loss. Figure 8.1 illustrates the profit and loss position of a competitive firm.
In this context, profitability becomes a rate of return on the owner's capital i.e. the 
rate of return = Profit /  Equity capital.
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Figure 8.1 Possible Profit o r Loss Positions o f Perfectly Competitive Firms
(A) Pure profits earned
MC ATC
CL 'Q
(B) Zero pure profits
(C) Loss incurred
Source: Peterson, W., 1989, p. 173.
8 . 2 . 1  Relevance to the Domestic Shipping Sector
From the Transport Efficiency Study (1990), a pre-determined level of capacity 
utilisation, or 'standard volume', is assumed to be 85 per cent of full ship capacity. This is 
indicated in the cost model developed for TES study. A load factor assumption is also built 
into the cost-model (given in Appendix A).
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The load factor is presumably the proportion of available space filled by revenue 
generating passengers or freight. This study is mostly concerned with freight shipping. The 
assumptions of a given load factor is, an extent, arbitrary, for there is no theory of general 
load factors. That is why there are difficulties with the measurement of minimum costs in 
shipping, for example, since they depend to some extent on load factors. For example, with 
35 per cent load factor at the standard volume, the unit cost will rise with changes in demand. 
As load factors rise to 50 per cent and 65 per cent, the unit cost will fall, thus providing 
prospective profit margins for the producers of shipping services. It is therefore assumed 
that maximum capacity utilisation, lower per unit cost and reasonable price-cost margins 
would result in efficiency gains being translated into lower competitive prices. The problem, 
however, is that there is no bench mark or threshold level at which the growth in the price- 
cost margins will be acceptable.
From Table 8.1 , the profit margins at given load factors for the different geographical 
trade areas, indicate that improved profit performance is related to improved capacity 
utilisation.
For larger vessels, Table 8.1 shows revenues, expenses and profits with average load 
factors of 35 per cent, 50 per cent and 65 per cent. For workboats Table 8.1 shows 
revenues, expenses and profits with average load factors of 45 per cent on 10 metre boats and 
35 per cent on the 15 metre boats.
8.2.3 Geographic Trade Routes: Freight Services
Main Port to Main Port Trade
The figures show that on the main port trade, a typical vessel with a load factor of 35 
per cent will generate sufficient revenue to cover direct and overhead expenses, plus about 65 
per cent of the costs associated with capital amortisation. With a load factor of 50 per cent, 
revenue is sufficient to produce a return on capital investment of about 8.6 per cent. With a








Main port 35 per cent 1787.50 1953.2 (165.7)
50 per cent 2536.60 2091.4 445.2
65 per cent 3319.7 2229.3 1090.4
Papuan Coast 35 370.4 611.6 (241.2)
50 529.2 640.2 (111.0)
65 688 668.8 19.2
334dwt -360 cubic metres bale capacity
Papuan Coast 35 545.4 674.3 (128.9)
50 779.1 716.5 62.6
65 1012.8 758.8 254.0
370dwt-530 m3 bale capacity
North NG Coast 35 1557.5 1624.1 (66.6)
50 2225.0 1751.8 473.2
65 2892.4 1881.8 1010.6
1315dwt-1630 m3 bale capacity
North NG Coast 35 477.8 667.6 (189.8)
50 682.5 706.8 (24.3)
65 887.3 745.9 141.4
402dwt-500m3 bale capacity
New Guinea Islands 35 614.3 708.2 (93.9)
50 877.5 758.5 119.0
65 1140.8 808.9 331.9
300dwt-450m3 bale capacity
New Guinea 35 555.4 901.3 (345.9)
50 819.5 901.3 (81.8)
65 1064.9 901.3 163.6
Pax. Service
(104 dwt)
Work boats 10m 42.8 38.5 4.2
15m coastal 108.1 62.0 46.1
15m river 61.3 41.8 19.5
Source: TES Report 1990, p. B-120.
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65 per cent load factor, sufficient revenue is produced to provide a return on capital 
investment of about 21 per cent.
The present situation is that load factors are approximately 57 per cent. This therefore 
allows the operators to earn a rate of return on capital investment of about 21 per cent.
Papuan Coast (Papuan Gulf) Trade
For smaller operators on the Papuan coast with (334 dwt) vessels, a 65 per cent load 
factor would achieve a return on capital investment of only 1.7 per cent. With a load factor of 
50 per cent, the revenue produced is only sufficient to cover direct costs and about 63.5 per 
cent of overhead charges with no contribution being able to be made to capital amortisation.
However, because of tariff differentials, an operator who confined his or her service 
to those ports in Tariff Zones 6,7 and 8 on the Fly and Strickland Rivers, would be able to 
maintain a profitable operation with a load factor of only 50 per cent.
Larger vessel (370 dwt) operators on the Papuan coast are able to produce a return on 
capital investment o f :
• 5.2 per cent with load factor of 50 per cent, and
• 21.2 per cent with a load factor of 65 per cent.
The present load factors are about 35 per cent for smaller ships and 40 per cent for 
larger vessels. Operators are therefore, experiencing a loss with smaller vessels and earning 
a return on investment of less than 10 per cent with larger vessels.
North New Guinea Coast (Northbound) Trade
Smaller vessel(470 dwt) operators on the North New Guinea coast must achieve a 
load factor of 55 per cent before they can make a profit. With a load factor of 50 per cent, 
revenue exceeds direct costs plus overheads but covers only about 94 per cent of capital
161
amortisation charges. However, at a load factor of 65 per cent, the operator is able to make a 
return of 11.1 per cent on capital investment.
Operators of larger vessels (1315 dwt) on North new Guinea coast are able to 
generate a return on capital investment of:
• 11.3 per cent with a 50 per cent load factor, and
• 24.2 per cent with a load factor of 65 per cent.
The present load factors are 55 per cent for smaller vessels and 50 per cent for larger 
vessels. Operators are therefore earning a return on capital investment of about 5 per cent for 
smaller vessels and 11.3 per cent for larger vessels.
New Guinea Islands Main ports and Feeder Trade
On the New Guinea Islands routes with vessels of 300 dwt, operators must achieve a 
load factor of about 45 per cent before they can make a profit. They are able to produce a 
return on capital investment of:
• 11.9 per cent with load factor of 50 per cent, and
• 33.2 per cent with a load factor of 65 per cent.
Present load factors are about 50 per cent on New Guinea Islands routes and 
operators earn a return on capital investment of about 11.9 per cent.
Inter-Island Workboat Trade
Workboat operators appear to be making the following returns on their capital 
investments:
• 9.3 per cent with a 10 metre boat with a load factor of 45 per cent,
• 55.9 per cent with a 15 metre coastal boat with 35 per cent load factor, and
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• 23.6 per cent with a 15 metre river boat with a load factor of 35 per cent.
Current tariffs are providing operators of larger boats with substantial profits.
Passenger Services
The operator of passenger only vessels on the North New Guinea and Island routes 
will generate:
• with a 50 per cent load factor, sufficient revenue to cover only operating expenses and 
42 per cent of annual capital amortisation costs, and
• with a 65 per cent load factor, sufficient revenue to produce a return on capital 
investment of 10.9 per cent.
Present load factors are about 67 per cent and the operator is, therefore, producing a 
return on capital investment of about 13 per cent.
Stevedoring Services
The stevedoring and cargo handling sections of the marine transport industry have 
maintained their viability by increasing labour productivity through mechanisation and 
training, particularly in Port Moresby and Lae. While the total throughput of dry general 
cargo at all Harbours Board ports appears to have increased at about 4 per cent per annum  ̂
over the last decade, the labour force required to handle that cargo has decreased by about 50 
per cent.
TES argues that the 1981 tariff structure has no reasonable relation to the costs of 
providing stevedoring and cargo handling services within the various tariff categories, and 
hence some rationalisation of the structure is necessary.
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Port Services, the sole stevedoring company until 1992 in Port Moresby, is considered, to 
be an 'efficient operator'. The company is estimated to be generating, before tax, an annual 
rate of return on invested capital of about 20 per cent. It will be interesting to see whether 
Port Services would still be able to maintain this level of profitability, since in 1992 two 
additional stevedoring licences were issued, one to United Stevedoring, owned by Consort 
Express line and the other to Ray Stewart of Curtain Brothers Marine.
Smaller companies operating in Lae and other ports are also making a profit of 
between 5 and 10 per cent.
In the case of Port Services they have been able to maintain efficiency and hence reap 
returns, thereby permitting the internal financing of new purchases and the maintenance of 
equipment. Generally, companies with relatively lower returns have been unable to internally 
finance equipment acquisition.
8 .2 .4  Profit Performance and its Implications
It can therefore, be argued that the relatively poor market performance of shipping 
companies may be due to low load factors and inefficient operations.
The differential in performance can also be attributed to regulation, which can both 
exclude new firms and keep prices on high density routes substantially above costs. The 
relative importance of the market control of entry restriction and tariff regulation is quite 
pronounced. Relatively poor market performance coincides with the fact that new entry is 
not permitted and there is no case where entry and exit has been free in the maritime sector. It 
is also associated with the maintenance of rates above minimum costs on high density routes.
High natural barriers to entry in the scheduled liner main port service, for example, can also 
affect the performance of firms wishing to expand services. Such liner operations, 
particularly common carriers like Consort Express Line, Lutheran Shipping and other small 
to medium sized independent operators, are affected by the discriminatory integration and
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coercive behaviours of dominant firms. These therefore affect the efficiency of independent 
operators wishing to service other markets.
The charter services sector, on other hand, is arguably the most competitive. 
Operators sell their services on the charter market with competitive rates to attract contracts 
from oil companies, construction firms and mining companies. Once a permanent charter 
contract is achieved, the operators try to maintain efficiency with contract provisions in mind 
so as to hold their niche. This is a specialised service. These services mostly carry 
'homogeneous' goods but because a large proportion of such freight originate from 
international markets, avenues for co-operative behaviour between firms is minimal.
Another more recent entry into maritime sector, in particular, the inter-island shipping 
industry has occurred with the advent of 'third-level workboat' services to coastal and outer­
islands. Here, the entry of such new firms would make this particular sector more efficient. 
Workboat services clearly do improve the access to remote areas and also, when hired by 
provincial governments, do, to an extent, improve the provision and distribution of social 
services to isolated rural communities.
However, as noted earlier, the ships operating under current tariff structures and load 
factors still make a viable return on investment. Those vessels that are quite large, with 
relatively more carrying capacity, tend to generate substantial returns on their capital 
investment. This is quite evident in main port-main port trade where economy of scale 
benefits are exploited.
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8 . 3  T E C H N I C A L  I N N O V A T I O N
The magnitude of technical innovation is also important, and raises the issue of 
whether there are any important differences between market structures conducive to static 
efficiency and those consistent with a high and effective rate of innovation (Kneafsey, 1975).
The market efficiency of innovations is important, given the amounts expended on 
research and development, and the market success of the innovations which all the transport 
firms have adopted to some degree over the period. The really interesting question, 
however, is which shipping companies have been most successful in their policies. Since no 
financial information was disclosed on this area, it is difficult to determine the firms' success 
rate.
However given these constraints, it can be surmised that there is no conflict between 
market efficiency and effectiveness of innovations. In markets with low entry barriers, for 
example, innovations tended to reflect more closely the needs of the market. The same can be 
said of the charter services, where specific requirements are being catered for, 
i.e.innovations are 'need oriented', especially for bulk shipments. However,in markets 
subject to high entry barriers, innovation seems to have diverted service from the needs of the 
market. Low entry barriers play a very decisive role in the efficient operation of markets. 
This is quite consistent with microeconomic theory and has certain implications for public 
policy.
Studies have shown that innovative activity is greatest in firms with 5 to 20 per cent market 
shares (Shepherd 1990.p.l61). Below that, firms may be too small to find significant 
innovations, and above 20 per cent, they tend to wait to innovate until forced by other firms.
The general consensus, therefore, is that a large share of innovations comes from lesser 
firms and from outsiders rather than from dominant firms.
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8 .3 .1 Relevance to the Shipping Industry
W o r k b o a t  s u b - s e c to r
In the workboat industry, the firms are mostly owner operated by families or village 
co-operatives. Innovation activity' is not so prevalent in the industry. This is due to the 
smallness of these operators which in turn can be associated with the financial capital 
available to them. In other words, capital resources are rather scarce in this sub-sector.
However, there are instances where large workboats, mostly used for multi-purpose 
operations, undertake some form of innovation to differentiate their service from the common 
workboat. This is a one-off situation. For example, M. V.Malu, a relatively bigger workboat 
over 10m in length, has cost Sikins Shipping some 110,000 kina to construct. The ship 
contains innovative features such as amenities, and extra cargo space. Given the large 
number of operators providing freight services, and that it is difficult to maintain market share 
in the freight service, this extra investment has improved its market position, particularly in 
the inter island open charter market. Economy of scale can be exploited in the provision of 
charter services. The present indications are that it controls about 65 per cent of the charter 
sub-market.
This perceived advantage, therefore, helps market niching and dominance on 
profitable routes. Given these opportunities and being under competitive pressure, makes 
them act more rapidly. This is not peculiar to transport.
Similar activities also occur in some sub-markets of the main ports trade where those 
with small market shares do experience a favourable climate for undertaking innovation and 
experimentation. Dominant firms like Consort Express Line and Lutheran, may undertake 
innovation when potential competition is looming.
However, in most cases, innovation is undertaken mostly by firms with small market 
shares rather than by dominant firms. For dominant firms innovative undertakings are more 
of a check on market position than anything else and hence, bears a disciplinary impact on a 
firm’s operation.
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8 . 4  C O N C L U D I N G  R E M A R K S
The performance of shipping lines in the domestic maritime sector is influenced 
greatly by the market structure. The internal organisational, or structural, elements in 
association with formal regulatory controls, affect the economic performance of the 
operators. It is obvious that the market is characterised by a small number of operators and 
more than half are in ’cartel' arrangements, thereby diminishing the number even further.
However, in terms of financial performance, most firms in the different geographic 
sub-markets experience relatively good returns to cover capital investment costs. This is 
related to the load factors in that the higher the load factors, the higher will be the return on 
investment. For small operators with relatively low load factors, the revenue generated is not 
sufficient to support amortisation on investment. This diminished earning power could be 
attributed to inefficient operations, excessive competition, and an operational environment 
conducive to restricting the extension of services to other areas. However, all operators seem 
to be performing well under the current controlled pricing regime. There is an implication in 
this that the possibility of prices being too low is rather remote. This difficulty is further 




M A R K E T  IN T E G R A T IO N  A N D  C O L L U S IO N : T H E O R Y  & P R A C T IC E
9 .1  I N T R O D U C T I O N
Thus far, our discussion has looked at those elements of maritime industry structure 
based on the arrangements of suppliers of shipping services, conditions of entry, product 
differentiation, demand conditions, institutional arrangements, cost structures and resultant 
pricing practices. Industrial economic literature tends to confirm that there is a link between 
market structure, market conduct and economic performance in the market-place.
The behaviour of firms are central to the attainment of corporate objectives within the 
operational environment and under given constraints. There are two major constraints to firm 
behaviour:- legal constraints underlying criminal, contract and company law; and the 
competitive environment in which the firm operates. The basis of subsequent discussion will 
be on market behaviour under 'competitive constraints', with particular reference to vertical 
integration and collusion.
9 .2  D E F I N I T IO N  O F  V E R T IC A L  IN T E G R A T IO N  A N D  C O L L U S IO N
Vertical integration in industrial organisation refers to the successive stages involved 
in the production of a particular product or service that are performed by different firms 
within an organisation, or the converse, that is the extent to which a firm performs different 
successive stages in the production of a service or a product. It is also used to describe the 
action of a firm in acquiring or constructing facilities for carrying out productive stages 
which formerly either preceded or succeeded its productive activities.
Backward and forward vertical integration refer to the acquisition of preceding or 
succeeding stages, respectively. Backward integration means an integration in to an upstream 
market and forward refers to a downstream market.
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Partial and complete integration can also be distinguished also, where the former case 
refers to a firm which uses the market to acquire supplies or the disposal of part of its output, 
producing only part of its total requirement of a particular input, or processing part of its 
output at an earlier stage. [Needham 1976, Oster 1990. opcit].
Thus the degree of vertical integration is one of the decision variables of an 
organisation. There is always the choice which input to purchase from the external market 
and which one to produce internally, either through a process of acquisition of or merger 
with, an input producer, or through the internal development of a new venture in the input 
area, i.e. firms may be both in the captive as well as the transaction market. Finally, 
considerable variations exist as to the types of supplier and buyer relationships characterised 
as ‘captive’ or ‘merchant’ kinds.
Similarly, collusion refers to ’acting together', overtly or tacitly to ‘rig’ the market. 
There is also ‘co-existence’ to form orderly pricing or to maintain 'harmony' amongst 
competitors.
The most important market conditions that are conducive to collusion are firstly, 
concentration and fewness; and costs where similar cost structures make co-ordination easier, 
while high overhead costs results in the opposite. Demand conditions, either random or 
systematic, can affect competitor behaviour. Focal points are important in geographic market 
segments where segmentation can quite easily occur. Non-price competition and information 
are other aspects important to improving opportunities for collusive behaviour.
9 .2 .1 Evidence of Integration and Collusion
Whilst vertical integration has universal application to manufacturing industry, in 
functional terms it can also be related to service industries and the domestic maritime market 
is no exception.
In Papua New Guinea, the transport industry is substantially controlled by three 
groups of companies. The three major groups are:
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a) The Collins and Leahy Group. Although substantially owned by PNG interests, it is 
a listed company on the Australian Stock Exchange);
b) The Century Group of Companies (CGC), which is a joint venture owned by Bums 
Philp and through the Robert Laurie Company, by P&O Australia;
c) The Steamships Group, which is also a public limited company and operates mainly 
in PNG but is listed on the Australian Stock Exchange. About 33 per cent of the 
company is owned by Collins and Leahy and 33 per cent by Swire Group. The other 
33 per cent is owned by a large number of smaller organisations and private 
individuals. The Public Officers Superannuation Fund (POSF) is one of the larger 
minority shareholders.
Companies controlled by the 'big three' include:
1. Collins and Leahy
• Steamships
• Kiunga Aviation P/L
• Goroka Soft Drinks Distributors
• Heavy Lift (Rotorworks Helicopters) PNG Ltd
• A large number of industrial projects, agricultural estates and retail and 
wholesale traders, all of whom have small trucking fleets of their own or who 
use contract haulers.
2. Companies involved in transport, either fully owned or largely controlled by the 
Century Group:
• Port Moresby Transport (Road Freight)
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• Robert Laurie Company (PNG P/L (Freight Forwarders, cargo de­
consolidators, coastal and ocean going ship operators and, in a number of 
areas outside Port Moresby, road freight haulers).
• Port Services (this company is 50% owned by Century Group and 50% by 
Steamships - the company was until 1992 the sole stevedoring operator in 
Port Moresby).
• Buntings Stevedores
• Consort Express Line (Coastal ship operator- the Century Group, the 
Steamships Group and Lutheran Shipping (each have a 25% stake in this 
company).
• Joint Coastal Shipping (Coastal ship operators - this is a joint venture with 
companies in the Steamships Group).
• Riback (this company provides stevedoring services in Rabaul, Lae and 
Madang. The company's only real rival in these ports is Rabaul Stevedores 
which is part of Steamships Group).
• Western Tug and Barge (Coastal and River Barge services).
• Niugini Islands Cargo Services (Stevedoring services in Kavieng, Kimbe, 
Rabaul, Lae, Madang, and Oro Bay).
• Container Freight Stations (cargo de-consolidations).
• West New Britain Cargo Services (trucking).
• BNG Trading (wholesalers and retailers undertaking own road freight  ̂
operations.
3. Companies involved in transport either fully owned or largely controlled by
Steamships Group include:
• Chards Forwarding Agency (road freight haulers).
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PNG Shipping Corporation Pty Ltd (coastal and ocean going ship 
owners/operators).
Consort Express Lines Pty Ltd (coastal ship operators - Steamship Group, the 
CG and Lutheran shipping each have a 25% stake in this company).
Joint Coastal shipping Company (coastal ship operators, a joint venture with 
companies in Century Group).
Port Services
Rabaul stevedores (this company provides stevedoring services in Rabaul, 
Lae and Madang - the company's only rival is Riback, which is part of 
Century Group and which operates in the same three ports).
North Solomons Stevedores 
Kiunga Stevedores
Pacific Towing (tug & salvage operations)
Associated Distributors P/L (wholesaler distributors in Port Moresby area. 
This company is owned 100% by Steamships and undertakes some 'own 
account’ transport but sub contracts most of its work to Chards Forwarding 
Agency).
Associated Distributors (PNG) Pty Ltd (wholesale distributors in the Lae and 
Highlands areas. This company is a joint venture between Collins and Leahy 
and Steamships. The company subcontracts all its transport operations work 
to East West Transport which is a company owned by Collins and Leahy). 
CNC ( Cash and Carry wholesalers, which undertakes its own road freight 
haulage in the Port Moresby area.
SO Svensson (Hifi, an electrical goods dealers who undertakes own road 
freight haulage in the Port Moresby and Lae areas).
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4. Lutheran Shipping Line
• has a 25% stake in the Consort Express Line (Lutheran Shipping are the 
principal earners of trans-shipment cargo moving on Cosort Express through 
bills of lading to ports beyond Lae).
• Only uses PNGHB facilities at Oro Bay, Wewak, Aitape, Vanimo and 
Lorengau. At all other ports, they use private facilities, mainly their own.
• Undertakes their own stevedoring at their own ports. They charge their 
customers the same wharfage and cargo handling rate as do PNGHB and the 
stevedoring companies which operate in those ports.
Independent Operators
Although not involved in partnership or consortia arrangements, the following 
shipping companies also have facilities of their own at a number of ports and also undertake 
their own stevedoring at these ports:
• Coastal Shipping Company
• Pacific New Guinea line
• Curtain Brothers Marine
• Poroman shipping
These companies also charge their customers the same rate as the PNGHB and the 
stevedoring companies which operate in those ports.
Pacific New Guinea Line with its associate company, namely Meto Investments 
(Stevedoring company), controls 15% in The Lae market and 10% at Kimbe port, and a 
variable share of between 40 to 50 per cent at Rabaul, but there they are in competition with 
Coastal and Consort shipping. Their stevedoring operations in Rabaul, like Coastal 
Shipping’s are carried out on private facilities. The market shares commanded by Meto 
Investments is usually on PNGHB facilities.
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In Lae port, also, United Stevedoring which is a 100 per cent Consort owned 
company, controls about 60% of coastal traffic (mostly from CEL), while Rabaul Stevedores 
has 25% of the traffic. Overseas stevedoring and cargo handling are mostly undertaken by 
Riback.
In Port Moresby there will be some competition between Port Services, United 
Stevedoring and Ray Stewart (Curtain Brothers). This will certainly affect Port Services 
market dominance in Port Moresby for the next decade or so.
In Kimbe port, stevedoring and cargo handling services, is provided by Meto 
Investments and Kimbe Bay Shipping Agency (KBSA). KBSA control about 90% of the 
market and is an independent operator outside ALSC influence but whose charges are quite 
similar. The company also possesses substantial interests in wholesaling and retailing, such 
as Kimbe Mart, and a car dealing business. It also acts as an exclusive shipping agent for 
main port operators like Consort and such other ocean going operators as the Bank Line.
Inter Island Workboat Service
Span Enterprise Pty Ltd, the business arm of the United Church with interests in 
wholesaling and retailing at Salamo on Ferguson Island, owns three multi-purpose general 
cargo vessels operated both on its own basis also on a hire and reward basis.
Small village retailers and plantation ventures also undertake their own account shipping. 
However, generally, most operators provide freight and passenger services on a hire and 
reward basis.
Why Vertically Integrate and Collude?
The available evidence demonstrates that the domestic maritime market is integrated. 
This is evident because boundaries within the firms constantly change or shift.
The presence of independent operators who happen to be less rigorously integrated 
may see vertical integration as of some concern.
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Traditional thinking tend to be that vertical integration complete or partial and both 
forwards and backwards, enhances the market power of incumbent firms. This is closely 
related to the role of the 'big three'. If there is ‘tapered’ integration, where some part of the 
output at one stage is consumed by an associated company, for example, in terms of terminal 
or road freight, this may cause some concern and poses a threat to industry competitiveness.
However, whether this concern is justified or not can only be assessed through an 
examination of the important factors that condition vertical integration and collusion, to which 
we now turn.
9 .2 .2  Motives For Vertical Integration and Collusion
Profit Shifting
Shifting profits around through vertical integration can increase those profits, 
typically by avoiding taxes. If an organisation is paying very high taxes on its profits, it may 
be able to avoid some of those taxes by consigning profits to a relatively less taxed product 
line. Vertical integration can increase the possibilities of avoiding taxes. Similar 
opportunities are sometimes created by integration that spans over international boundaries, 
given that different countries have rather different corporate tax rates. Vertical integration 
can, on occasion, reduce an organisations tax burden.
This may offer some explanation for integration of the transport industry. Since 
shipping has international connections this enables them to make profits in offshore 
operations, using the flexibility in selecting a tax regime where taxes are less or (exempted).  ̂
If this happens, then segments of the industry competing with other domestic firms are given 
an unfair advantage, given the reduced domestic tax base.
By rebating or discounting prices to shareholders or associate companies, the motive 
for profit shifting is definitely present. With book entry strategies being adopted by some 
associate companies there is an assumption that profit maneuvering has been exercised. The
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point, however, is that the book value may not necessarily reflect the true cost of a particular 
service or product.
This therefore leads to the fact that with freight rate regulation still in force, profit 
shifting to other sections of the industry is not clear. Regulation can constrain the earning 
ability of some firms. However, if firms can purchase services, for example freight 
forwarding from a free standing agent, then its costs will rise and hence its revenue, while at 
the same time it meets the ‘rate of return’ constraint. Through this process, firms in the 
maritime industry, or other regulated industries, will have effectively shifted profits around 
through the use of vertical integration. In a regulated industry, vertical integration can 
expedite regulatory and tax evasion and lead to higher profits.
Transaction Cost Savings
The principles governing an organisations decisions as to how to structure its 
transactions or how deeply to integrate, are best summarised by Coase (1937), as cited in 
Oster 1990.
'The operation of a market costs something and by forming an organisation 
and allowing some authority (an entrepreneur), to direct the resources, 
certain marketing costs are saved. The entrepreneur has to carry out his 
function at less cost, taking into account the fact that he may get factors of 
deduction at a lower price than the market transaction which he supersedes, 
because it is always possible to revert to the open market if he fails to do 
this.' (Coase 1937 in Oster 1990)
The main thrust of the assertion is that firms rely on internal decision making to direct 
resource allocation. If it enters the market to purchase supplies, it must meet transaction costs 
associated with the market. However, an optimal strategy will involve trading off the costs 
of using each of the available methods of organising transactions or, more formally, to 
structure their transactions in ways that will minimise the costs of using transactional
apparatus.
1 7 6
S p e c i f i c  A s s e t s
Productive investments in assets specific to the transaction encourages vertical 
integration. Benefits can be achieved from specific investments. Williamson (1985) in Oster 
(ibid), has identified four areas where specific investments are most likely to occur. 
They are:
Site specificity: asset located in particular areas makes it useful for small buyers and sellers 
and can easily be removed.
Physical asset specificity: the product design, such as ships and associated features, makes it 
particularly useful to a small number of buyers.
Human asset specificity: the transaction requires specialised knowledge on the part of the 
parties to the transaction.
Dedicated assets: the expansion in facilities is only necessitated by the requirements of one or 
several buyers. Although these specialised investments when made, opens up 
possibilities for hold up, some form of vertical integration is necessary to provide the 
insulation against this hold up.
The matrix noted in Oster (p. 178), should provide some insight into the choice of 
arrangements and forces governing these relationships.















It is apparent from the matrix that vertical integration is prevalent when transaction 
between two parties are frequent and optimal investment strategies involve highly specific 
assets. In this case, the firm will find it worthwhile to bear the costs of monitoring and 
motivating activity internally, rather than face market bargaining. As either of the investment 
specificity falls, and/or the frequency of the transaction diminishes, firms move towards a 
form of contracting. Lastly, for non specific investments market transactions are most 
common.
The greater the asset specificity, c e te r is  p a r ib u s , the tighter will be the buyer and 
supplier link. Complete ownership integration is common in shipping lines, stevedoring and 
transport. An example of this in the maritime market would be the ownership relationship 
between Consort Shipping and United Stevedoring.
Joint Ventures
Joint ventures also exist in some sections of the maritime market. Some units, 
although, maintaining financial integrity, do share facilities. This is a case of less bonded 
integration but is a form of overt collusion. Laurabada Shipping (a joint venture between 
the PNG Shipping Corporation and the Century Group) is a good example of this form of 
market behaviour.
This relationship is illustrated in Figure 4.1 presented in Chapter 4.
Information Access
In some cases, having both external and internal suppliers within organisations can 
improve information availability to a central organisation. Partial integration improves a 
firm’s ability to bargain with suppliers, so there is an informational advantage from backward 
as well as forward vertical integration.
For other reasons firms may wish to engage in some vertical linking. Regulatory rules also 
favour integration. The possibility of investing in productive assets specific to a joint activity
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of two firms may encourage some integration. Vertical integration may be sought as a way to 
improve information. It is thus argued that the presence of transaction specific investments 
and the need for better information tend to move organisations out of spot markets and into 
some form of either a contractual relationship or of vertical integration.
Trade Associations
The Coastal Shipowners Association, the Association of Licensed Stevedoring 
Companies (ALSC) and the National Shippers Council (NSC) are examples of trade 
associations. The general effect has been to raise the degree of co-operation in pricing as well 
as information accessing.
Defensive Integration
By integrating backwards, a manufacturer can gain an assured source of supply 
which improves its bargaining strength. In economic theory, a profit maximising firm will 
integrate backwards if total costs of producing an output, given the demand conditions, 
results in a reduction in cost at any level of output thus facilitating a rise in profit at that level 
of output. However, the profit seeking firm will not be able to produce at the same output 
level after integration, because the scale of a firm's final output will remain unchanged if cost 
saving attributable to vertical integration is the same at all levels of output. If cost saving 
decreases with the scale of the final output or service, the profit maximising level of output 
will fall as a result of vertical integration, and the reverse is true if cost savings increase with 
the scale of the final product.
A sales revenue maximising firm will also integrate backwards provided that the cost 
of the final product is thereby reduced. Here, a firm facing given demand conditions, 
assuming unity price elasticity of demand for the final product, increases sales revenue by 
increasing the scale of output.
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Similarly, if the firm desires to maximise its growth rate of operation, it can integrate 
backwards if profits are increased and the cost of producing the final product is being 
minimised. Forward integration would seem to have the potential of assuring an outlet for 
one's product, and perhaps a profitable one at that.
Defensive motives are quite plausible in the shipping lines that develop their own 
interests in port facilities. Curtain Brothers Marine is a good example of this, since then 
command sufficient cargo traffic mostly project related cargo for such mines as Ok Tedi and 
Misima. Thus port facilities are an alternative which shipping lines can use besides the 
Harbours Board facilities.
Market sharing arrangements
This aspect of collusive behaviour can take the form of restricting output from each 
firm or specific segmentation of the market into geographic service areas. This relates to the 
suppliers of services being confined to one sub-market in arrangement with other suppliers. 
This is a form of defensive integration or collusion which is quite common in the shipping 
sector.
Control
This is collusive behaviour conceived via government set standards or 'cartel' 
conditions enforced between members. These controls can be executed between suppliers, or 
by involving the 'power' of regulatory authorities. This sometimes results in restricted 
supply and higher prices, and an 'insulation' for incumbent firms.
Good evidence of such actions can be seen in the activities of the Coasting Trade 
Committee (CTC) and the circumstances under which it carries out its responsibilities. In 
most instances this regulatory power can be 'implicitly' used to protect member-interests.
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Monopolising Intent
Pickering (1974 ) and Shepherd (1990 op .c it), have identified the following three 
factors as monopoly related incentives. First is the effect upon entry or the elevating of entry 
barriers. If most or all of a market supply is contained within integrated firms, then 
independents and potential entrants may find it necessary to have capacity at both levels, 
fearing that otherwise they will be unable to obtain sufficiently secure and reasonably priced 
supplies. This double level necessity may increase costs and capital requirements hence 
raising entry barriers, even more so, if there is a constraint on capital funds facing the 
potential entrant. This point is important, especially if the potential entrant is unable to obtain 
the required amount of capital, or faces a highly priced capital market compared to incumbent 
firms. However, there is a contention that raised capital requirements do not necessarily 
increase entry barriers.
The belief is that potential entrants are themselves established firms in the maritime 
market, rather than newly created firms, and there is no a priori reason why potential entrants 
should have less access to internally generated, or external funds in amounts and at terms 
which are disadvantageous compared to those, prevailing for incumbent firms.
A second factor is effect on the existing competition. A vertically integrated firm 
supplying competitors, as well as its own subsidiaries, is often considered to be in a strong 
position to control the competitive strengths of its rivals and, in extreme cases, to decide 
whether they may exist at all. Such control could come through vertical price 'squeezes' 
whereby producers supply their own subsidiaries at much lower prices than competitors or 
alternatively through improvements to non price features of their service. There is also the 
option of partially integrating forward can enable the seller to separate the market for its 
product and increase its profit by price discriminating across geographical markets.
Similarly, a vertically linked firm may control distribution outlets to minimise 
competition. The relevance to the maritime market can be seen in the light of the substantial 
control exercised by the 'big three', over stevedoring and cargo handling, as well as freight
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forwarding and road haulage. If there were any market opportunity at all, then competitors 
would want to exploit the benefits of owning their own distributing outlets.
Finally, there is the concept of market imperfection and uncertainty. When market 
shares are substantial and imperfections significant, some monopoly raising effects are likely. 
The question however is, at what market share will the effect most likely to be important. 
This difficulty cannot, however, be addressed because of the lack of relevant data. 
However, arguably, such effects will depend to an extent, on the degree of competition in 
the capital markets, the role of entry barriers and uncertainty and will depend on a thorough 
analysis of integrated firm behaviour.
The country has a private capital market that is relatively small and unsophisticated, 
characterised by only a few institutions. The six commercial banks can not be regarded as 
competitive. This presumption is reflected in the high costs of capital with attendant high 
interest rates, which hinders prospective entrants from attaining required capital for 
expansion. Unless this is addressed, investment in productive technology will be slow, and 
offshore borrowings by businesses will continue to rise.
This is why such conditions encourage vertical integration - in order to obtain 
unspecified residual rights, in a linked operation, or to maintain information in terms of 
strategic decision making. In a thin market like PNG’s domestic maritime market, effective 
bargaining is rare and vertical integration has unfortunately rapidly achieved prominence.
On the other hand, in a predictable market situation, specific investment undertaken to 
supply specific needs do enhance contractual arrangements. An important reference would be 
the permanent and open charter ’market'. The specialised deliveries provided by Curtain 
Brothers, Pimco Shipping and Western Tug & Barges (WTB), operate under contractual 
obligations with mining ventures at Ok Tedi, Misima and Lihir as well as with oil companies 
and construction companies mostly on permanent charter basis.
Some coastal shipping companies, such as Pacific New Guinea, Coastal Shipping, 
Lutheran Shipping and Consort, which are dedicated to coastal operations, may provide
182
containerised or bagged bulk shipments, under however, all open charter or short term, 
basis. Bulk rates are negotiable but charter rates do vary between companies and depend on 
the length of journey and type of cargo.
9.3 WELFARE IMPLICATIONS
A range of motivations for vertical integration and the ways in which such a practice 
may operate, have been discussed but it is still not clear whether the welfare consequences of 
this aspect of market conduct are favourable. The net results are, however, likely to be 
detrimental if market power is substantially raised through the creation of entry barriers or 
competition is hindered or if the search for cost savings are reduced.
In some cases, as noted by Oster (1990), this practice may increase the scale of operations, 
and put pressure on both capital and managerial resources. The flexibility of firms may also 
be reduced, while at the same time requiring then to learn a new, albeit related, business.
9.4 IMPLICATIONS FOR THE MARITIME SECTOR
It is therefore argued that firms with sufficient financial capital will not undergo 
vertical integration unless the profit per unit of capital invested in performing an additional 
stage, exceeds the returns that could be earned if the capital were invested elsewhere, 
including additional investment in diversification or in horizontal market growth in the 
existing market. The profit motive seems to be the fundamental decision making variable in 
any corporate organisation.
If vertical integration lowers costs, it will be desirable on grounds of efficiency in that 
entrants should be forced to integrate. As argued by Oster (1990), the right level of vertical 
linkage will also depend upon the opportunities for specific investments, the frequency of 
transactions across vertically linked units, and market uncertainty and in particular market 
failures. Similarly, the overall objective of collusive behaviour is to enhance inter-firm co­
operation to maintain 'stability' between operators.
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In the domestic maritime sector, The Steamships Group and The Century Group have 
dominated the entire market. This is true in the sense that they have extensive international 
linkages. It is therefore a reasonable assumption that availability of expert shipping support 
services has assisted their process of vertical integration and collusion. This has steadily 
reduced the size of the external or non-vertically integrated shipping market. This has 
therefore made it difficult for independent operators that are not part of vertically integrated 
operations to secure sufficient tonnage for profitable operations. For example, The Pacific 
New Guinea Line, The Coastal Shipping Company and other smaller operators have reduced 
their fleets by two or three vessels.
The market sharing arrangements between The Consort Express Line and The 
Lutheran Shipping Company is a form of collusion based on niching. Essentially, there is a 
notion of ’core trades' for both firms (i.e. southbound and northbound services 
respectively), which are regarded as their area of special expertise and on which intense 
rivalry will be avoided and on which entry would possibly invite retaliation. There are also 
so called 'floating trades' where both firms also experience constant and relatively intense 
competition from independent operators. Market sharing in this context comes with revenue­
sharing and capacity pooling between CEL, Luthship and PNGSC. This implicit conduct 
does not aim at growth but aims to maintain profitable operations with a certain shipping 
capacity. The combined effect of some formal governmental controls together with 
ingrained habits does improve their chances of attaining a high degree of 'shared monopoly', 
or as assumed in Chapter One — a 'protected duopoly' status.
Hence, the misguided objectives of government controls, supposedly facilitative steps 
to minimise externalities and monopolising intent, and the growing stability generated by 
market integration and collusion in such a thin market, is a cause for concern. The notion of 
stability within this context may mean a 'quiet life' for established interests.
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9 .5  CONCLUDING REMARKS
The threat to industry competitiveness is therefore an important and justifiable concern 
to shippers and potential competitors alike. The problem of pricing as well as discriminatory 
market integration requires regulatory reforms. This therefore implies changes in pricing 




The central objective of this thesis is to assemble sufficient knowledge to analyse 
shipping cost structures, industry structures, supply and demand conditions and institutional 
arrangements. A detailed discussion of their present conditions has been made in the 
foregoing chapters and the results are summarised in the following paragraphs.
In Chapter 2 the literature survey pointed out that the rationale for economic regulation 
has been to correct for market failures and to internalise externalities. However, there have 
been other non-economic objectives that pertain to the role of regulation. These include 
national unity, equity, and other social objectives. It was discovered that issues of 
privatisation and de-regulation are fairly attractive policy questions to the maritime sector in 
Papua New Guinea. The problem, however, is the capacity to dismantle such long instituted 
regulations in the sector.
In Chapter 3 an overview of the maritime sector in Papua New Guinea showed that 
the industry is relatively over regulated with price control, quantity control, safety regulations 
and requirements for labour training. The government levies operators to meet the training 
needs such as of the sea-going crew.
In Chapter 4 the market structure was identified as oligopolistic with elements of 
monopoly present in some major trade routes. The maritime industry appears to pursue 
business practices that might be characterised as oligopolistic. This is true in the sense that 
the market only supports a restricted number of shipping operators on the main geographic 
trade routes. The only 'contestable' market is the inter-island workboat services.
In Chapter 5 the demand for shipping services was 'identified' as being relatively 
elastic, and although no formal modelling or estimation was attempted, the demand for 
shipping appears to stem from the demand for commodities. Partial equilibrium analysis
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does not capture the dynamics of shipping demand, since there are other factors besides price 
such as quality of service, volume of custom which dictates the charactersitics of the pattern 
of volume of trade relevant to organisational and competitive decisions by the shipping firms, 
as well as other non-price attributes. With the application of the willingness to pay (WTP) 
concept, social benefits from shipping can be estimated.
In Chapter 6, the discussion of the institutional aspects of the maritime sector showed 
that PNG Harbours Board, Stevedoring companies and waterfront labour play significantly 
powerful roles in the sector. Their interactions in the sector influence the shipping, 
waterfront services efficiency, pricing practices and profitability.
In Chapter 7 an assessment of cost structures under a variety of assumptions 
regarding capacity utilisation, and pricing practices, clarified that, in domestic shipping, the 
government approved price seems relatively high. It also contains a cross-subsidy element 
where short haul routes are being subsidised by middle or long distance routes. Similarly, 
the smaller shippers are subsidising those with special rates.
In the case of The Papua New Guinea Harbours Board (PNGHB), their tariff policies 
are discriminatory. They do not seem to maximise revenue or the growth potential of the 
industry.
In Chapter 8 it was noted that the performance of the shipping companies is closely 
related to the load factor. The higher the load factor, the higher is the profit on their capital 
investment. This therefore implies that the prices are relatively high. Also, those shipping 
companies with smaller market shares tend to be more innovative than large dominant firms.
In Chapter 9, while exploring the question of market integration, it was found that 
there is a serious problem of market integration and collusion between large shipping 
companies. This is due to scale effects, product differentiation, natural entry barriers and the 
cost calculations that are critical determinations of such market behaviour.
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OVERALL SUMMARY
In summary, the PNG maritime sector is relatively over-regulated, and there is very 
little competition in the main ports sectors. The most competitive trade routes appear to be 
between Lae - New Britain (Rabaul and Kimbe), and the inter-island workboat services in 
The Milne Bay Province and The New Britain area. Whilst regulation is needed, over 
regulation can be counterproductive.
Conclusion & Policy Implications
The study dealt with the patterns of shipping services in the short and long distance 
sea routes, the effects of institutional arrangements and the pricing policies of government for 
the supply of shipping services.
The overall theme of the analysis was to examine the underlying forces of demand for 
and supply of shipping so as to determine the need for 'reduced* public intervention, a 
re-assessment of the current pricing regime, and the removal of other institutional rigidities 
inherent in the system. Thus, the traditional regulatory environment and discriminatory 
market practices were examined and it was found that these have often led to a high market 
price.
The factors responsible for the evolution of the present industry structure, were found 
to be government actions such as regulations conditioning the operational environment in 
which market conduct is determined, and institutional arrangements between operators that 
distort the goals of optimum or efficient pricing policies.
The strong co-ordination on a national basis of the industrial relations activities of 
stevedores and ship-operators through the ALSC and CSOA underlies their bargaining power 
in the market. Similar arrangements also exist between waterfront labour and the shippers 
council. However, the problem with the shippers council is that it has only a small number 
of effective members, unlike the waterfront labour unions which appear to be the most 
powerful actors in the sector.
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Further constraints of the relatively small market size and economies of scale also 
affect the competitive strategies of incumbent operators and new entrants. Thus, entry into 
the maritime sector on a significant scale would involve expansion into routes or ports that are 
currently served by the dominant operators. This requires a double-level entry by potential 
entrants. We found that under these circumstances, the maritime sector is an industry with 
too little competition.
PNG Harbours Board, waterfront stevedoring firms, and shipping firms are all 
subject to formal economic regulation. The Board and the shipping companies are under the 
regulatory control of the government and stevedores are subject to Harbours Board control. 
Regulatory mechanisms include contracts with operators, safety and quantity licensing and 
formal procedures for review or approval of charges or tariffs through price control.
In the case of the Harbours Board, it is charged with the responsibility of making a 
profit, as well as meeting its community service obligations. However, its tariff and pricing 
policies are to recover all costs including an annual 1%  return on operational assets at current 
prices. There is a twin effect of high capital expenditure and the revaluation of operational 
assets on the Board's cost structures, when replacement cost increases outstrip revenue 
growth. This revaluation policy and subsequent depreciation effect assumes the replacement 
of like with like and takes no account of the ability of each port’s possible earning power. 
Hence cross-subsidisation arise where larger viable ports are compensating for losses in 
smaller ports.
Amendments to the existing loan covenants for less profitable ports are therefore 
necessary. Or alternatively, the costs of these socially related services should be more 
accurately identified and funded directly from consolidated revenue if the ’user pays' 
principle is considered undesirable or inapplicable. It is essential to identify these cross­
subsidies so that the issue is one of transparency and one which can be enhanced by cost 
based pricing.
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In the case of domestic shipping, the operators seem to be making positive economic 
returns at almost 50% load factors. The returns are covering their capital investment costs as 
well as supporting the amortisation of investment. Secondly, the small shippers tend to be 
cross-subsidising those with special rates. This therefore, implies that government approved 
tariffs for the sub-sector seem to be relatively high. There are, however, no social gains from 
such a pricing regime involving allocative inefficiencies, although technical efficiencies have 
been realised.
The control of entry and exit through licensing also affect performance in both the 
shipping and waterfront sub-sectors. The leasing periods for Harbours Board facilities to 
tenants who must locate there, are generally for longer periods of about 5 years. For 
domestic shipping, the licensing period is 8 years. These long contract periods, at times re­
negotiated by stevedores under contract to Harbours Board, eighteen months prior to 
expiration, significantly reduce the impact of tendering systems in promoting effective 
competition.
The Government through the Harbours Board or the Department of Transport should 
become more involved in areas such as monitoring the performance of providers of services 
and negotiating shorter performance-based leases and licenses. A greater Harbours Board 
involvement in these activities, for example, will indicate that there is a need for it to review 
its arrangements with the stevedoring companies and unions at all major ports.
It is, therefore, argued that there are problems of inadequate effective competition in 
the market, highlighted by the presence of discriminatory and defensive market integration 
and coercive behaviour by operators, and that there are economic distortions caused by 
current pricing policies. These institutional shortcomings require significant adjustments and 
policy shifts. If there is to be growth in the maritime sector and economic development, 
which requires a stable, reliable, regular, and efficient low cost shipping service to all parts of 
the country's coastal communities, these issues have to be addressed. This is vital because
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efficient transportation supports the foundation of regional socio-economic development by 
providing smooth linkages between spatially separated locations.
Policy Implications
In the maritime sector, there is no tendency towards 'full' deregulation, but there can 
be seen to be a tendency towards effective competition within a framework of a mixed 
marriage between competition and regulation, where such effective competition as can be 
permitted, consistent with efficiency, can contribute to improved performance. Thus, there 
needs to be an optimal degree of regulation.
Secondly, there needs to be a careful re-examination of pricing policies and 
institutional arrangements. The goals of an efficient pricing policy ought to be:
i) to maximise revenue; and
ii) to maximise growth of the industry.
This means capacity utilisation, investment and growth should be at their social 
optimum and optimum pricing policy should maximise capacity use or minimise costs, and 
encourage competition.
Simplified administration and documentation can also save time and costs to 
operators. It is important that operators are provided with such streamlined facilities
New innovations in ship or cargo handling equipment will improve efficiency and 
productivity of the maritime sector, and would probably reduce costs. Society's willingness 
to pay for these services would increase if rates and safety standards set by the government 
reflected this reduced transportation costs or pecuniary externalities, as well as achieving 
technical efficiencies reflected in lower unit costs. However, this depends crucially on the 
progress in removing economic distortions in order to facilitate low cost transport and 
encourage investment and growth.
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% OF PROVINCIAL POPULATIONS WITH ACCESS
Available Road Access AvaMable Port Access
Trunk Feeder None Mah Feeder Minor
Western 108,705 14 ------ W — r r 35
Gulf 68,122 23 22 56 21 20
Central 149384 46 26 26 7 12
NCD 195,382 100 100
Mine Bay 157,288 9 2 89 5 35 62
Northern 96,762 55 10 35 2 39
S. Highlands 302,977 41 56 3
Enga
W.Highlands
238.537 43 49 8
293,031 51 43 6
Simbu 183,801 40 55 5
E. Highlands 
Morooe
300,598 35 56 9
363,743 39 41 20 23 13 12
Madang 270,299 38 12 50 11 12 11
EastSepfc 248,308 39 35 25 11 4 8
West Sepi< 139,573 36 20 45 6 14
Manus 32,830 55 45 18 5 10
New Ireland 87,194 47 12 45 8 9 66
East New Britain 184,408 42 31 26 15 10 23
West New Britain 128,475 58 42 18 63
North Solomons 175,900 62 30 8 2 24 16
Papua New Guinea 3,716317 42 33 25 11 11 10
PROVINCE
-----------------% ÔÊ ^RöviNölÄL'PöPULÄtiöN^ WTfR ÄCCK3----------------------------------
Available CoastaVRrver Access Availalble Aerodrome(s) No Road Access













Western 14 39 11 37 11 24 46 14 26 59
Gulf 60 14 25 14 40 3 52
Central 47 1 52 13 22 18 7
NCD 100 100
Milne Bay 25 61 14 15 31 31 3 10 79
Northern 45 55 11 21 4 15 20











Simbu 100 6 1 10 12 5
E. Highlands 
Morobe
100 8 20 9
45 3 51 3 14 59 11 11 8
Madang 40 14 46 4 17 43 32 18
East Sepi< 19 9 72 1 5 27 1 16 10
West Sepk 23 1 77 24 73 16 43 2
Manus 81 19 5 45
New Ireland 61 39 2 12 27 45
East New Britain 82 2 16 7 14 11 15
West New Britain 83 17 8 16 31 5 37
North Solomons 72 4 24 2 7 1 3 6
Papua New Guinea 32 2 6 60 8 11 26 7 12 14
Source: 1980.1990 Population Census; DoT Estimates
Table A-?
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORT
EMPLOYMENT IN THE TRANSPORT SECTOR
A ESTABLISHMENTS AND EMPLOYEES IN THE TRANSPORT INDUSTRY
Year Numiber of Establishments
Encfng Land Water Air Allied Transport
Dec Transpo Transpo Transpo Services & Storage
1987 109 144 87 27 367
1986 116 141 85 29 371
1985 120 145 85 27 377
1984 128 143 88 32 391
1983 132 160 88 37 417
Number of Employees
Land Water Air Allied Transpor
Transpo Transpo Transpo Services & Storage
2217 2375 2805 574 7971
2305 2514 2738 390 7947
2277 2384 2725 550 7936
2216 2940 2730 617 8503
2651 3801 2690 626 9768
Percentage of PNG Citizen Employees
Land Water Air Allied Transpor
Transpo Transpo Transpo Services & Storage
91.1 94.4 78.6 89.0 87.5
93.1 945 77.9 84.4 87.8
92.7 93.4 795 83.1 87.8
92.8 92.2 78.9 89.5 87.9
93.4 94.1 78.0 88.0 89.1











1987 2019 2242 2204 511 8976
1986 2147 2368 2132 329 8976
1985 2110 2227 2174 457 8968
1984 2056 2712 2153 552 7473
1983 2475 3577 2097 551 8700
Percentage of Female Employees
Land Water Air Allied Transpor
Transpo Transpo Transpo Services & Storage
8.9 7.3 16.9 18.6 12.0
9.2 6.6 16.6 27.4 11.8
9.0 6.6 18.0 22.7 12.3
8.3 5.6 20.6 15.1 11.8
8.2 45 19.3 17.7 10.4











1987 197 174 475 107 953
1986 212 166 454 107 939
1985 206 157 490 125 978
1984 183 164 563 93 1003
1983 218 170 520 111 1019
Source: NSO, Annual Census of Employment
Notes: (1) AWed services includes storage, freight forwarding, travel agencies etc
TAFT,F A - 3
TRANSPORT YEARBOOK 1990
T (Contd)
EMPLOYMENT IN THE TRANSPORT SECTOR
ft EMPLOYMENT IN TRANSPORT AND C. NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES IN TRANSPORT 
STORAGE BY PROVINCE________  AND RELATED OCCUPATIONS
ProMnoe Numbers Employed
1987 1986 1985 1984 1983
Western 62 74 66 78 131
Gulf 6 5 5 4 9
Cental 13 15 15 20 14
NCD 3190 3019 3063 3489 3958
MtoeBay 124 70 75 79 91
Northern 52 98 108 103 102
S. highlands 26 24 22 22 27
Enga 14 16 15 19 148
W. highlands 329 406 378 341 478
Simbu 18 17 20 24 33
E. Highlands 733 657 678 516 452
Morobe 1349 1221 1341 1362 1406
Madang 390 390 404 389 535
EastSepik 122 129 152 154 202
West S ep* 33 29 29 25 34
Manus 40 42 42 40 41
New Ireland 68 63 74 87 93
E. New Britai 619 814 671 854 1330
W. New Britai 300 395 331 287 319
N. Solomons 393 463 450 697 364
Southern 3447 3281 3331 3773 4305
Highlands 1120 1120 1111 922 1136
Momase 1894 1769 1926 1930 2177
Islands 1420 1777 1568 1965 2147
TOTAL 7881 7947 7936 8590 9765
SectonOocupaton | 1987 | 1966 | 1986 | 1984 | 1963












































































Sector Wholesale and Retail Trade
























A l Transport Related Sectors






















EMPLOYEE EARNINGS IN THE TRANSPORT SECTOR
A SALARIES, WAGES AND EMPLOYER CONTRIBUTION
NOMINAL KINA (MILLIONS)________________________ CONSTANT KINA (1990), MILLIONS
Year



















1967 9.86 13.52 27.92 290 54.19 1095 14.90 30.77 3.19 59.71
1966 9.21 12.54 25.83 291 49.99 10.49 14.28 29.52 263 56.91
1965 9.03 11.91 21.15 396 45.67 1034 14.30 25.40 4.30 54.84
1964 8.49 14.22 19.75 2.63 45.09 10.S7 17.70 24.59 327 56.13
1963 10.20 13.62 18.68 2.60 45.11 13.64 1822 24.99 3.48 60.34
Year





















1967 4.443 5,691 9,954 5,049 6,798 4,896 6,272 10,969 5,564 7,491
1966 3,996 4,968 9,470 5,923 6,290 4,549 5,679 10,782 6,743 7,161
1965 3,964 4,996 7,763 6,511 5,755 4,760 5,999 9,321 7,818 6,910
1964 3,831 4,636 7,235 4,259 5,303 4,769 6,021 9,006 5,302 6,601
1963 3,847 3,584 6,946 4,160 4,618 5,146 4,794 9,291 5,564 6,177
C. SALARIES AND WAGES PAID IN TRANSPORT AND RELATED OCCUPATIONS
NOMINAL KINA (MB.LIONS)________________________CONSTANT KINA (1990), MILLIONS
-------------------1 1967 1966 1965 1964 1963 1967 1966 1965 1964 I 1983
Sector Transport Communication and Storage
Land Transport 9,850 9,213 9,046 8,490 10,196 11,606 11,215 11,614 11,301 14,587
Water Transport 13,517 12544 11,911 14,219 13,623 15,927 15,270 15,292 18,927 19,485
Air Transport 27,920 25,925 21,153 19,751 18,684 32,899 31,559 27,158 26,291 26,724
Afied Servioes 2896 2309 3,581 2.628 2,604 3.415 2,811 4,598 3,498 3,725
Sector Total 73,510 69,966 64,678 61,668 60,447 86,619 85,159 83,039 82,088 86,459
Transport % 73.7 71.5 70.6 73.1 74.6 73.7 71.5 70.6 73.1 74.6
Sector Construction
Const. Other 8.784 9,278 8,277 11,385 52247 10,350 11,294 10,627 15,155 74,730
Sector Total 38,681 41,829 45,419 43,073 107,257 45,579 50,919 58,313 57,335 153,427
Transport % 22.7 222 18.2 26.4 48.7 22.7 22.2 18.2 26.4 48.7
Sector: Manufacturing
Transport Equip.
and Other 5,276 3,758 3,615 4,531 3,310 6,217 4,575 4,641 6,031 4,734
Sector Total 64,591 57.347 57,112 56,490 46,266 76,109 89,810 73,325 75,195 66,176
Transport % 82 6.6 6.3 8.0 72 82 6.6 6.3 8.0 7J2
Sector: Wholesale and Retail Trade
Vehicle Sale & Re 21.772 18,683 18,320 15,843 16,151 25,654 22.987 23,521 21,089 23,101
Petrol Sale 2902 2356 2582 2,035 1,706 3,419 2,868 3,315 2.709 2440
Sector Total 126,420 117,686 114,172 114,606 119,377 148,964 143,261 146,584 152,555 170,749
Transport % 19.5 18.0 18.3 15.6 15.0 19.5 18.0 18.3 15.6 15.0
All Transport Related Occupations
Total Transport 92919 84.266 78,485 78,882 118,523 109,489 102,579 100,766 105.002 169,527
Total Woridorce 605.140 572,336 541,068 495,138 52^ u l6 713,051 696,716 694,695 659.089 751,805
Transport % 154 14.7 14.5 15.9 22.5 15.4 14.7 14.5 15.9 22.5
Source: NSO. Annual Census ot Enrpbyment Note: CPI adjusted, all groups, weighted urban average
r:;.p'£  à- !<
TRANSPORT YEARBOOK 1990 X
. Sf.  ̂ *
.  -  i
TRANSPORT SECTOR CONTRIBUTION TO GDP











































































1990 3058.6 27.8 385 78.9 85 1535 5.0
1989 31765 23.2 319 65.9 6.8 127.9 4.0
1988 3224.0 22.8 315 64.6 6.7 125.4 39
1987 31315 22.3 30.6 63.2 6.6 122.7 3.9
1986 3046.4 21.1 28.7 59.3 5.3 114.4 3.8
1985 ERR
1984




Source: NSO Gross Domestic product and Expenditure, 1986-1990 
NSO Annual Census of Employment
Table A-5
COASTAL CARGO HANDLED OVER
PNG HARBOURS BOARD WHARVES, 1981-1988
R E V E N U E  T O N N E S  (’0 0 0 s )
1981 1982 1983 1 9 8 4 1985 Í 1986 1987 1988
L O A D E D
D A R U 2 5 2 2 3 1 3 1
P O R T  M O R E S B Y 4 5 163 2 2 7 180 142 206 2 2 7 156
A L O T A U 2 2 2 2 6 6 6 7
S A M A R A I 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
O R O  B A Y 4 5 4 8 7 7 7 8
L A E 1 0 4 100 100 1 3 7 142 139 161 184
M A D A N G 11 5 6 7 6 9 9 6
W E W A K 12 11 11 14 13 13 13 13
V A N IM O 4 4 4 6 6 5 8 8
A IT A P E 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
K IM B E 7 8 5 8 10 10 11 11
R A B A U L 7 8 12 11 12 11 13 13
K A V ff iN G 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 3
L O R E N G A U 2 2 1 1 2 3 3 3
K IE T A 13 15 18 2 6 24 19 18 25
B U K A 9 9 10 13 17 14 14 11
S U B T O T A L 2 2 5 339 406 4 1 8 393 4 4 6 496 450
D IS C H A R G E D
D A R U 11 10 11 10 9 13 10 12
P O R T  M O R E S B Y 36 48 5 7 7 9 79 86 105 108
A L O T A U 1 4 14 15 2 0 21 21 28 23
S A M A R A I 3 2 1 1 1 0 0 o|
O R O  B A Y 16 13 18 28 25 24 31 30  !
L A E 32 38 33 3 7 51 56 65 70 ;
M A D A N G 12 15 12 14 18 20 17 12 i
W E W A K 26 24 25 2 2 28 28 28 26
V A N IM O 11 7 10 15 14 17 18 18
A IT A P E 1 1 1 2 3 3 3 3
K IM B E 3 0 45 47 6 6 74 66 69 69
R A B A U L 20 17 2 0 3 2 41 3 5 34 32
K A V T E N G 9 10 9 11 13 13 15 20
L O R E N G A U 10 11 11 13 14 12 16 19
K IE T A 39 33 40 55 50 49 53 54
B U K A 7 7 8 11 11 12 9 7
S U B T O T A L 2 7 7 295 318 4 1 6 4 5 2 455 501 503
T O T A L 5 0 2 634 724 8 3 4 845 901 997 953
S o u r c e; P N G  H a r b o u r s  B o a r d  A n n u a l R ep o rts?  A P B  2 n d  P o rt  S tu d y  ( 17 ?  7^)
T a b l e  A - 6 a
B. CARGO DISCHARGED BY COMMODITY (1989)
P O R T /






In ed ib le
F u e ls C h em ical
P rod u cts








V eh ic les
(1 )
TO TA L
D A R U 3 097 1 7 2 7 849 0 4  719 351 1951 513 654 51 13 912
K IU N G A 22 440 3 1 7 7 7 1 3 0 0 106 589 15 513 36 975 6 508 3 142 539 2 0 2 0 1 3
B A IM U R U 470 86 64 0 760 67 576 511 112 5 2 651
K E R E M A 1 9 4 2 719 340 0 2 051 158 1 4 3 2 170 144 41 6 997
P O R T  M O R E S B Y 27 918 7 539 16 342 15 9 700 7 7 0 9 18 776 10 144 59 201 1 2 5 7 158 601
A L O T A U 8 749 2 7 8 3 1 0 6 7 0 2 6 0 6 1 4 0 1 5 980 1 3 5 1 1 1 3 6 262 25 335
M ISE M A 271 137 112 1 24 864 1 197 789 741 40 41 28 193
O R O B A Y 8 1 8 6 3 264 546 0 1 0 1 6 5 1 5 8 3 6 671 972 917 299 32  603
L A E 18 080 1 1 0 7 0 19 605 103 586 2 9 4 6 23 334 1 1 3 0 5 35 790 2 897 125 716
F IN S C H H A F E N 395 270 244 0 874 220 3 045 137 345 87 5  617
M A D A N G 5 262 3 332 5 1 7 6 1 6 937 1 1% 7 828 870 4 935 98 35  637
W E W A K 5 6 5 6 5 524 2 202 2 8 1 4 9 764 7 448 1 2 5 7 1 7 0 6 264 32 972
V A N 1 M O 2 9 9 9 1 0 3 4 474 0 7 1 1 9 456 4 049 2 1 6 1 316 197 18 805
A IT  A P E 739 320 183 0 699 72 831 266 95 11 3 216
K C M BE 5 7 9 0 6 094 15 061 0 2 252 1 2 5 6 9 990 2 225 1 8 8 9 306 44 863
B L A L L A 1 7 5 5 899 2 925 0 1 5 7 9 228 1 2 5 7 388 88 24 9 143
R A B U A L 16 587 1 4 6 4 5 16 499 63 2  283 1931 11 401 4 287 1 1 2 2 6 691 78 613
K A N D R IA N 221 24 90 0 501 90 373 43 25 15 1 3 8 2
K A V IE N G 4 1 9 4 3 254 801 1 1 1 7 9 1 4 0 5 5 525 1 0 8 5 1 3 0 8 214 18 966
L O R E N G A U 3 571 1 5 4 1 904 0 3 784 727 7 097 789 727 102 19 242
L TH IR 48 33 94 0 350 207 311 264 14 6 1 3 2 7
K IE T A 10 967 8 888 3 473 3 422 1 6 9 8 10 851 1 0 1 5 10 090 239 47 666
B U K A 1 0 4 2 326
t
124 0 658 219 861 58 129 13 3 430
S U B T O T A L 150399 76 686 94 305 189 197 826 4 1 3 9 6 167 351 47 060 1 3 4 0 2 9 7 659 916 900
T a b l e  A - 6 b
J*. ■ -r . r / '  ( c o n t ’d )
C O A S TA L A R E A :
W E S T E R N -C O A S T 1 7 5 1 158 318 14 3 924 467 1 343 470 317 13 8 775
W E S T E R N -R IV E R 229 21 0 0 1 129 60 342 27 71 0 1 8 7 9
G U L F 1 1 8 9 198 113 0 2  511 215 2 684 1 3 8 6 468 12 8 776
C E N T R A L 197 4 457 0 1 178 179 790 749 168 15 3 737
M IL N E  B A Y -N .C O A S T 696 151 62 0 1 6 0 7 74 718 60 55 0 3 423
M IL N E  B A Y -S .C O A S T 0 0 196 0 188 120 283 12 2 4 805
M IL N E  B A Y  IS L A N D S 333 32 76 0 834 14 303 49 25 6 1 6 7 2
O R O  C O A S T 9 0 87 0 200 20 179 242 2 4 743
M O R O B E  C O A S T 188 77 65 0 612 25 1 057 47 174 18 2 263
H U O N 201 260 211 0 230 88 1 987 177 185 26 3 365
M A D A N G  C O A S T 3 13 5 0 815 1 133 10 128 14 1 122
E A S T  S E F K -C O  A S T A L 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
S E P IK -IN L A N D 26 4 253 0 760 210 1 302 62 311 0 2 9 2 8
W E S T  S E P IK -C O  A S T A L 119 0 75 0 140 18 139 11 0 2 504
M A N U S 53 10 147 0 743 7 202 90 16 11 1 2 7 9
N E W  IR E L A N D -S O U T H 371 169 260 0 1 4 0 6 561 2 767 1 4 6 9 193 6 0 7 256
N E W  IR E L A N D -N O R T H 151 9 28 0 2 579 89 650 645 226 2 0 4 397
S jC O A S T  N E W  B R IT A IN 198 134 141 0 1 7 9 5 137 1 805 354 334 14 4 912
N .C O A C T  N E W  B R IT A IN 283 54 131 2 6 2 7 9 58 505 828 57 7 8 2 0 4
N O R T H  S O L O M O N S 59 16 1 3 7 9 0 148 374 374 12 53 6 2 421
S U B T O T A L 6 056 1 3 1 0 4 0 0 4 16 27 078 2 717 17 563 6 7 0 0 2  785 2 3 2 68 461
T O T A L  D IS C H A R G E D 1 5 6 4 5 5 77 996 98 309 205 2 2 4 9 0 4 4 4 1 1 3 184 914 53 760 136 814 7 891 985  361
N o t e  (1 ) v e h ic le s  n o m in a lly  1 r e v e n u e  to n n e  e a c h
S d iftis ITU r a n a ly s is  o f  ca rg n  m a n ife r tfi
*
T a b l e  A-6c
A. CARGO LOADED BY COMMODITY (1989)
P O R T /
C O A S T A L  A R E A
F ood T obacco/
B creragcs
P rim ary/
A g r ic o lt
C ru d e
In e d ib le
F a d s C h em ica l
P ro d u cts







M a n a t
A r tic le s
V eh ic les
a >
T O T A L
D A R U 121 1 123 2 47 5 57 73 4 1 9 8 9 4 636
K IU N G A 2  870 0 2  532 0 5 276 4 370 3 283 2  314 8 8% 51 29 592
B A IM U R U 28 0 954 0 15 14 21 12 697 1 1 742
K E R E M A 9 2 182 0 30 7 18 27 1 7 0 3 10 1 9 8 8
P O R T  M O R E S B Y 57 567 26 913 1 0 7 6 7 79 1 2 6 1 1 7 2 2 1 3 0 77 910 21 405 13 0 2 0 3 086 358  994
A L O T A U 162 42 626 0 6 6 31 261 2 3 4 6 23 3 5 0 3
M 1 S IM A 0 27 0 0 0 27 170 438 196 145 1 0 0 3
O R O  B A Y 59 69 3 8 4 0 0 201 24 352 550 5 6 4 6 119 10 860
L A E 80 573 4 0 0 0 9 20  204 78 63 967 11 249 75 218 13 810 37  052 1 6 7 5 343  835
F IN S C H H A F E N 17 0 283 0 1 3 188 59 1 3 8 9 29 1 % 9
M A D A N G 4 235 3 847 2 1 7 2 1 10 793 492 3 932 715 2  353 206 28 746
W E W A K 1 5 4 9 179 3 9 7 2 2 56 186 686 199 3 546 115 10 490
V A N IM O 98 10 4 5 0 7 0 12 5 142 365 2 1 3 2 70 7  341
A IT  A P E 0 23 272 0 3 2 42 61 238 0 641
fQ M B E 38 19 4  201 4 259 38 466 628 6 6 0 5 183 12 441
B IA L L A 3 0 14 713 0 65 5 30 102 500 30 15 448
R A B U A L 5 007 3 170 7 374 16 17 351 5 024 17 871 4  370 14 990 762 75  935
K A N D R IA N 1 0 237 0 0 0 74 5 145 4 466
K A V IE N G 43 6 1 6 0 1 0 86 50 232 250 2  222 45 4  535
L O R E N G A U 745 15 1 2 7 5 0 34 21 121 161 3 159 35 5 5 6 6
U H I R 0 1 1 0 1 4 162 653 46 20 888
K 3E T A 2 935 3 643 3 956 1 94 409 2 802 1 8 6 2 20  448 1 167 37  317
B U K A 33 5 4  637 0 0 0 33 2 536 5 5 251
S U B T O T A L 156 093 77 981 88 429 183 2 2 4 4 1 4 44 071 183841 48 322 1 3 2 0 6 3 7 790 % 3 187
%
T a b l 'ö  6 -  6 d
¿ L i Z — .7  ¿ - s  ( c o n t ’ d )
-COASTAL AREA:
WESTERN-COAST 10 0 13 0 31 11 2 21 131 0 219
WESTERN-RIVER 7 0 16 4 1 0 9 1 87 0 125
GULF 14 1 202 0 181 1 158 390 942 5 1894
CENTRAL 0 0 1 0 1 5 2 0 116 1 126
MILNE BAY-N.COAST 52 0 29 4 8 4 60 1 999 799 0 2 955
MILNE BAY-S.COAST 0 0 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 102
MILNE BAY ISLANDS 2 0 118 0 32 1 4 0 30 0 187
ORO COAST 0 0 12 0 0 0 0 0 115 0 127
MOROBE COAST 61 3 378 0 3 0 63 15 213 15 751
HUON 26 0 610 14 0 3 50 134 215 15 1067
MADANG COAST 0 0 1038 0 0 0 3 18 29 1 1089
EAST SEPIK-CO ASTAL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
SEPIK-INLAND 0 0 79 0 0 0 2 66 320 2 469
WEST SEPIK-CO ASTAL 0 0 31 0 0 0 0 0 88 0 119
MANUS 2 0 27 0 53 0 2 66 458 4 612
NEW IRELAND-SOUTH 9 1 2589 0 29 13 383 1621 362 32 5 039
NEW IRELAND-NORTH 0 0 706 0 22 3 22 614 85 7 1459
SJOOASY NEW BRITAIN 175 10 1894 0 0 0 36 184 286 10 2 595
N.COAST NEW BRITAIN 0 0 1371 0 166 0 237 293 290 4 2 361
NORTH SOLOMONS 4 0 664 0 0 2 5 15 169 3 862
SUBTOTAL 362 15 9 878 22 527 43 1038 5 437 4 735 101 22158
TOTAL DISCHARGED 156455 77 996 98 307 205 224941 44114 184 879 ' 53 759 136 798 7 891 985 345
Notes (1) vehicles nominally 1 revenue tonne each
Sonnets i:e j r analysis of cargo manifftrta
T a b l e  A - 6 e
1 9 8 9  C H A R G E  O F  C O A S T A L  C A R G O  L O A D E D  B Y  C O M M O D I T Y  ( i n  K i n a )
P O R T F ood T ob acco /
B ev era g es
P rim a ry /
A g r ic o li.
C rude
In e d ib le
F u e ls C h em ica l
P ro d u cts
M a n o f.




V e h ic le s
a)
M ise .
M an u f.
A rtic les
ALOTAU 5  985 628 7  560 145 196 1 284 10 4 0 5 8 820 47  960
AITAPE 0 712 7  874 - 101 34 1 237 2  047 - 7 1 5 1
BIALA 105 - 1 6 2 9 0 2 - 2  531 151 852 3 033 6  167 13 685
BUKA 910 172 9 0  251 - 238 80 957 48 2  065 12 584
DARU 19 633 10 4 0 7 6 12 2 760 127 1 8 2 7 2  638 2 7 0 5 133 675
KAVIENG 856 218 1 1 3 2 4 - 2  253 1 4 5 0 3 666 8 257 1 1 6 7 4 6 0  278
Ü ET A 7 0 1 9 3 1 0 6 8 0 1 4 1 2 1 6 37 3 135 8 440 95  899 6 2  611 326  599 4 3 9  257
K3MBE 1 1 5 4 515 1 2 7 9 7 3 99 7  178 1 2 8 1 15 873 12 503 37  918 134 762
LAE 3 042 592 2 5 3 5  019 1 4 0 0  011 3 876 1 4 9 3  468 819 095 4 6 8 8  006 1 0 3 7  183 1 4 0 8  210 2 226 001
LORENGAU 3 731 1 1 4 2 2 7 1 3 5 - 487 672 3 237 3 052 5 1 4 4 75 571
MADANG 1 8 4 1 6 1 1 9 2 9 5 9 66 347 26 337  681 18 618 148 726 29 446 56 348 63 665
ORO BAY 1 6 3 0 2 0 1 7 1 0 5 6 5 5 - 5 0 4 6 228 5 822 19 539 28 045 70  216
POM 1 7 1 1 1 5 4 9 3 7  878 1 7 1 5  098 3 598 1 311 991 3 0 2 7 5 2 1 6 6 0  722 498 258 661 089 346  152
RABAUL 1 8 7 8 7 7 76 963 1 5 2 6 5 4 429 503 286 165 845 548  323 135 556 2 2 0 8 2 1 323  885
SAMARAI 8 189 - - 201 - - 1 209 49 508 - 113
VANIMO 9 0 5 8 420 289 007 - 1 0 9 0 546 9 922 24 015 3 7  411 119 175
WEWAK 47 836 6  295 1 3 2 7 3 6 81 1 7 7 6 6 456 25 428
_____ 1
6 9 0 9 48 984 109 926
Source: TES Data Bank at
T a b l e  A - 7
1 9 8 9  C H A R G E  O F  C O A S T A L  C A R G O  D I S C H A R G E D  B Y  C O M M O D I T Y  ( i n  K i n a )
P O R T F ood T ob acco /
B ev era g es
P rim ary/
A g r ìco li.
G rade
In ed ib le
F u e ls C h em ica l






V e h ic le s
(1 )
M ise .
M an a li
A rtic les
A L O T A U 220  377 80  508 29 547 92  212 4 1 5 9 9 163 214 39 359 108 583 27 636
A IT A P E 3 0 1 8 4 1 1 9 1 5 6  013 - 19 615 2  225 30  568 80  027 4  683 2 818
B IA L A 63 903 26 754 32  881 - 44 822 9 773 50  854 9 626 7 8 0 0 2 2 0 9
B U K A 3 4 1 0 2 9 886 2 4 2 4 - 23 648 6 198 24 363 1 2 2 5 3  321 3 1 4 8
D A R U 153 047 64  735 32  772 - 2 7 1 1 5 8 15 807 79 278 19 447 2 0  620 23 934
K A V 1E N G 149 394 1 0 7 1 6 6 22  712 26 37 797 47 955 1 7 5 6 0 6 34  817 6 1 1 4 6 31 836
K 3E T A 451 933 2 5 4 6 8 3 110 141 199 7  788 6 0 8 0 8 272  758 6 1 7 0 0 3 0  009 71 892
K IM B E 1 9 2 6 2 9 153 391 1 6 3 1 6 4 11 89 433 48 855 255 207 88 970 93 851 37  537
L A E 6 5 5 9 0 5 4 0 5 1 2 2 6 2 0 4 6 9 3 690 22 464 1 1 1 4 1 5 887  031 383 323 6 6 5  152 939 748
L O R E N G A U 136 186 53 434 26 504 - 1 2 0 1 1 9 28 102 245 389 27  569 32  079 23 428
M A D A N G 1 4 1 6 4 5 90  371 1 8 5 3 5 5 20 29 820 29 405 171 995 2 1 8 4 6 28 017 108 950
O R O  B A Y 1 7 9 9 6 7 99 585 13 509 - 2 8 2 0 4 2 60  815 204 997 28 004 57 539 2 1 2 0 2
P O M 9 1 2 2 6 5 233  055 3 9 0 8 7 0 484 29 486 1 2 1 1 2 3 5 2 7 2 6 9 285 601 458  051 1 374 434
R A B A U L 675  269 433  626 3 5 0 7 1 2 1 3 3 7 4 5 8 0 2 76 052 458 990 129 464 276  786 305 563
S A M A R A I 12 461 3 310 563 - 21 519 624 5 659 437 _ 857
V A N IM O 1 2 5 6 8 2 42 316 18 871 - 3 0 1 7 0 18 403 148 405 37 597 42  599 9 985
W E W A K 2 6 0 1 0 4 202  877 137 165 38 49 023 30  647 2 7 0 0 2 0 59 037 105 928 41 683




Table B.1.1 Operating Cost: 2,500 dwt Vessel - Main Port to Main Port (continued)
—6-5% LP90 PggtQf-----  —50% Load Factor 35% Load Factor
Kin* per Kin* per Kin* per Kina per Kina per Kina per
Y w  NeullCll Mil# Year Nautical Mile Year Nautical Mile
Amortisation of 
capital cost less 
residual value over 
ship life
465328 11.71 465328 11.71 465328 11.71
Maintenance costs.
routine 120000 3.02 120000 3.02 120000 3.02
annual 360000 9.06 360000 9.06 360000 9.06
Fuel 171019 4.30 171019 4.30 171019 4.30
Crew:
wages 109150 2.75 109150 2.75 109150 2.75
victuals 32850 0.83 32850 0.83 32850 0.83
Insurance 150000 3.77 150000 3.77 150000 3.77
Sub-total 35.43 35.43 35.43
Cargo handling costs 466336 11.73 358720 9.02 251104 6.32
Overheads 284552 7.16 254274 6.40 223630 5.63
Other annual costs 5038 0.13 5038 0.13 5038 0.13
Port costs 65043 1.64 65043 1.64 65043 1.64 -
TOTAL 2229316 56.09 (30.28) 2091422 52.62 (28.41) 1953163 49.14 (26.53
Cost per cubic metre per nautical mile (kina)
including cargo handling costs 0.0227 (0.0123) 0.0277 (0.0150) 0.0369 (0.01 S
excluding cargo handling costs 0.0180 (0.0097) 0.0229 (0.0124) 0.0322 (0.017
N ote: F igures in b rackets  sho w  costs in kina per kilom etre.
' a b l e  3 - 1
Wilbur Smith Associates
FINAL CALCULATIONS
Tabi« B. .2 Operating Cost: 300-500 dwt Vssssl - Papuan Coast (continusd)
—s.5% Load Factor 50% Load Factor 35% Load Factor
Kina par Kina par Kina par Kina par Kina par Kina par
illl—  MimiCll Mil« Y»tr Nautical Mila Yaar Nautical Mile
Amortisation of 
capital cost less 
residual value over 
ship life
85310 2.43 85310 2.43 85310 2.43
Maintenance costs:
routine 22000 0.63 22000 0.63 22000 0.63
annual 66000 1.88 66000 1.88 66000 1.88
Fuel 192945 5.51 192945 5.51 192945 5.51
Crew:
wages 63581 1.81 63581 1.81 63581 1.81
victuals 17520 0.50 17520 0.50 17520 0.50
Insurance 27500 0.78 27500 0.78 27500 0.78
Sub-total 13.55 13.55 13.55
Cargo handling costs 96642 2.76 74340 2.12 52038 1.49
Overheads 76830 2.19 70480 2.01 64204 1.83
Other annual costs 2345 0.07 2345 0.07 2345 0.07
Port costs 18138 0.52 18138 0.52 18138 0.52 .
TOTAL 668812 19.09 (10.31) 640159 18.27 (9.86) 611581 17.45 (9.42)
Cost per cubic metre per nautical mile (kina)
including cargo handling costs 0.0816 (0.0440) 0.1015 (0.0548) 0.1385 (0.0748)
excluding cargo handling costs 0.0698 (0.0377) 0.0897 (0.0484) 0.1267 (0.0684)
Note: F igures in brackets  show  costs  in kina per kilom etre.
T a b l e  3 - 2
Wilbur Smith Associates
FINAL CALCULATIONS
Table B 3 . ! Operating Cost: 300*500 dwt Vessel - Papuan Gulf (continued)
-■ 65% Load Factor___  50% Load Factor 35% Load Factor
Kina per Kina per Kina per Kina per Kina per Kina per
T i l l—  Miytlcet Mile Year Nautical Mile Year Nautical Mile
Amortisation of 93066 2.66 93066 2.66 93066 2.66
capital cost less 
residual value over 
ship life
Maintenance costs:
routine 24000 0.68 24000 0.68 24000 0.68
annual 72000 2.05 72000 2.05 72000 2.05
Fuel 165837 4.73 165837 4.73 165837 4.73
Crew:
wages 89389 2.55 69389 2.55 89389 2.55
victuals 26280 0.75 26280 0.75 26280 0.75
Insurance 30000 0.86 30000 0.86 30000 0.86
Sub-total 14.29 14.29 14.29
Cargo handling costs 142279 4.06 109445 3.12 76612 2.19
Overheads 93794 2.68 84308 2.41 74959 2.14
Other annual costs 2405 0.07 2405 0.07 2405 0.07 „
Port costs 19746 0:56 19746 0.56 19746 0.56
TOTAL 758796 21.66 (11.69) 71476 20.45 (11.04) 674293 19.24 (10.39)
Cost per cubic metre per nautical mile 
including cargo handling costs
(kina)
0.0629 (0.0339) 0.0772 (0.0417) 0.1037 (0.0560)
excluding cargo handling costs 0.0511 (0.0276) 0.0654 (0.0353) 0.0920 (0.0497)
N ote: F ig u res  in b rack e ts  sho w  costs  in kina p er kilom etre .
T a b l e  B - 3
Wilbur Smith Associates
FINAL CALCULATIONS
Tabla B 4 Oparating Coatí 1,000-1,500 dwt Vassal - North Coast (continuad)
65% Load Factor___ 5Q%Load Factor___ 35% Load Factor
Kina per Kina per Kina per Kina per Kina per Kina par
Year Mutílcil Mill Y llf Niutlcil Mil« Ytar Nautical Mile





routine 83500 1.91 83500 1.91 83500 1.91
annual 250500 5.72 250500 5.72 250500 5.72
Fuel 255133 5.82 255133 5.82 255133 5.82
Crew:
wages 109150 2.49 109150 2.49 109150 2.49
victuals 32850 0.75 32850 0.75 32850 0.75
Insurance 104375 2.38 104375 2.38 104375 2.38
Sub-total 26.47 26.47 26.47
Cargo handling costs 437574 9.99 336595 7.68 235616 5.38
Overheads 240390 5.49 211427 4.83 184728 4.22
Other annual costs 3296 0.08 3296 0.08 3296 0.08
Port costs 41200 0.94 41200 0.94 41200 0.94 -
TOTAL 1881759 42.96 (23.20) 1751818 40.00 (21.60) 1624140 37.08 (2002)
Cost per c u i ic metre per nautical mile (kina)
including cargo handling costs 0.0405 (0.0219) 0.0491 (0.0265) 0.0650 (0.0351)
excluding cargo handling costs 0.0311 (0.0168) 0.0396 (0.0214) 0.0556 (0.0300)
N o te : F ig u res  in b ra ck e ts  show  costs  in kina per kilom etre.
. T . a b l e  '
Wilbur Smith Associates
FINAL CALCULATIONS
Table BT 5 Operating Cost: 300 - 500 dwt Vessel - North Coast (continued)
Kina par Kina par Kina par Kina par Kina par Kina par
Year Nautical Mila Year Nautical Mila Year Nautical W
Amortisation of 
capital cost less 
residual value over 
ship life
98882 2.26 98882 2.26 98882 2.26
Maintenance costs:
routine 25500 0.58 25500 0.58 25500 0.58
annual 76500 1.75 76500 1.75 76500 1.75
Fuel 159458 3.64 159458 3.64 159458 3.64
Crew:
wages 83342 1.90 83342 1.90 83342 1.90
victuals 24090 0.55 24090 0.55 24090 0.55
Insurance 31875 0.73 31875 0.73 31875 0.73
Sub-total 11.41 11.41 11.41
Cargo handling costs 134225 3.06 103250 2.36 72275 1.65
Overheads 88195 2.01 80005 1.83 71815 1.64
Other annual costs 2660 0.06 2660 0.06 2660 0.06
Port costs -21189 0.48 21189 0.48 21189 0.48
TOTAL 745917 17.03 (9.20) 706752 16.14 (8.71) 667587 15.24
Cost per cubic metre per nautical mile (kina) 
including cargo handling costs 0.0524 (0.0283) 





N o te : F igures  in b rackets  sho w  costs  in kina p er kilom etre .
'^abïé- 3-5 ■’ "
Wilbur Smith Associates
FINAL CALCULATIONS
Tabla B .6 Operating Coat: 300 - 500 dwt Vassal - Island Sarvica (continuad)
65% Load Factor 50% Load Factor 35% Load Factor
Kina par Kina par Kina par Kina par Kina par Kina par
Y ts r .... Nautical Mila Year Nautical Mila ÏU I__ Nautical Mite
Amortisation of 
capital cost less 
residual value over 
ship life
77555 1.69 77555 1.69 77555 1.69
Maintenance costs:
routine 20000 0.43 20000 0.43 20000 0.43
annual 60000 1.30 60000 1.30 60000 1.30
Fuel 202512 4.40 202512 4.40 202512 4.40
Crew:
wages 89389 1.94 89389 1.94 89389 1.94
victuals 26280 0.57 26280 0.57 26280 0.57
Insurance 25000 0.54 25000 0.54 25000 0.54
Sub-total 10.89 10.89 10.89
Cargo handling costs 172575 3.75 132750 2.89 92925 2.02
Overheads 100552 2.19 89965 1.96 79435 1.73
Other annual costs 2358 0.05 2358 0.05 2358 0.05
Port costs 32705 0.71 32705 0.71 32705 0.71
TOTAL 808927 17.59 (9.50) 758515 16.49 (8.91) 708160 15.40 (
Cost per cubic metre per nautical mile (kina)
including cargo handling costs 0.0601 (0.0325) 0.0733 (0.0396) 0.0978 (0.0528)
excluding cargo handling costs 0.0473 (0.0255) 0.0605 (0.0327) 0.0849 (0.0459)
Note: F ig u res  in b rack e ts  sho w  costs  in kina per kilom etre.
T a b l e  3-tS
Wilbur Smith Associates
FINAL CALCULATIONS
T ab le  3 .7  Operating C o s t 100- 300 dwt Passenger Vessel - North Coast & Islands (continued)
Kina Per Passenger For Load Factor
Kina Per Year Kina Per Seat 65% 50% 35%
Amortisation of 
capital cost less 
residual value over 
ship life
147175 469 721 937 1339
Maintenance costs:
routine 30000 96 147 191 273
annual 60000 191 294 382 546
Fuel 186566 594 914 1188 1698
Crew:
wages 87770 280 430 559 799
victuals 26280 84 129 167 239
Insurance 37500 119 184 238 341
Sub-total 1832 2819 3664 5235
Overheads 300000 955 1470 1910 2730
Other annual costs 2343 7 11 15 21
Port costs 23635 75 116 151 215
TOTAL 901269 2870 4416 5741 8201
Cost per seat per nautical mile (kina) 0.0420 (0.0227)
C o s t  per passenger per nautical mile (kina) 0.0646 0.0840 0.1200
(0.0349) (0.0454) (0.0648)
N o te : F ig u re s  in b ra c k e ts  s h o w  c o s ts  In k in a  p e r  k ilo m etre .
T a b l e  3 - 7
Wilbur Smith Associates
Table BT8 Operating Coats for Workboats
BASIC PARAMETERS
15 Metre Workboat 15 Metre Workboat
Vessel Tvoe 10 Metre Workboat Coastal River
Assumed capital cost (kina) 45000 82500 82500
Assumed life (years) 20 20 20
Assumed residual value (%) 0 0 0
Assumed interest rate (%) 15 15 15
Carrying capacity (cubic metres) 
Assumed average load factor
20 65 35
(80% out and 10% in) 
(60% out and 10% in)
45
35 35
Number of trips per year 50 50 20
Assumed round trip distance (kms) 
Maintenance cost:
500 500 450
(2250 to 4450 kina) 
(4125 to 8250 kina)
3350
6000 6000
Fuel cost per trip (kina) 400 600 540
Crew cost per trip (kina) 163 200 500
Overhead cost (%) Not applicable 5 5
Registration, licence, maritime 
training levy, safety inspection
Not applicable 173 173
and survey and other costs (kina per year)
CALCULATIONS
10 Metre Workboat 15 Metre Workboat 15 Metre Workboat
Coastal Coastal River
Vessel Tvoe Klna/vr Kina/trio Kina/vr Kina/trio Kina/vr Kina/triD
Amortisation of capital cost less 
residual value over ship life
7023 141 12875 258 12875 644
Maintenance costs 3350 67 6000 120 6000 300
Fuel costs 20000 400 30000 600 10800 540
Crew costs 8150 163 1000 200 1000 500
Sub-total 38523 771 58875 1178 39675 1984
Overheads costs 0 0 2944 59 1984 99
Registration, licence, maritime 
training levy, safety inspection 
and survey and other costs
0 0 173 3 173 9
Total 38523 770 61992 1240 41832 2092
Cost per cubic metre of cargo \  42.80 27.25 85.37
carried per trip (kina) —
T a b l e  3 - 8



















(K /w ) ^  10% A io % REVENUE TO  OPERATOR 
(K)
PON-ALO 4,800 10,969 227 1.80 3,800 3230 2230 0.66 48688 38669 3750 33.75 4 1 2 5 411,338 370,204 452,471
2.77 2.29 0.50 767.60 634.59
3.69 322 0.35 1,461.00 1,27600
227 120 3230 0.66 569.27 451.40 411,338 370,204 452,471
277 6 2 9 0 5 0 9 o aœ 74657
3.69 322 0.35 1,71856 1,499.66
2.27 120 2230 0.65 80647 639.49 411,338 370,204 452,471
277 229 0 5 0 1279.37 1,058.00
3.69 322 0.35 2,43600 2,12600
POM-ORO 8,000 3230 2.27 120 3,800 0.65 237.48 188.31 41.00 3650 45.10 132,430 116187 146673
2.77 229 0 5 0 37672 311.44
3.69 322 0.35 71691 62660
227 120 3230 0 5 5 279100 144.00
277 229 0 5 0 443.00 36640
3.69 322 0.35 843.00 73600
227 120 2220 0.65 39600 31685
2.77 229 0 5 0 62600 519.00
3.69 322 0.35 1,19600 1,043.00
DOMESTIC SHIPPING SERVICES: COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
m a m  r u i  

















JK /m ) Y  io % ^ 1 0 %
f » _______ ___ _________
POM-LAE 11200 55,428 2 27 1.80 3300 3230 2280 0.65 5,705.00 4324.00 44.00 39.60
48.40 2,438,83208
277 2 2 9 0.50 9,051.00 7,482.00
■ • ; •
3.69 3.22 0.35 17224.00 15,030.00
&  :
227 130 3230 0.65 6,712.00 5322.00 &
2.77 2 2 9 0.50 10,648.00 8,191.00
- - 
■ ■ r
3.69 3 22 0.35 2028300 9 3 2 1 0 0
■ .#C- :
■ :
227 1.80 2280 0.65 9309.00 7340.00
' i&.' :
. ■ W
2.77 2 2 9 0.50 15,084.00 12/470.00
ÎÏ-- •
3.69 3 22 0.35 28,706.00 25,050.00
■ '■'■■■ ' . . • ' f e  -
• ' . .*Tv
■ . w
T
l a e -p o h 11200 85,827 227 1.80 3,800 0.65 8,834.00 7,005.00
3,77638480
277 2 2 9 0.50 14,014.00 11,586.00
$
3.69 3 2 2 0.35 26,670.00 2327300
c ;
f .
' 227 1.80 3230 0.65 1039300 8 2 4 1 8 0
2.77 2 2 9 0.50 16,487.00 13,630.00
fÿ
3.69 3 2 2 0.35 31,37600 27.380.00
227 1.80 2280 0.65 14,724.00 11,67580 ......... . — — .
2.77 2 2 9 0.50 23,357.00 19,310.00
3.69 32 2 0.35 44,449.00 38,788.00 _ j f  .»a— » *1
------------------. --------------------------- -----------— ------------------
T a b l e  C - 2
DOMESTIC SHIPPING SERVICES: COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 
Main Ports Trade
S E C T O R DIST.(NM)
TOTAL
CARGO
V /R T )
RATE 












|io% ^ 1 0 % REVENUE TO  OPERATOR<K>
POU-RAB 17,600 14,267 227 1.80 3,800 3£30 2,280 0.65 2,308.00 1,830.00 44.00 39.60 48.40 627,748.00 564,973.00 690,523.00
2.77 229 0.50 3,661.00 3,02600
3.69 322 0.35 6,967.00 6079.00
2.27 1.80 3,230 0.65 2,715.00 2,153.00
2.77 2.29 0.50 4,307.00 3,560.00
3.69 322 0.35 8,196.00 7,152.00
227 1.80 2280 0.65 3,846.00 3,050.00
2.77 229 0.50 6,101.00 6044.00
3.69 322 0.35 11,611.00 10,132.00
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REVENUE TO  
OPERATOR (K)
LAE-MAD 6,000 27,723 5 2 4 425 0.65 31,552.00 33.75 935,651.25
LAE-WWK 12,000 29,486 5 2 4 425 0.65 67,116.00 3620 1,088,033.40
LAE-AJT 15,000 2,262 5 24 425 0.65 6,436.00 39.60 89,572.20
LAE-VAN 18,000 14,488 5 2 4 425 0.65 49,466.00 39.60 573,724.80

















REVENUE TO  
OPERATOR <K)
RAB-KIM 10,000 6,983 601 383 0.65 16858.00 33.75 23567625
RAB-KAV 11,000 6,763 6.01 383 0.65 16,327.00 3690 249,554.70
RAB-LAE 25,000 9,131 601 383 0.65 55,109100 3690 336933.90

















REVENUE TO  
OPERATOR (K)
POM-DARU 14,000 13,861 6 2 9 451 0.65 41,637.00 39.83 552,014.33
POM-4ŒREMA 7,000 6948 6 2 9 451 0.65 10,43600 33E3 232,931.70
POM-OBO 21,000 1,847 6 2 9 451 0.65 8,322.00 50.63 93,504.38
POM -KIUNGA 28,000 201,223 6 2 9 451 0.65 1208,917.00 6120 12,314,847.60
POM-BAIMURU 8,750 2.644 6 2 9 451 0.65 4,964.00 33.53 88,65332
'able C - k .
T N T E R -T S B A N D  W O R K B O A T  C H A R T E R  R A T E S  ( 1 9 9 2 )
VESSEL ROUTE LENGTH RATE/DAY
(KTNA)
MV Boselewa. 350 .00
MV Yagelu 350 .00
MV Aron a Bosnia 8 days 480 .00
MV Bilivaso Bosnia. 8 days 300 .00
MV In am aria Misima 8 days 280 .00
MV Badua »1 ft 300 .00
MV Ronald .Tays Rabaraba 4 days 300 .00
MV Babini Samarai 4 days 295 .00
MV Try TT Esa'ala 4 days 295 .00
MV Kadewali Bolubolu 4 days 250 .00
MV Main All areas 450 .00
MV Nuwagala n 250 .00






Kiri wina/Woodlark 250 .00
MV Widi ft 250 .00
MV Ebesa tf 250 .00
MV Penu ft 250 .00
All trips are assumed to originate from Alot.au port. Trips from Alotau 
to Woodlark and/or Bosnia and return takes about 4 days. Trips to 
Normanby/Ferguson Islands takes about a day. However, going around 
the Normanby island takes  almost two days. On average it would cost  
about. 1000 kina or six (44 gallon) drums of fuel.
Passengers  fares ranges between 10 kina ($12) to places such as 
Salamo, Morima, Dogura. and Rabaraba; and 15 kina ($18) to Cape Vogel 
and OoodEnough; and to Wanigela is about 16 kina ($19).
The cost, of a. bag of copra is between 3 kina ($5) and 5 kina ($7).
The routes North East Coast covers Rabaraba to Oro Bay including Cape 
Vogel and Wanigela, and North Coast covers the East Cape to Rabaraba.
There are 26 ports of call between Alotau and Wanigela. This is an 
example of the m u lt i - s top  port inherent in the workboat industry.  
(Source: Workboat. Operators, Alotau, 1992).
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